Opinion
No. 00 C 7163
February 6, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Brenda Pigram ("Plaintiff") claims she is totally disabled as a result of leg injuries she suffered in October 1992. She filed this action against JoAnne B. Barnhart ("Defendant"), challenging the Social Security Administration's (hereinafter, "SSA") decision denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (hereinafter, "DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d). Now before the court are cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs motion is denied, Defendant's motion is granted and the SSA's final decision is affirmed.
I. Procedural History
On February 9, 1993, Plaintiff filed an application for Title II DIB in which she alleged that she has suffered from a disability since October 23, 1992, when she fell on a wrought iron fence and allegedly sustained nerve damage. (Record (hereinafter, "R.") 33, 70, 91.) The SSA first denied her application on May 7, 1993, noting that her condition was improving and that she "would not be disabled for a period of 12 continuous months." (R. 76.) Plaintiff filed a request for reconsideration on September 13, 1993, but her application was again denied on January 6, 1994. (R. 76-80, 84-86.) Plaintiff requested and received a hearing on January 25, 1996 before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Edward R. Gustafson. (R. 30-69.) In a written order dated July 20, 1996, the ALJ concluded that Pigram was not disabled as defined under the Social Security Act because she did not have a severe impairment. (R. 20-21.) On August 1, 1996, Plaintiff filed a timely request for review of the ALJ's decision with the SSA Appeals Council. (R. 16.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review on September 14, 2000. (R. 3-4.) Accordingly, the ALJ's decision stands as the SSA's final decision. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of that decision.
II. Factual Background
A. Plaintiffs Testimony and Medical History
Plaintiff was born on February 13, 1958. (R. 70.) She completed high school and a three-month course to become a certified nursing assistant (hereinafter, "CNN"). (R. 41-42, 95.) From 1980 until her accident in October of 1992, Plaintiff worked as a certified nursing assistant at a nursing home and at several nursing agencies. (R. 95.) Plaintiffs work required her to lift and move patients weighing over 100 pounds, and was thus considered "heavy to very heavy." (R. 108-111.)
On October 23, 1992, the alleged onset date of disability, Plaintiff fell on a wrought iron fence while carrying some groceries and sustained complex lacerations to her left thigh. (R. 33, 114.) She was taken by ambulance to Thorek Hospital. (R. 114.) As reflected in Thorek's records, she underwent several procedures, specifically, evacuation of a hematoma, debridement of the femoral artery with arteriography, intraoperative angiogram and creation of a dermacutaneous skin flap. (R. 114.) In Plaintiffs discharge summary, Dr. Guerriero commented that plaintiff "tolerated the procedure well" and had "good postoperative results." (R. 115.) The principal diagnosis identified on the discharge summary was laceration of the left thigh. Secondary diagnoses included vascular insufficiency of the lower extremity, injury of the femoral artery, and an old myocardial infarction presumably unrelated to the injury. (R. 114.) On October 26, 1992, Plaintiff was transferred to Grant Hospital for follow-up care. (R. 115, 139.) She was treated with bed rest and medication and was discharged on October 29, 1992 in stable condition. (R. 139.) These medical records do not disclose any limitations imposed by Plaintiffs injuries.
Precisely how this accident occurred is not explained in the record.
Plaintiff underwent Doppler testing to evaluate the cardiovascular blood flow in each of her legs on January 16, 1993. (R. 151-152.) The test revealed mild vascular insufficiency in her left leg, but there was no evidence of vascular insufficiency in her right leg. (R. 152.)
The ultra sound report indicates that Plaintiffs attending physician was from Graceway Medical Center, but that the testing was performed by radiologists from M.G. Ultrasonics, Ltd. (R. 151.) It is unclear whether the tests were actually performed at Graceway or at M.G. Ultrasonics, Ltd.'s facilities.
On April 16, 1993, Dr. Lasquite of Graceway Medical Center evaluated Plaintiff and completed a Peripheral Vascular Report to provide medical information to the Bureau of Disability Determination Services in connection with Plaintiffs application for disability benefits. (R. 150.) He characterized Plaintiffs diagnosis as "status posttraumatic disruption and repair of the left femoral artery, mild vascular insufficiency of the tibial artery, and injury to the left saphenous nerve." (R. 150.) The Peripheral Vascular Report form prompts the physician to "describe the patient's ability to do work-related activities such as sitting, standing, moving about, lifting, carrying, handling objects, hearing, speaking, traveling." In response, Dr. Lasquite reported that Plaintiffs ability to perform "may be reduced" by left leg pain. (R. 150.)
On April 24, 1993, SSA physician Dr. Harry Bergman completed a Residual Functional Capacity Assessment in which he predicted that Plaintiff would have no significant physical impairment in work-related activities after October of 1993. (R. 159.)
Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident on October 18, 1993, and went to the emergency room at Grant Hospital where she was diagnosed with a left shoulder contusion and a cervical strain. (R. 170.) The emergency room physician prescribed Advil, bed rest, and heat, and also advised Plaintiff to return to the emergency room if she had further complications. (R. 170.) The record does not indicate that there are any continuing problems as a result of this incident.
Dr. Lasquite saw Plaintiff again on November 12, 1993, when he completed a Cardiac Report for the Bureau of Disability Determination Services in connection with Plaintiffs application for benefits. (R. 174-175.) He reported that Plaintiff was having chest pains from an unknown origin that were precipitated by walking, lasted a few seconds, and were relieved by rest. (R. 174-75.) Dr. Lasquite also noted Plaintiff's history of an old myocardial infarction. (R. 174.) In response to the Cardiac Report form's prompt to "describe the patient's ability to do work related activities such as sitting, standing, moving about, lifting, carrying, handling objects, hearing speaking, traveling," Dr. Lasquite stated that Plaintiff had a good ability to perform. (R. 175.)
On December 7, 1993, SSA physician Dr. Robert Patey reviewed the record and prepared a Residual Physical Functional Capacity Assessment in which he opined that plaintiff had the residual capacity to perform the full range of medium work. (R. 182-190.) Because Dr. Patey found Plaintiff could only lift 50 pounds, the amount required for medium work, rather than the 100 pounds required in the heavy work of a certified nursing assistant, Plaintiff characterizes Dr. Patey's report as a finding that Plaintiff had a serious impairment. (R. 183.)
In May of 1995, Plaintiff returned to work part-time as a nurse's aid while her application for Social Security benefits was still pending. (R. 33.) During the January 25, 1996 administrative hearing, Plaintiff explained that she returned to work because her husband was laid off from his job and she decided to "try to pitch in and help." (R. 48.) She testified that, although she was working at the time of the hearing, she did not think she could work much longer because the pain in her left leg was too great and it interfered with her concentration. (R. 34, 37-39, 56.) As of the hearing date, Plaintiffs current medications were Tegretol, Naprosyn and Ibuprofen, but her medications were scheduled to be adjusted soon. (R. 40.)
Tegretol (also known as Carbamazepine) is an anti-epileptic drug used in the treatment of pain associated with trigeminal neuralgia, a disorder of the trigeminal nerve causing serious bouts of pain. (R. 222.) Tegretol is not used to treat more common aches and pains. (R. 222.) Reported side effects include fatigue, drowsiness, and headache; Plaintiff claims to have experienced sleepiness due to the Tegretol. (R. 222.)
During the interim between Plaintiffs injury and May of 1995 when she returned to work, Plaintiff spent the typical day watching her niece, which entailed "sitting down, watching her, washing, watching T.V." (R. 57.) Plaintiff testified that she did not do many of the household chores because her "husband pitch[es] in and help[s] [her] a lot," but she and her husband did the grocery shopping together. (R. 58.)
On December 9, 1995, Plaintiff was treated in the emergency room at Cook County Hospital ("CCII") for pain in her left leg, as well as pain in her right side and back. (R. 226.) At that time, she was diagnosed with neuropathy secondary to a traumatic injury, musculoskeletal pain, and a trichoinonas infection. (R. 225.) She was given Tegretol and Motrin and told to follow-up in the neurology clinic. (R. 225.)
Trichornonas infection is a common sexually transmitted disease and is treated with antibiotics. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of Parasitic Diseases Fact Sheet on Trichomonas Infection, (Jan. 31, 2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dpd/parasites/trichomonas/ factsht_trichomonas.htm. (R. 218-219.)
Plaintiff returned to the emergency room at CCH on January 15, 1996 with complaints of worsening left leg weakness. (R. 239.) She was diagnosed with femoral neuralgia (nerve pain), and told to take her previously prescribed medications. (R. 240.) Plaintiff was referred to CCH's Fantus Health Center for pain treatment. (R.218-219)
On January 24, 1996, Plaintiff was evaluated in the pain clinic at the Fantus Health Center. (R. 238.) Plaintiff explained to the examining physician that she had been able to function until six or seven months earlier when she began to notice pain and gradual weakness in her left leg. (R. 238.) The examining physician detected some hypesthesia (abnormally decreased sensitivity) and muscle weakness in Plaintiffs left leg, but her reflexes were symmetrical and there was no evidence of muscle atrophy. (R. 238.) The examining physician diagnosed Plaintiff with causalgia of the left leg secondary to nerve injury, and recommended a nerve block. (R. 237.)
The court is unable to read the examining physician's signature, nor is this physician otherwise identified in the record.
The Miller-Keane Medical Dictionary defines causalgia as "a burning pain often associated with trophic skin changes in the hand or foot, caused by peripheral nerve injury. The syndrome may be aggravated by the slightest stimuli or it may be intensified by the emotions. Causalgia usually begins several weeks after the initial injury and the pain is described as intense, with patients sometimes taking elaborate precautions to avoid any stimulus they know to be capable of causing a flare-up of symptoms. They often will go to great extremes to protect the affected limb and become preoccupied with such protection." Miller-Keane Medical Dictionary, 2000, available at http://my.webmd.com/content/asset/miller_keane_6225, (visited Feb. 4, 2002).
The next day, (the same day as the hearing before the ALJ), January 25, 1996, Plaintiff was again evaluated in the Fantus Health Center's pain clinic. The examining physician observed in his Progress Notes that Plaintiff possibly suffered from sympathetic pain rather than neuropathic pain. (R. 236.) The examining physician instructed Plaintiff to continue taking her medications, and also recommended a femoral nerve block and physical therapy. (R. 236.) The nerve block was performed on January 29, 1996 at the Fantus Health Center. (R. 235.)
On February 15, 1996, a physical therapist in the Department of Physical Therapy at CCH evaluated Plaintiff. (R. 231.) The Physical Therapy Progress Notes report that Plaintiff complained of constant pain in entire left leg and that Plaintiff said her knee would occasionally give way such that she often came close to falling. (R. 231.) The physical therapist also indicated that Plaintiff had a full range of motion except in her left hip, and had full muscle strength, except in her left leg where the strength was decreased due to secondary pain. (R. 231.) The physical therapist concluded that Plaintiff should undergo physical therapy for two to four weeks. (R. 231.)
B. Medical Expert's Testimony
Dr. Bernard Stevens testified as a medical expert at Plaintiffs January 25, 1996 hearing. According to his resume, Dr. Stevens has "extensive clinical experience and skill in direct patient care," along with "significant consulting experience and expertise in the adjudication of Social Security disability claims, involving all aspects and facets of case adjudication of neuro-musculoskeletal and cardiovascular disability claims." (R. 202.) Dr. Stevens testified that despite Plaintiffs allegations of intractable pain, there was no supportive medical evidence in the file. (R. 62.) Dr. Stevens further explained that the surgical report was noticeably detailed, but also did not indicate any nerve damage. (R. 62.) Thus, Dr. Stevens recommended that Plaintiff undergo a comprehensive neurological examination, Doppler testing, an EMG and a nerve conduction velocity study on her left leg because, aside from Plaintiffs allegations, "there's nothing to really go on." (R. 62.)
C. The ALJ's Decision
1. The Five-Step Test
The Social Security Act defines a "disability" as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d) (1)(A). The Social Security regulations prescribe the following five-step test to determine whether an individual is disabled:
(1) Is the claimant presently employed?
(2) Is the claimant "severely" impaired? Do the claimant's physical or mental impairment(s) "significantly limit [claimant's] ability to do basic work activities?"
(3) Does the claimant's impairment(s) meet the level of severity identified in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Appendix 1?
(4) Can the claimant perform his or her past relevant work?
(5) Can the claimant perform any other work in the national economy in light of her age, education, and work experience? 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920See Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 2001). A claimant will be found to have a "disability" under the Social Security Act upon making the requisite showing that the claimant's impairment meets the requisite level of severity at step (3) or upon determining that the claimant cannot perform any other work in the national economy at step (5). "A negative answer at any point, other than step (3), ends the inquiry and leads to a determination that a claimant is not disabled." Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001), quoting Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1985).
Appendix I to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. § 404 provides a list of all the medical conditions that may constitute a disability under the Social Security Act. It also describes how these medical conditions need to be documented in order to be "severe" enough to constitute a "disability."
In performing this analysis, the ALJ discontinued the evaluation after step two because he concluded that Plaintiffs impairment was not severe. An impairment is classified as severe if it "significantly limits [a claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (a). Basic work activities include the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs, including: (1) physical functions like walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in routine work setting. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (b)(1)-(6).
The ALJ concluded that because Plaintiff "failed to produce any credible evidence that would provide a basis for her complaints, she is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act." (R. 24.) The ALJ observed that, after April of 1993, the record indicates Plaintiff did not seek any additional treatment for her leg until nearly three years later, nine months after she had returned to work as a certified nurse's assistant. (R. 21.) Furthermore, the ALJ noted, Plaintiffs surgery was performed without incident, she sustained no nerve damage, and the April 1993 Doppler study revealed only a mild vascular insufficiency, meaning she did not suffer from any significant interference with her circulation. (R. 23-24.) With respect to Dr. Lasquite's diagnosis that Plaintiff may have saphenous nerve injury to her left leg, the ALJ reasoned that this doctor must not have "read the operative report wherein no nerve damage is referred to and the tibial artery is not mentioned." (R. 23.)
The saphenous nerve is a branch of the femoral nerve that supplies the leg, ankle, and foot. See Harcourt Academic Press Dictionary of Science and Technology, available at http://www.harcourt.com/dictionary/def/8/9/1/897100.html, (visited Feb. 4, 2002).
The ALJ found Plaintiffs testimony relating her alleged pain back to her 1992 injury incredible. (R. 24.) For example, he found it "unbelievable that claimant could work nine months without any significant absences and then suddenly develop pain and numbness in her leg for no demonstrated reason." (R. 24.) The Plaintiffs version of events, the ALJ observed, "requires us to believe that her circulation was fine while she worked for nine months but not subsequently," a conclusion he found "hardly credible." (R. 24.)
III. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is authorized by section 405(g)of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1176. "The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). "Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000). When the medical evidence is inconsistent, the ALJ must "weigh all of the evidence and decide whether [the claimant is] disabled." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c)(2). See Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313-14 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that ALJ properly discounted medical opinions which lacked adequate clinical support). This court "does not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute [the court's] own judgment for that of the commissioner." Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869. Furthermore, this court affords the ALJ's determination of credibility "special deference" and will only reverse this finding if the Plaintiff can show that it is "patently wrong." Powers v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2000).
The ALJ's findings and conclusions are not, however, entitled to unlimited judicial deference. This court may not uncritically "rubber stamp" the ALJ's decision. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 869. Thus, the Seventh Circuit has noted the court's obligation to critically review the record to ensure that the ALJ did not "play doctor" by making "independent medical findings." Rohan v. Charter, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996). Similarly, the court must also critically review the ALJ's decision to ensure that the ALJ "articulate[d] some legitimate reason for his decision" and built an "accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion." Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872.
Plaintiff contests the ALJ's conclusion that her impairment is not severe. She argues that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence and contains errors of law.
B. Failure to Order Further Medical Tests
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to order the nerve testing recommended by the medical expert, Dr. Stevens. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ was wrong to conclude that she suffered no nerve damage merely because she had returned to work and the alleged damage was not detected during the initial surgery. (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment or Remand (hereinafter, "Pltf. Memo.") at 7.) As explained above, the ALJ relied on evidence in the record in concluding that the repair of Plaintiffs artery and vein damage had been successful, and that she did not have nerve damage. (R. 24.) While there was one piece of medical evidence contradicting the conclusion that Plaintiff suffered no nerve damage, the ALJ relied on credible evidence from Plaintiffs operative report to reach the opposite conclusion, and "the resolution of competing arguments based on the record is for the ALJ, not the court." Donahue v. Barnhart, No. 01-2044, 2002 WL 91438, at *1, ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. Jan. 25, 2002). Furthermore, the impact of Dr. Stevens' recommendation for further evaluation was tempered by his telling observation that there is no real medical evidence corroborating Plaintiffs complaints of pain after her injury. (R. 62.) Given the deferential standard of review, although additional nerve testing might have been more conclusive, this court finds that the ALJ's decision was based on substantial evidence.
Plaintiff briefly argues that even though her 1995 impairment may have come from a different source than the 1992 injury, the ALJ committed legal error by rejecting that impairment, especially without ordering further tests. (Pltf. Memo. at 11.) This allegation merely revisits Plaintiffs first claim, however, and again, the court finds that there was substantial evidence corroborating the ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff did not have nerve damage and he was not obligated to order further tests. The ALJ mentioned that Plaintiff did have a few abnormal findings on her last neurological exam, such as decreased strength in her left leg, but concluded that the record as a whole did not suggest that those findings would significantly limit her ability to perform basic work activities. (R. 22, 24-25.) Whether or not the more recent allegations of impairment stem from a source other than the October 1992 injury is irrelevant where the ALJ concluded that the alleged impairment does not constitute a disability.
As the Seventh Circuit has explained, an ALJ impermissibly "plays doctor" when he or she "fail[s] to address relevant evidence." Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 1171, 1177 (7th Cir. 2001). An ALJ may substitute his own judgment for a physician's opinion only where he "rel[ies] on other medical evidence or authority in the record." Clifford, 227 F.3d at 870. The court finds in this case that the ALJ did not run afoul of the prohibition against "playing doctor" when he determined that the abnormal findings on Plaintiffs neurological exam did not significantly limit Plaintiffs ability to perform basic work activities. Here, the ALJ relied upon substantial medical evidence in the record, including a successful post-operative report after the October 1992 injury and normal results from x-rays taken in August 1993, as well as the fact that Plaintiff had successfully returned to her past work as a certified nursing assistant, in concluding that these facts outweighed the minor anomalies found in Plaintiffs neurological exam. (R. 22-25.) This he was entitled to do; "[w]hen treating and consulting physicians present conflicting evidence, the ALJ may decide whom to believe, so long as substantial evidence supports that decision." Dixon, 270 F.3d at 1178, citing Books v. Chater, 91 F.3d 972, 979 (7th Cir. 1996).
C. Failure to Follow SSR 96-6p
Plaintiffs second argument is that the ALJ committed a legal error in failing to follow the requirements of Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-6p. SSR 96-6p states in pertinent part that (1) findings of fact made by State agency medical and psychological consultants and other program physicians and psychologists regarding the nature and severity of an individual's impairment(s) must be treated as expert opinion evidence; and (2) the ALJ and the Appeals Council may not ignore these opinions and must explain the weight given to these opinions in their decisions. SSR 96-6p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34466 (1996). Plaintiff correctly observes that the ALJ's decision makes no reference to Dr. Patey's December 7, 1993 report in which Dr. Patey expressed the opinion that Plaintiff was limited to occasional lifting of no more than 50 pounds. (Pltf. Memo. at 8.) Plaintiff argues that this was equivalent to categorizing her impairment as severe because, in her work as a certified nursing assistant, she occasionally lifted over 100 pounds. (Pltf. Memo. at 8.) An impairment, however, is only severe if it "significantly limits [a claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521 (a). Plaintiff offered no evidence that it was a requirement of her work as a certified nursing assistant that she be able to lift over 100 pounds such that being able to lift only 50 pounds was in fact a significant limitation on her basic work activities. In fact, at the time of the January 1996 hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff worked as a certified nursing assistant, rebutting her own argument that she had a severe impairment. (R. 34.)
To the extent the ALJ erred in failing to discuss the weight given to Dr. Patey's opinion, this court concludes the error was harmless. SSR 96-6p goes beyond the directive not to ignore the opinions of State agency medical consultants and further explains that these opinions "can be given weight only insofar as they are supported by evidence in the case record . . . considering . . . the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole." SSR 96-6p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34466 (1996). Thus, the ALJ should have explained why he gave no weight to Dr. Patey's opinion, but in light of such facts as Plaintiffs return to work and the opinions of Dr. Bergman and Dr. Lasquite who did not report any work-related restrictions as of November 1993, Dr. Patey's opinion was inconsistent with the record. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has observed that "[n]o principle of administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different result." Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989). The ALJ's opinion was supported by substantial evidence and inclusion of Dr. Patey's opinion would not change the final result.
D. Failure to Consider Entitlement to Close Period Benefits
Plaintiffs final argument is that the ALJ committed legal error when he failed to consider whether Plaintiff was entitled to a period of benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a)(1)(D)(ii); 42 U.S.C. § 416 (i). Plaintiff points out that after her accident, she did not work for more than 2 "A years, and the record is not clear with regard to her capacity from October 23, 1992 to October 23, 1993. (Pltf. Memo. at 9.) Accordingly, Plaintiff argues, Social Security Administration regulations mandate that the ALJ should have recontacted Dr. Lasquite who was her treating physician at the time. The regulations Plaintiff cites, however, provide that an Agency will recontact a medical source only when the information received is inadequate to determine whether a claimant is disabled or when the medical source report contains a conflict or ambiguity that must be resolved. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512 (e). Dr. Lasquite gave his opinion in November 1993 that Plaintiff had a good ability to perform work-related activities. (R. 175.) Thus there was no need for the ALJ to recontact Dr. Lasquite. Only Plaintiff categorizes the record as unclear with regard to her capacity while she was not working, and she does not point to any ambiguity or conflict in the medical reports that would necessitate recontacting Dr. Lasquite.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, Plaintiff's motion is denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 14-1) is granted. The final ruling of the Social Security Administration is affirmed.