Opinion
No. COA18-1095
05-21-2019
TERRY PIGFORD, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER PACE, JR. and TINEKA A. PACE, Defendants.
No brief filed on behalf of plaintiff-appellee. Ryan McKaig for defendants-appellants.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Onslow County, No. 16-CVD-4004 Appeal by defendants from order entered 21 May 2018 by Judge James L. Moore, Jr. in Onslow County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 April 2019. No brief filed on behalf of plaintiff-appellee. Ryan McKaig for defendants-appellants. BERGER, Judge.
On May 21, 2018, the trial court entered an order granting Terry Pigford ("Plaintiff") an easement over the property of Christopher Pace, Jr. ("Mr. Pace") and Tineka A. Pace (collectively "Defendants") and awarding Plaintiff $9,700.00 in damages. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court's finding of fact number nine was not supported by competent evidence, and findings of fact numbers ten and eleven were restatements of the testimony at trial. We affirm the trial court.
Factual and Procedural Background
After Plaintiff's septic system was damaged, he filed suit alleging that Mr. Pace drove over his septic tank, crushed it, and then filled it with pieces of concrete. In Plaintiff's complaint, he requested that the trial court grant him an easement over Defendants' property for ingress and egress, and enter an injunction prohibiting Defendants from entering Plaintiff's property or obstructing his access. Plaintiff also sought reimbursement for repair of his damaged septic system.
A bench trial was held, and the trial court subsequently entered a written Order on May 21, 2018. In its Order, the trial court granted Plaintiff an easement over Defendant's property and awarded Plaintiff $9,700.00 in damages. From this Order, Defendants appeal challenging three of the trial court's findings of fact.
Analysis
Defendants first contend that finding of fact number nine was not supported by competent evidence and is contradicted by substantial evidence. We disagree.
"It is well settled in this jurisdiction that when the trial court sits without a jury, the standard of review on appeal is whether there was competent evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts." Hilliard v. Hilliard, 146 N.C. App. 709, 711, 554 S.E.2d 374, 376 (2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Under Rule 52 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court hearing a case without a jury is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1) (2018). The trial court's
findings of fact have the force and effect of a verdict by a jury and are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support them, even though the evidence might sustain a finding to the contrary. The trial judge becomes both judge and juror, and it is his duty to consider and weigh all the competent evidence before him. He passes upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. If different inferences may be drawn from the evidence, he determines which inferences shall be drawn and which shall be rejected.Knutton v. Cofield, 273 N.C. 355, 359, 160 S.E.2d 29, 33 (1968) (citations omitted).
Here, finding of fact number nine reads as follows:
9. That the Defendants have entered onto the property of the Plaintiff and crushed his septic system and filled his septic tank with construction debris.
In making this finding, the trial court relied on Jeffrey Johnson's ("Mr. Johnson") testimony. Mr. Johnson testified that he had witnessed Mr. Pace use a bobcat to dump concrete debris into Plaintiff's septic tank. On appeal, Defendants contend that Mr. Johnson's testimony is not credible. During the bench trial, Mr. Pace denied Mr. Johnson's allegation, and testified that he had never dropped debris or instructed anyone else to deposit trash, waste, debris, or rocks on Plaintiff's property. Mr. Pace also testified that on the day in question he had placed concrete on his property, but he had no idea who had placed the concrete on Plaintiff's property.
Although Mr. Johnson and Mr. Pace presented conflicting testimony during the bench trial, the trial court "passes upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom." Knutton, 273 N.C. at 359, 160 S.E.2d at 33. Here, the trial court determined the credibility of the testimony of Mr. Johnson and Mr. Pace, and the weight to be given to the evidence. The trial court's finding of fact was proper because there was "competent evidence to support" it. Hilliard, 146 N.C. App. at 711, 554 S.E.2d at 376 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we affirm.
Defendants also contend that findings of fact numbers ten and eleven were mere recitations of the testimony and exhibits presented at trial contrary to the requirements of Rule 52. We disagree.
Under Rule 52, during a bench trial, a trial judge is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1).
To comport with Rule 52(a)(1), the trial court must make a specific statement of the facts on which the rights of the parties are to be determined, and those findings must be sufficiently specific to enable an appellate court to review the decision and test the correctness of the judgment. Rule 52(a)(1) does not require recitation of evidentiary facts, but it does require specific findings on the ultimate facts established by the evidence, admissions and stipulations which are determinative of the questions involved in the
action and essential to support the conclusions of law reached.Hilliard, 146 N.C. App. at 710, 554 S.E.2d at 376 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
"This Court has found that findings that merely recapitulate the testimony or recite what witnesses have said do not meet the standard set by the rule[,]" Long v. Long, 160 N.C. App. 664, 668, 588 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2003) (citation omitted), because "they do not reflect a conscious choice between the conflicting versions of the incident in question which emerged from all the evidence presented." Chloride, Inc. v. Honeycutt, 71 N.C. App. 805, 806, 323 S.E.2d 368, 369 (1984) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "The court must itself determine what facts are established by the evidence rather than merely reciting what the evidence may tend to show." Id.
Here, findings of fact numbers ten and eleven state:
10. That Plaintiff has obtained an estimate for the repair and replacement of said septic system and the costs of said repair is $9,700.00.Based on these findings, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that "Plaintiff has proven damages for damage of the septic system in the amount of $9,700.00."
11. That Tom Mattison testified as an expert in the field of septic tanks that the estimate he previously provided of $9,700.00 should be amended to $15,000.00 due to additional requirements now in place.
Although the beginning of finding of fact number ten appears to be a recitation of the evidence, the trial court ended the finding by stating that "the costs of said repair is $9,700.00," which is a specific finding "on the ultimate facts established by the evidence, admissions and stipulations." Hilliard, 146 N.C. App. at 710, 554 S.E.2d at 376 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Also, while the better practice would have been to state there was no evidence contradicting Tom Mattison's testimony in finding number eleven, findings ten and eleven together with their corresponding conclusion do more than recite testimony. See Smith v. Smith, 247 N.C. App. 166, 174, 785 S.E.2d 434, 440 (2016) (determining that "detailed findings and the[ir] corresponding conclusions" may "reflect the processes of logical reasoning." (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Both findings together demonstrate that the trial court engaged in logical reasoning because the findings detail what testimony and exhibits were reviewed and relied on as evidence to support the trial court's ultimate conclusion of law. Thus, the findings reveal how the trial court linked the evidence to the conclusion that Plaintiff should recover $9,700.00 as opposed to $15,000.00.
Because the trial court's findings of fact were "specific findings on the ultimate facts established by the evidence," Hilliard, 146 N.C. App. at 710, 554 S.E.2d at 376 (citation and quotation marks omitted), the trial court's findings were proper. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Judge DIETZ concurs.
Judge ZACHARY concurs in result only.
Report per Rule 30(e).