Opinion
TTDCV186014361S
08-24-2018
Steven PIGOTT v. Allison HARLAND
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Sferrazza, J.
The plaintiff, Steven Pigott, seeks a declaratory judgment construing a provision in a will executed by the decedent, Ruth Pigott. In his prayer for relief, he requests that the distribution of estate assets as set forth in the will be validated. The plaintiff also claims, in his complaint, that any factual issues surrounding this will construction be heard by a jury. The appearing defendants move to strike that jury claim.
The plaintiff argues that Practice Book § 17-56(a)(b) entitles him to a jury trial. Section 17-56(a)(b) neither creates nor eliminates the right to have a jury decide a case. Instead, it is the underlying claim that confers that right, which the declaratory nature of the judgment merely preserves. For instance, if the declaratory judgment seeks to ascribe ownership of a car then a jury trial might be available because that right would exist for a damages action based on conversion. If, however, the substantive claim underlying the declaratory judgment action is equitable in nature, then no right to a jury trial exists, U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Spring Brook Farm Dairy, 135 Conn. 294, 297-98 (1949). "In determining the right to a jury trial [in a declaratory judgment action], the test is whether the matter at issue would have been triable to a jury before the [declaratory judgment] statute," 2 E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 2002) § 147. F, p. 229. Therefore, if the plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial, that right must arise from the nature of his underlying claim rather than on the mere fact that the complaint seeks a declaratory judgment.
Although the pleadings are somewhat inconsistent about whether the plaintiff desires a decision concerning the validity of the will, as opposed to interpretation of a provision in the will whose validity is uncontroverted, the specific allegations and argument opposing the motion to strike clarify that it is a will construction that is in dispute. Indeed, the plaintiff wants the will to be enforced, not invalidated. No party seeks that result.
Thus, for this motion, the dispositive circumstance is whether a party is entitled to demand a jury trial in a case aimed at interpreting the meaning of a particular bequest in the will. Specifically, the dispute is whether use of the phrase "said son," rather than "said daughter," was a scrivener’s error (possibly of a careless "copy-and-paste" variety).
In Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon Hospital, 188 Conn. 1 (1982), our Supreme Court disallowed consideration by the trier-of-fact of extrinsic evidence to demonstrate the existence of a drafter’s mistake in a will. Id., 9-10. "How often is it, that the words used by the scrivener convey a different estate from what the testator designed! Yet it has always been decided, that parol testimony could not be admitted to prove, that the deviser meant to give a different estate from what the will expressed," Id., 11-12. The Supreme Court cited an 1826 case where a party attempted to avoid this prohibition through a bill in equity, but the Supreme Court rejected that maneuver, Id., 14-15.
In 1998, the Supreme Court overruled its decision in Connecticut Junior Republic, supra, and established that mistakes in wills could be proven, by clear and convincing evidence, using parol evidence, Erickson v. Erickson, 246 Conn. 359, 374 (1998). This court discusses these two cases because in Erickson, supra, the high court mentioned that the rule governing correction of drafting errors, induced by fraud, ought to be receptive to proof by extrinsic evidence through exercise of a court’s equitable powers, Id., 374. The reference to equity in both cases suggests that no jury trial is available as of right in matters such as the one presently before the court. The general principles applicable to reformation of clerical errors in written instruments are those which emanate in equity rather than through legal remedy, Voll v. Lafayette Bank and Trust Co., 223 Conn. 419, 429-30 (1992); Harlach v. Metropolitan Property and Liability Insurance Co., 221 Conn. 185, 191 (1992).
The plaintiff additionally argues that the legislature created a statutory right to jury trials in will construction cases by virtue of General Statutes § 52-215 and the language quoted below:
"The following-named classes of cases shall be entered in the docket as jury cases upon the written request of either party ...: Appeals from probate involving the validity of a will or paper purporting to be such ..." (emphasis added).
However, as described above, the present action is neither an appeal from probate nor one questioning the validity of a will. Assessing the validity of a will is regarded as a power distinct from construing a will provision. Probate court have long possessed the authority and duty to decide whether a putative will was admissible or not, Appeal of St. Leger, 34 Conn. 434, 446 (1867). "When therefore the executor ... ‘exhibits’ the will to the court of probate ... it becomes the imperative duty of that court, of its own motion, to take custody of it, and proceed to enquire and determine whether it was executed according to the formalities prescribed, freely, by a person of lawful age and of sound mind and sufficient capacity, and is a valid will; and to approve or reject it accordingly," Id., (emphasis added). Under § 52-215, the parties are entitled to have an appeal "from probate involving the validity of a will" decided by a jury.
In contrast, and somewhat surprisingly, probate courts lacked the power to construe provisions in a will to ascertain if a scrivener’s error occurred, Huber v. St. Labre Indian School Education, Assn., 4 Conn.App. 436, 439-40 (1985). "The General Assembly has not empowered Probate Courts to determine directly and conclusively the construction to be given to wills and codicils," Id., 439. Such a legal challenge had to be initiated in the Superior Court, Id., 440.
In 1993, our legislature did act and expressly conferred upon courts of probate the authority to "construe the meaning and effect of ... any will ..." P.A. 93-279 § 6, now codified in General Statutes § 45a-98(a)(4). See, Bender v. Bender, 292 Conn. 696, 713 (2009).
However, the legislature did not, concomitantly, amend § 52-215 to grant the right to a jury trial in will construction appeals as it had for will validity contests. The court concludes that a determination of whether a scrivener’s mistake occurred in a will is essentially an equitable function resembling reformation and for which no right to trial by jury obtains. The motion to strike the jury claim is granted.