Piggly Wiggly, Macon Inc. v. Kelsey

8 Citing cases

  1. Giusto v. Int'l Paper Co.

    Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-00646-SDG (N.D. Ga. Jun. 3, 2021)

    Atkins v. Tri-Cities Steel, Inc., 166 Ga.App. 349, 351 (1983) (citation omitted). See also Piggly Wiggly, Macon, Inc. v. Kelsey, 83 Ga.App. 526, 530 (1951) (โ€œA person may be an invitee as to certain parts of premises and a licensee or trespasser as to other parts.โ€). โ€œWhen there is conflicting evidence as to the legal status of the injured party, the question is rightfully left to the jury.โ€

  2. Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Padgett

    285 Ala. 463 (Ala. 1970)   Cited 23 times

    Where one enters a part of the premises reserved for the use of the occupant and his employees, into which there was no express or implied invitation to go, there can be no recovery for resulting injuries from a defective condition of that part of the premises, even though he was an invitee to other parts of the premises. 38 American Jurisprudence, Negligence, Section 100, p. 761; 65 C.J.S., Negligence, ยง 33, p. 489; Tomsky v. Kaczka, 17 N.J. Super. 211, 85 A.2d 809; Alvarado v. Anderson, 175 Cal.App.2d 166, 346 P.2d 73; Powell v. Jones, 133 Cal.App.2d 601, 284 P.2d 856; Piggly Wiggly, Macon v. Kelsey, 83 Ga. App. 526, 64 S.E.2d 201. The verdict of $17,500 for the loss of an index finger and injury to a thumb is excessive.

  3. Huddle House, Inc. v. Burke

    211 S.E.2d 903 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 8 times
    In Burke the employee had enlisted the help of a customer, a young boy, who was injured as he was removing ice from the storage area of an ice machine.

    This is decidedly different from cases where one is injured not knowing the servant is violating instructions, as was the case in the example given in Summers v. Barron, 59 Ga. App. 202, 210 ( 200 S.E. 228). Further, an invitation to part of the premises as to a customer is not an invitation to all places. Piggly Wiggly, Macon v. Kelsey, 83 Ga. App. 526 ( 64 S.E.2d 201); Coffer v. Bradshaw, 46 Ga. App. 143, 149 ( 167 S.E. 119). The only conclusion we can reach under these circumstances is that the injured boy, Burke, was nothing but a mere trespasser or volunteer to whom the duty owed was not to wilfully and to wantonly injure him, and this rule applies alike to adults and to children of tender years.

  4. Crosby v. Savannah Electric c. Co.

    150 S.E.2d 563 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966)   Cited 45 times
    In Crosby v. Savannah Electric Co., 114 Ga. App. 193, 198 (150 S.E.2d 563), it is held: `The doctrine of mantrap or pitfall is rested upon the theory that the owner is expecting a trespasser or a licensee and has prepared the premises to do him injury. [Cit.] A typical example is the setting of a spring or trap gun to stop or prevent depredations by animals or humans....

    In the context here it is one who wrongfully goes upon or climbs the pole of the defendant; or, to state it differently, one who, without authority or permission from the owner, does so. Permission or consent to climb the pole can not be implied, even if the owner may have knowledge that it was customary for children to play in the area where it was located. Rowland v. Byrd, 57 Ga. App. 390 ( 195 S.E. 458). Nor would it matter that the children may have been licensees as to the ground where they played, for extension of permission (express or implied) by the owner of the ground to play upon it could not include an extension of permission by the owner of the pole to climb it. Cf. Piggly Wiggly Macon, Inc. v. Kelsey, 83 Ga. App. 526 ( 64 S.E.2d 201), and Smith v. Jewell Cotton Mill Co., 29 Ga. App. 461 (2) ( 116 S.E. 17), where it was held that "[T]he invitee may not wander at will, without further invitation, to out-of-the-way or dangerous places on the premises, or use parts thereof for purposes wholly disconnected from and in no way pertaining to the business in hand or the objects of the invitation. . ." It could not be assumed that a permission to play upon the land area in the vicinity of the pole would extend to the climbing of the pole to highly dangerous wires some twenty feet above, even if the land and the pole were under common ownership, and much less so when it appears, as here, that the land and the pole were under separate ownership.

  5. Curl v. Cherry

    124 S.E.2d 289 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962)   Cited 2 times

    In accordance with the well-settled rule that ambiguous pleadings are to be construed most strongly against the pleader and that pleadings are to be construed in the light of their omissions as well as their averments, the failure of the plaintiff to allege facts as to what status he occupied on the defendant's property will be construed as an allegation that the plaintiff was a bare licensee or a trespasser. Cook v. Southern Ry. Co., 53 Ga. App. 723 ( 187 S.E. 274); Piggly Wiggly, Macon, Inc. v. Kelsey, 83 Ga. App. 526 ( 64 S.E.2d 201); Ricks v. Boatwright, 95 Ga. App. 267 ( 97 S.E.2d 635). The allegations of negligence failing to show a violation of any duty to the plaintiff as a bare licensee or as a trespasser ( Code ยง 105-402; Mandeville Mills v. Dale, 2 Ga. App. 607, 58 S.E. 1060), it was error to overrule the defendant's general demurrer. Judgment reversed. Carlisle, P. J., and Custer, J., concur.

  6. Spindel v. Gulf Oil Corp.

    100 Ga. App. 323 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959)   Cited 12 times

    Although this court can take judicial notice that the date of the injuries was a Sunday, it will not presume that all of the shopping center was closed for business on that day in the face of the allegation that it was open to the public, since there are businesses, such as drug stores and service stations, which operate on Sunday. The plaintiff fails to allege that the invitation extended to the part of the premises where he was injured (as to which see Piggly Wiggly, Macon, Inc. v. Kelsey, 83 Ga. App. 526, 64 S.E.2d 201) but for the purposes of general demurrer it is not necessary to decide whether he was in fact an invitee or licensee since one owes to any person the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring him where his presence is either actually known or reasonably to be anticipated. Georgia Power Co. v. Deese, 78 Ga. App. 704 ( 51 S.E.2d 724).

  7. Barber v. Rich's, Inc.

    90 S.E.2d 666 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955)   Cited 3 times

    In that case the elevator was being operated by a servant of the defendant. See Macon Savings Bank v. Geoghegan, 48 Ga. App. 1 ( 171 S.E. 853); Byrd v. Atlanta National Bank, 16 Ga. App. 7 ( 84 S.E. 219); and Piggly Wiggly Macon, Inc. v. Kelsey, 83 Ga. App. 526 ( 64 S.E.2d 201). There are many decisions concerning the issue before us. We think it would be superfluous for us to enter into a discussion of these cases in an effort to distinguish them from the case at bar.

  8. Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Brewster

    80 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954)   Cited 2 times

    The plaintiffs in error contend that the amended petition shows that the plaintiff was a mere licensee as to the storeroom portion of the store premises, and that no breach of duty owed by the defendants to the plaintiff as a licensee is shown. Conceding that a person may be an invitee as to certain portions of premises and a licensee or trespasser as to other portions ( Piggly Wiggly v. Kelsey, 83 Ga. App. 526, 64 S.E.2d 201), we think that the amended petition shows that the plaintiff was an invitee as to the storeroom portion of the store premises. The amended petition alleges that the plaintiff entered into the main portion of the store premises for the purpose of buying groceries, and thus alleges that she was an invitee as to that portion of the premises.