Opinion
Case No. CV 15-8047-JFW (Ex)
10-04-2019
William D. PILGRIM, et al. v. GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS: None ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS: None
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS: None
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS: None
PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART GENERAL MOTORS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT [filed 8/26/19; Docket No. 53]
HONORABLE JOHN F. WALTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On August 26, 2019, Defendant General Motors LLC ("GM") filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint ("Motion"). On September 6, 2019, Plaintiffs Estate of William D. Pilgrim, Walter Goetzman, Chad Reese, Jerome E. Pederson, Ahmed J. Cannon, Michael Fernandez, Roy Haleen, Howard Kopel, Robert C. Murphy, Mike Peters, Marc Adams, Kaleb Isley, Kai Qian, Mark Rowe, Dallas Wicker, Miguel Quezada, Christopher Constantine, Bradley Grant, John Parsons, Robert L. Briggs, Robert Edgar, Roger L. Browning, Lyle Dunahoo, Aaron Clark, Alan Pelletier, Edwin William Krause, Frank Juzswik, S. Garrett Beck, David Sheldon, Jan Engwis, Adam Balducci, Alan Ferrer, Jared Kiley, Jeff Kolodzi, Derek Van Den Top, Morris Smith, Andres Frey, Shawn Bain, Jeffrey M. Millslagle, Robert Geiss, Lyle Barkley, Dennis Palmquist, Anthony Stack, Randy Standke, Tuan Bui, Mathew Evans, David Ward, David Penrod, Devry Davis, William Church, Edwin Rojas, Richard Jenkins, James Osheim, John Pendleton, Jack Woodall, John Lebar, and Benjamin Luke (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed their Opposition. On September 16, 2019, GM filed a Reply. Pursuant to Rule 78 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7-15, the Court found the matter appropriate for submission on the papers without oral argument. The matter was, therefore, removed from the Court's September 30, 2019 hearing calendar and the parties were given advance notice. After considering the moving, opposing, and reply papers, and the arguments therein, the Court rules as follows:
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Factual Background
In this putative class action, Plaintiffs are fifty-seven current or former owners or lessees of 2006-2013 Chevrolet Corvette Z06 and 2013 Chevrolet Corvette 427. Seventeen plaintiffs are citizens of California (collectively, the "California Plaintiffs"), and the remaining forty plaintiffs reside in twenty different states: Arizona, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin (collectively, the "Non-California Plaintiffs"). The former General Motors Corporation ("Old GM") manufactured the 2006-2009 model year Corvettes that are the subject of this action. Model year 2010 and later vehicles that are the subject of this action were manufactured by General Motors LLC ("GM").
The Non-California Plaintiffs do not allege any connection with the state of California.
Old GM is not a party to this action.
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the engines in their 2006-2013 Chevrolet Corvette Z06 and 2013 Corvette 427 have an unspecified defect that results in "excessive" or "early" wear of the engine's valve guides. Although Plaintiffs do not allege any specific design or manufacturing defect that causes the alleged excessive valve guide wear, they allege that this unspecified defect renders their vehicles' engines "susceptible to frequent mechanical failure." Of the fifty-seven Plaintiffs, only nineteen Plaintiffs allege that they have actually experienced any engine trouble and the remaining thirty-eight Plaintiffs do not allege any interference with the use or operation of their vehicles. Instead, ten Plaintiffs allege that they paid for valve guide repairs, eleven Plaintiffs claim that their valve guides were diagnosed as "out of specification" by unidentified mechanics without any allegation that they paid for repairs, nine Plaintiffs claim that their vehicles exhibit valve guide wear even though their vehicles were never inspected by a mechanic, and, as to the remaining eight Plaintiffs, there are no signs of any valve guide wear. Despite claiming that valve guide wear is a safety hazard that may cause fires and loss of steering or braking power, none of the Plaintiffs have experienced any safety hazard or suffered any injuries.
Plaintiffs allege in conclusory fashion that GM was aware of the purportedly excessive valve guide wear, and misrepresented "the characteristics, uses, benefits, and qualities" of Plaintiffs' vehicles. Plaintiffs do not allege that they saw or relied on any specific GM advertisement, statements, or other materials in making their purchasing decisions. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that GM advertised the vehicles as "being of the highest quality and durability."
B. Procedural Background
On October 14, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. On December 22, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. On January 25, 2016, pursuant to a stipulation, this Court entered an Order staying this action pending the Bankruptcy Court's final order on the Motion to Enforce, filed January 19, 2016 in Case No. 09-50026 (MG), In re Motors Liquidation Co. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), and any final appellate ruling sought by either side. On July 16, 2019, pursuant to a stipulation, the Court lifted the stay of this action. On July 26, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint against GM, alleging sixty claims for relief. Those sixty claims for relief can be divided into ten categories: (1) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA") ; (2) negligence ; (3) violation of the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA") ; (4) violation of the California Unfair Competition Law ("UCL") ; (5) fraud by concealment ; (6) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act ("Song-Beverly") ; (7) negligent failure to recall ; (8) violations of various state consumer protection statutes ; (9) breach of implied warranty ; and (10) implied warranty in tort. Plaintiffs seek to represent statewide classes of purchasers and lessees of 2006-2013 Chevrolet Corvette Z06 and 2013 Chevrolet Corvette 427 vehicles in California and twenty other states.
Claim 1, brought on behalf of all Plaintiffs.
Claim 2, brought on behalf of all Plaintiffs.
Claim 3, brought on behalf of California Plaintiffs.
Claim 4, brought on behalf of California Plaintiffs.
Claims 5 (CA), 9 (AL), 11 (AZ), 13 (FL), 16 (GA), 18 (IL), 20 (IN), 23 (KY), 25 (MD), 28 (MA), 31 (MI), 34 (MT), 37 (NJ), OH (40), 43 (PA), 46 (SD), 49 (TN), 51 (TX), 54 (UT), 57 (VA), and 60 (WI).
Claim 6, brought on behalf of California Plaintiffs.
Claim 7, brought on behalf of California Plaintiffs.
Claims 8 (AL), 10 (AZ), 12 (FL), 14 (GA), 15 (GA), 19 (IL), 22 (KY), 24 (MD), 27 (MA), 30 (MI), 33 (MT), 36 (NJ), 39 (OH), 42 (PA), 45 (SD), 48 (TN), 50 (TX), 53 (UT), 56 (VA), and 59 (WI).
Claims 21 (IN), 26 (MD), 29 (MA), 32 (MI), 35 (MT), 38 (NJ), 44 (PA), 47 (SD), 52 (TX), 55 (UT), and 58 (VA).
Claim 41, brought on behalf of the Ohio Plaintiffs.
II. Legal Standard
A. Rule 12(b)(2)
Whether a federal court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant turns on two independent considerations: whether an applicable state rule or statute permits service of process on the defendant, and whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process principles. See Pacific Atlantic Trading Co. v. M/V Main Express , 758 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1985).
California's long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the limits of constitutional due process. See Gordy v. Daily News, L.P. , 95 F.3d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1996) ; Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 410.10 ("A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States"). Consequently, when service of process has been effected under California law, the two prongs of the jurisdictional analysis collapse into one – whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant comports with due process. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. National Bank of Cooperatives , 103 F.3d 888, 893 (9th Cir. 1996) ; Aanestad v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , 521 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1974).
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause permits courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state that "maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). There are two recognized bases for personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants: (1) "general jurisdiction," which arises where the defendant's activities in the forum state are sufficiently "substantial" or "continuous and systematic" to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over him in all matters; and (2) "specific jurisdiction," which arises when a defendant's specific contacts with the forum have given rise to the claim in question. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408, 414-16, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). See Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross , 112 F.3d 1048, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 1997) ; Fields [ v. Sedgwick Associated Risks, Ltd.] , supra , 796 F.2d [299] at 301-02 [ (1986) ].
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. "A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only where there is either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’ " Summit Technology, Inc. v. High-Line Medical Instruments Co., Inc. , 922 F. Supp. 299, 304 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept. , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988) ). However, "[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "[F]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 1965.
In addition, Rule 9(b) provides: "In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake." Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) are designed "to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong." Neubronner v. Milken , 6 F.3d 666, 671 (9th Cir. 1993). In order to provide this required notice, "the complaint must specify such facts as the times, dates, places, and benefits received, and other details of the alleged fraudulent activity." Id. at 672. Further, "a pleader must identify the individual who made the alleged representation and the content of the alleged representation." Glen Holly Entertainment, Inc. v. Tektronix, Inc. , 100 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint and must construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g. , Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. , 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998). "However, a court need not accept as true unreasonable inferences, unwarranted deductions of fact, or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations." Summit Technology , 922 F. Supp. at 304 (citing Western Mining Council v. Watt , 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981) cert. denied , 454 U.S. 1031, 102 S.Ct. 567, 70 L.Ed.2d 474 (1981) ).
"Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co. , 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). However, a court may consider material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., id. ; Branch v. Tunnell , 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994).
Where a motion to dismiss is granted, a district court must decide whether to grant leave to amend. Generally, the Ninth Circuit has a liberal policy favoring amendments and, thus, leave to amend should be freely granted. See, e.g. , DeSoto v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. , 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). However, a Court does not need to grant leave to amend in cases where the Court determines that permitting a plaintiff to amend would be an exercise in futility. See, e.g. , Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery , 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Denial of leave to amend is not an abuse of discretion where the pleadings before the court demonstrate that further amendment would be futile.").
III. Discussion
A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over GM on the Claims of Non-California Plaintiffs.
In its Motion, GM moves to dismiss the claims brought by the forty Non-California Plaintiffs on the grounds that those Plaintiffs and their claims have no connection to California and, thus, under Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup. Ct. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017), this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over GM. In their Opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the holding in Bristol-Myers is inapplicable to this case because Bristol-Myers involved a state court mass tort case.
Under the Class Action Fairness Act, GM is treated as a citizen of both Delaware, under whose law it is organized, and Michigan, the location of its principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10). It is undisputed that this Court lacks general jurisdiction over GM. See Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 137, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2013) ; see also Gaines v. Gen. Motors, LLC , 2018 WL 3752336, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2018) (holding that it "would be futile" to argue that a federal district court in California could exercise general jurisdiction over GM). Thus, the only possible basis for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over GM is through an exercise of specific jurisdiction.
In Bristol-Myers , a group of plaintiffs, most of whom were not California residents, sued Bristol-Myers in California state court based on claims that the drug Plavix had damaged their health. Bristol-Myers, which was not a California citizen, argued that the state court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the non-Californians' claims. The Supreme Court agreed and held that the non-Californians' claims did not arise in California or out of any of Bristol-Myers' activities in California. In addition, the Supreme Court held that in order for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction, there must be an "affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum state." Bristol-Myers , 137 S.Ct. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown , 564 U.S. 915, 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) ). Thus, specific jurisdiction is limited to "adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction." Goodyear , 564 U.S. at 919, 131 S.Ct. 2846.
Plaintiff argues that Bristol-Myers does not apply because this case was filed in federal court and not state court. The Supreme Court in Bristol-Myers expressly stated that "since our decision concerns the due process limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State, we leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court." Bristol-Myers , 137 S.Ct. at 1783-84. Although the Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed this question, many district courts have and the "general consensus post- Bristol-Myers appears to be that ... its reasoning is applicable to federal courts sitting in diversity." In re Packaged Seafood Prod. Antitrust Litig. , 338 F.Supp. 3d 1118, 1172 (S.D. Cal. 2018) ; see also Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc. , 297 F.Supp. 3d 114, 125 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that courts often "appl[y] Fourteenth Amendment personal jurisdiction standards in Fifth Amendment cases," especially when the "federal court sits in diversity and assesses state law claims"); Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc. , 2017 WL 4224723, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017) (holding that in Bristol-Myers , one of the "interests at issue in determining if personal jurisdiction lay in California [was] the burden on the defendant," which includes "practical problems resulting from litigating in the forum" and "the more abstract matter of submitting to the coercive power of a State that may have little legitimate interest in the claims in question," but that "these concerns do not disappear because the case is removed" and "the substantive law of California applies"). Therefore, this Court concludes that Bristol-Myers applies to federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction and, thus, Bristol-Myers applies in this case.
Plaintiffs also argue that Bristol-Myers does not apply because this case is a class action, not a mass tort action. The Court disagrees. Whether an action is brought as a class action has no real effect on whether a defendant can challenge a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. See Alvarez v. NBTY, Inc. , 2017 WL 6059159, at *5 (S.D. Cal., Dec. 6, 2017) ("[I]t is well settled law that a defendant can challenge personal jurisdiction relating to each named plaintiff in a class action"); Am.'s Health & Resource Center, Ltd. v. Promologics, Inc. , 2018 WL 3474444, at *2 (N.D. Ill, July 19, 2018) (holding that the due process requirements are the same for class and non-class actions). In addition, the cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of their argument that Bristol-Myers does not apply to class actions actually address the issue of whether Bristol-Myers applies to out-of-state unnamed plaintiffs in nationwide class actions. However, the issue in this case is whether Bristol-Myers applies to the forty out-of-state named plaintiffs bringing claims that have no connection to California and are based on the laws of twenty different states. Thus, the applicability of Bristol-Myers to unnamed out-of-state plaintiffs in nationwide class actions "is not the issue here." Gaines , 2018 WL 3752336, at *2. Moreover, many district courts that have considered whether Bristol-Myers applies to out-of-state named plaintiffs in class actions have concluded that it does. See, e.g. , Gaines , 2018 WL 3752336 (relying on Bristol-Myers and holding that "[b]ecause there is no basis for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the proposed out-of-state named plaintiffs' claims against GM arising entirely from out-of-state activities, leave to amend the complaint to add these claims is denied"); Horowitz v. AT & T Inc. , 2018 WL 1942525, at *15 (D. N.J., Apr. 25, 2018) (noting that courts have "found that a court does not have specific jurisdiction over individual claims asserted by nonresident named plaintiffs because there is no connection between their claims and the corporation's activities within the forum, even if those claims are similar or identical to claims brought in the same case by a resident named plaintiff against the same defendant"). The Court agrees with those courts that have concluded that Bristol-Myers ' limitation on personal jurisdiction applies to named plaintiffs in putative class actions.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should exercise pendant personal jurisdiction over the non-California Plaintiffs' claims. However, "[p]endent jurisdiction exists where there is a sufficiently substantial federal claim to confer federal jurisdiction, and a common nucleus of operative fact[s] between the state and federal claims." Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc. , 936 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1991). In this case, there is no federal claim that raises federal question jurisdiction and a common nucleus of operative fact between California state law claims and non-California state law claims cannot alone confer pendent personal jurisdiction. See Maeda v. Pinnacle Foods Inc. , 390 F.Supp. 3d 1231, 1247 (D. Haw. 2019). Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the non-California Plaintiffs' claims.
Despite Plaintiffs' argument to the contrary, the MMWA does not confer nationwide personal jurisdiction. See Chufen Chen v. Dunkin' Brands, Inc. , 2018 WL 9346682 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2018) ("Neither CAFA nor the Magnuson-Moss Act permits nationwide service of process"). In addition, because there are fewer than one hundred named plaintiffs and the MMWA claim is not cognizable, the MMWA does not confer federal question jurisdiction in this case. See, e.g. , MacDougall v. Am. Honda Motor Co. , 2017 WL 8236359, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2017) (dismissing MMWA claim for lack of federal question jurisdiction because the plaintiffs "haven't named more than 100 plaintiffs").
Accordingly, because there is no basis for the Court to constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over the forty out-of-state named Plaintiffs' claims against GM that arise entirely from out-of-state activities that have no connection to California, those claims are dismissed and because amendment is futile, those claims are dismissed without leave to amend.
Those claims include: Claim 1 as to all non-California Plaintiffs, Claim 2 as to all non-California Plaintiffs, and Claims 8 through 60 in their entirety.
B. Plaintiffs' Magnuson-Moss Warranty Claim Must Be Dismissed.
In their first claim for relief, Plaintiffs allege a violation of the MMWA. GM argues that Plaintiffs' MMWA claim must be dismissed because class actions under the MMWA with fewer than one hundred named plaintiffs are not ‘cognizable’ in federal court.
The MMWA provides a federal claim to "a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with ... a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract." 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). "Breach of an obligation imposed by state law will support a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act." Keegan v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc. , 838 F. Supp. 2d 929, 954 (C.D. Cal. 2012). The MMWA provides that plaintiffs pursuing relief under the MMWA may do so in "any court of competent jurisdiction in any State or the District of Columbia" or "in an appropriate district court of the United States." 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1). The MMWA also provides certain limitations for cases brought in federal court:
No claim shall be cognizable in a suit brought [in an appropriate district court of the United States]
(A) if the amount in controversy of any individual claim is less than the sum or value of $25;
(B) if the amount in controversy is less than the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in this suit; or
(C) if the action is brought as a class action, and the number of named plaintiffs is less than one hundred.
In this case, there are only fifty-seven named Plaintiffs, which is far less than the number required to allege a cognizable MMWA class action claim. Because Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the requirements of the MMWA, the Court must dismiss Plaintiffs' MMWA claim. See MacDougall v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. , 2017 WL 8236359 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2017) ("Plaintiffs' argument that the Court can exercise jurisdiction over their Magnuson-Moss Act claim through CAFA is nonsensical. CAFA – a basis for federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over state law disputes between diverse parties – doesn't fill in the gaps for missing substantive requirements of a federal law"); see also Cadena v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. , 2019 WL 3059931, at *11 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2019) (holding that "the weight of more recent authority is that the 100-plaintiff requirement cannot be supplanted by the prerequisites for exercising diversity jurisdiction under CAFA").
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' first claim for relief for violation of the MMWA is dismissed, and because amendment is futile, it is dismissed with prejudice. Patterson v. RW Direct, Inc. , 2018 WL 6106379, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2018) (dismissing MMWA claim with prejudice because the 100 named plaintiffs requirement was not satisfied).
C. GM's Remaining Arguments
The Court concludes that GM's remaining arguments are more appropriately resolved on a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, GM's Motion is denied with respect to Claim 3 for violation of the CLRA, Claim 4 for violation of the UCL, Claim 5 for fraud by concealment, Claim 6 for violation of Song-Beverly, and Claim 7 for negligent failure to recall. GM's Motion is also denied with respect to Claim 2 as to all California Plaintiffs.
IV. Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, GM's Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part . Claim 1 and Claims 8 through 60 of the Second Amended Complaint are dismissed in their entirety without leave to amend. Claim 2 is dismissed as to all non-California Plaintiffs without leave to amend.
IT IS SO ORDERED.