Opinion
No. 1-13-3445
06-05-2014
ARLEN J. PIETROWSKI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Respondent-Appellee.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County
13 CH 9558
The Honorable
Peter Flynn,
Judge Presiding
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Fitzgerald Smith and Lavin concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The retirement board did not err in awarding an injured officer a duty disability benefit at a reduced 50% rate, as opposed to a 75% rate, because the record contains sufficient support for the board's finding that the officer's disability resulted from a preexisting physical defect or disease. ¶ 2 This appeal addresses whether an injured police officer is entitled to duty disability benefits at 75% of his salary or at a reduced level of 50% because the disability resulted from a physical defect or other disease which existed at the time the injury was sustained. Petitioner Arlen J. Pietrowski contends that his current condition originated from an on-duty injury he sustained on September 8, 2011, and did not result from a preexisting condition. Pietrowski thus appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County denying his petition for administrative review and affirming the decision of the Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (the Board) awarding him a duty disability benefit at the 50% level. The Board asserts that Pietrowski is not entitled to a 75% award because he failed to meet his burden to "establish not only that he is disabled but also that the cause of his disability entitled him to duty benefits at a given level." ¶ 3 Regardless of whether a "manifest weight of the evidence" or a "clearly erroneous" standard of review is applied, our conclusion remains the same: the Board did not err in its decision to award duty disability to Pietrowski at the 50% level. The record contains sufficient evidence to support the Board's finding that "Pietrowski's current disability resulted from and was aggravated by a pre-existing physical defect." We thus affirm the judgment of the circuit court affirming the Board's decision.
¶ 4 BACKGROUND
¶ 5 Pietrowski joined the Chicago Police Department (CPD) on March 26, 1990. In an affidavit in support of his application for disability benefits, Pietrowski stated as follows:
"On September 8, 2011, I was on duty and went to 10640 S. Peoria to assist on a domestic call. The offender fled and myself and another officer had to fight, struggle and wrestle on the ground to effect the arrest. During the fight, I suffered numerous injuries, including one to my spine. As a result, I have had to have a spinal fusion surgery and am currently unable to perform the duties of a Chicago Police Officer."The record on appeal includes various medical records that reflect Pietrowski's evaluations, diagnoses, and/or treatment by multiple medical professionals following the events of September 8, 2011, including his spinal surgery on December 15, 2011. In addition, the record contains a ten-page report prepared by Dr. Jay Levin, M.D., regarding an independent medical examination conducted by Levin; the report summarizes and analyzes the medical records Levin reviewed and also discusses his evaluation of Pietrowski on December 5, 2012. ¶ 6 The Levin report includes the following information relevant to this appeal. Orthopedic surgeon Dr. Richard Lim, M.D., examined Pietrowski on September 14, 2011, six days after the incident. Levin's description of Lim's examination includes: "[Pietrowski] does have a chronic history of back pain down his left leg, which he has been living with for years. He states that his right leg pain started just last week, on September 8, 2011." The notes regarding Lim's analysis of the radiographs of Pietrowski's lumbar spine state "[i]mpression, degenerative disk disease, spondylolisthesis." An MRI of Pietrowski's lumbar spine on September 20, 2011, reviewed by radiologist Dr. Dale Charletta, M.D., demonstrated "lumbar scoliosis, spondylosis, and L5-S1 anterior listhesis." Dr. Levin's report further provides, in part:
"The MRI of the lumbar spine was completed on September 20, 2011 which appeared not to have been brought to my office when I examined this examinee on December 5, 2012, since in fact, the first MRI that I reviewed was one dated March 22, 2012. It appears from the radiologist's interpretation on that study of the MRI dated September 20, 2011, describes longstanding changes of the lumbar spine [sic]."¶ 7 In response to the question, "Is [Pietrowski]'s current status as a result of the current I.O.D. (Injury of Duty) on September 8, 2011?," Levin wrote the following:
"The examinee described to me that he had no complaints prior to September 8, 2011 referable to his lumbar spine. This is inconsistent with the medical records¶ 8 The appellate record also includes a "Day Count Summary" from the CPD listing Pietrowski's days off from work based on medical issues from 1992 through 2012, which are categorized as (a) "injured on duty" or "IOD" days and (b) non-IOD days. The Day Count Summary reflects, among other things, that Pietrowski had eight IOD days in February, 1998 relating to a "left leg" injury. Following the September 8, 2011 incident, he had 360 IOD days from September 12, 2011 through September 27, 2012. ¶ 9 With his CPD medical leave exhausted, Pietrowski filed an application for disability benefits on October 11, 2012. During proceedings on February 28, 2013, the Board heard the testimony of Pietrowski and of the Board's consulting physician, Dr. Peter Orris, M.D. ¶ 10 Pietrowski testified during the Board hearing not only about his September, 2011 injury, but also regarding two IOD reports he had submitted on February 8, 1998 and March 13, 2000. When asked by the Board's attorney about the relevance of the 1998 and 2000 incidents, Pietrowski's counsel answered, "Well, if the doctor is alleging that there is a chronic history of pain, we want to show that the chronic history or the initiation of the pain came in '98 and 2000 from prior IOD claims if there's any doubt." Pietrowski stated that he "suffer[ed] from a lot of back pain and *** pain in the left thigh" following his 1998 injury on duty. After an eight-day absence following that incident, Pietrowski testified that he was placed on light duty and that "the doctor returned [him] to full duty" after a "month[,] at the most, a month and a half." Pietrowski testified that a "fall" in 2000 affected his right ankle and right knee, but he received no medical treatment. ¶ 11 According to Dr. Orris's testimony, Pietrowski did have x-rays approximately ten days after the 1998 incident, contrary to Pietrowski's testimony. Although Orris did not have the actual x-rays, he stated that, according to the 1998 report from the orthopedic group that evaluated the x-rays, the "diagnostic x-rays of the lumbar spine were unremarkable." Orris testified that "that could have well overlooked a shift, but in here it contradicts that the shift occurred acutely due to that 1998 injury" and that it was "unlikely" that the 1998 incident was the cause of Pietrowski's current problems. When questioned by Pietrowski's counsel whether he could "rule out the 1998 injury as one of the causes of the degenerative condition." Orris responded:
that I have reviewed above. Notwithstanding that, he does describe an event of September 8, 2011 when he was involved in an altercation with an arrestee. I am assuming that the complaints he had on September 8, 2011 were acute and that he had no complaints similar to that for at least 3 months prior to this event and that event precipitated the symptoms immediately therein. In that case, there is a causal connection by aggravation of the underlying condition."
"It depends on what you mean by 'rule out.' Would I find it unlikely based on a normal x-ray at that time and a return to work as described as full duty without - well, the full duty without symptoms in the leg, that's the problem. He had chronic problems with the other leg, and whether that could have been related or not is not clear."¶ 12 Pietrowski's counsel asked Dr. Orris "how else, if he had no other injuries, would [Pietrowski] have this spondylolisthesis that he has today?" Orris responded, in part:
"Well, first of all, he had symptomatology in one leg due to other causes that he thought were -- Dr. Levin thought that there may be a combination of causes for that and one of them may have been in the back. So at some time he may have injured that back and caused this slippage. 'When' is not documented in these records one way or another."Questioned by the Board's counsel about the diagnosis of "degenerative disk disease"—defined by Dr. Orris as "arthritis in that disk, in the bones around that disk"—Orris testified, in part, that because "a period of months" could produce such condition, "[i]f the films were taken at the same time as the accident, the degenerative disk disease would not be there." Orris further testified that the "degenerative changes" shown on the x-ray taken two weeks after the September 8, 2011 incident were "not due to the injury in 2011." ¶ 13 In its written decision entered on April 5, 2013, the Board found, among other things, that Pietrowski "is currently disabled as a result of the September 8, 2011 act of duty incident and that he is entitled to a duty disability benefit." The Board also found that, contrary to Pietrowski's argument, "neither the [1998] and/or the 2000 incidents were the cause of or a contributing factor in his current claim of back disability." The Board further found that "Pietrowski's current disability resulted from and was aggravated by a pre-existing physical defect as more fully set forth in 1) xrays and MRI's [sic] taken within days after the 2011 incident in part finding degenerative disc disease; and 2) Dr. Levin's medical reporting." Concluding that Pietrowski failed to establish his entitlement to a 75% duty disability benefit, the Board awarded him a duty disability benefit at 50% of his salary. ¶ 14 After briefing and arguments, the circuit court denied Pietrowski's petition for administrative review and affirmed the Board's decision. Pietrowski filed this appeal.
Dr. Orris described spondylolisthesis as "[a] shifting of the spine, one over the other." When asked by the Board's attorney, "Is that something that is a condition that someone is either born with or is it congenital or do you acquire it just by the passage of time? How does it come about?," Orris responded, "Well, yes, actually all of the above, but most frequently some kind of trauma."
¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 Our role is to review the Board's decision, not the determination of the circuit court. Marconi v. Chicago Heights Police Pension Board, 225 Ill. 2d 497, 531 (2006). In this case, the Board found, and Pietrowski agrees, that he is disabled and is entitled to receive a duty disability benefit. Their disagreement centers on whether Pietrowski's disability "resulted from" any physical defect or disease which existed at the time his injury was sustained on September 8, 2011. Section 5-154 of the Illinois Pension Code (the Pension Code) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"An active policeman who becomes disabled on or after the effective date as the result of an injury incurred on or after such date in the performance of an act of duty, has a right to receive duty disability benefit during any period of such disability for which he does not have a right to receive salary, equal to 75% of his salary *** at the time the disability is allowed; *** provided, however, that: *** If the disability resulted from any physical defect or mental disorder or any disease which existed at the time the injury was sustained, *** the duty disability benefit shall be 50% of salary." 40 ILCS 5/5-154 (West 2012) (Emphasis added).¶ 17 Pietrowski contends that the issue of whether his disability "resulted from" a preexisting condition presents a mixed question of law and fact and thus requires a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. A decision is deemed clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board of Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 234 Ill. 2d 446, 464 (2009). The Board suggests that a "manifest weight of the evidence" standard of review applies to its findings of fact. A decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only where the reviewing court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to an administrative agency, determines that no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the agency's decision. Samuels v. Retirement Board of Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 289 Ill. App. 3d 651, 660 (1997). The Board notes, however, that "[e]ven where the standard of review moves into an area where it becomes a mixed question standard *** reversal is appropriate only where the agency decision is clearly erroneous." In this case, applying either the "clearly erroneous" or "manifest weight of the evidence" standard—both of which are "highly deferential" (Niles Township High School District 219, Cook County v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 387 Ill. App. 3d 58, 70 (2008))—we reach the same result. ¶ 18 This court has previously addressed whether a disability "resulted from" a preexisting physical defect or disease, as provided in section 5-154 of the Pension Code. In Samuels v. Retirement Board of Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in reversing the board's decision to award duty disability benefits at the 50% rate because competent evidence supported the board's determination that the officer's disability resulted from her preexisting degenerative disc disease. Samuels, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 662-63. The court stated the following regarding section 5-154:
"We find that section 5-154 is unambiguous. We interpret the statute to provide duty disability benefits in two separate instances: (1) where a disability occurs as a result of (is caused by) an on-duty injury; and (2) where a disability results from (stems from) a preexisting condition as opposed to being caused by the injury. In the first instance, the duty disability benefit is 75% of the officer's salary. In the second instance, where the disability "resulted from any physical defect or mentalThe Samuels court concluded that, "[a]s competent evidence was presented to support the Board's decision, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Board, we cannot say that a rational trier of fact would not have agreed with the Board's decision." Id. at 662. ¶ 19 In Cole v. Retirement Board of Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 396 Ill. App. 3d 357 (2009), this court again considered the "resulted from" language in section 5-154. Beginning with an act-of-duty incident in 1993, the plaintiff-officer in Cole sustained various on- and off-duty injuries during a thirteen-year period. Id. at 358-361. The Board in Cole found that the officer was entitled to an ordinary disability benefit as a result of the degenerative disc disease and degenerative joint disease attributable to non-duty-related accidents following the 1993 incident, or the officer's degenerative disc disease preceding the 1993 incident. Id. at 365. The circuit court reversed, finding that the officer was disabled as a result of duty-related injuries but that the disability resulted from a preexisting physical defect. Id. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's decision, concluding that "there was evidence that the plaintiff showed signs of degenerative disc disease at the time she suffered her act-of-duty injuries." Id. at 370. Citing Samuels, the court stated that "the officer will be given a duty disability pension of 50% of his salary if the disability 'resulted from' the preexisting condition, notwithstanding the effect the on-duty injury may have had on the preexisting condition." Id.; Samuels, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 662. ¶ 20 Pietrowski contends on appeal that "[s]imply put, there is no competent evidence in the record that supports the Board's conclusion that Officer Pietrowski's current[] disability is not related to the September 8, 2011 injury." We do not believe that Pietrowski frames the issue correctly. Pursuant to Samuels and Cole, the issue is whether Pietrowski's disability resulted from the preexisting condition, notwithstanding the effect his on-duty injury may have had on the preexisting condition. ¶ 21 Applying either a "clearly erroneous" or "manifest weight of the evidence" standard of review, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence that Pietrowski's disability resulted from a preexisting condition, notwithstanding the effect of his September 8, 2011 injury on such condition. For example, as noted in Dr. Levin's report, Dr. Lim's diagnosis or "impression," based on his examination of Pietrowski on September 14, 2011 and his review of Pietrowski's lumbar spine radiographs, was "[d]egenerative disc disease, spondylolisthesis." Levin's report referenced Dr. Charletta's interpretation of the MRI as "describ[ing] longstanding changes of the lumbar spine." During the Board proceedings, Dr. Orris testified that the "localized arthritis, degenerative" around two vertebral joints implied "some chronic duration" and that the "degenerative changes" on the xrays taken two weeks after September 8, 2011, were not due to the injury Pietrowski sustained that day. Because a "period of months" could produce degenerative disk disease, Orris did not find it likely that such condition would appear on films taken at the same time as Pietrowski's September, 2011 injury. Based on the foregoing, and other evidence in the record, we are not left with the impression that a mistake has been made, nor do we determine that no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the Board's decision. ¶ 22 Pietrowski further contends on appeal that "[t]he only documented and supported injuries [he] suffered were all IOD's, and the fact that [he] returned to full-duty after the 1998 and 2000 IOD's, all support the conclusion that [his] condition is the direct result of an injury on duty." He asserts that "[t]he evidence submitted to the Board shows that [his] prior back problems had mostly resolved before the September 8, 2011 injury, that [he] suffered a new back injury while on duty on September 8, 2011, which caused his current disability, and that he did not suffer from any other injuries outside these three documented IODs." In concluding that the 1998 and 2000 IODs were not a cause or contributing factor in Pietrowski's current claim of back disability, the Board cited, among other things, (a) the x-ray findings after the 1998 incident reported as normal, (b) the lack of any medical opinion citing to the 1998 incident as a cause or contributing factor, and (c) the fact that the injury in 2000 did not involve complaints of back injury. Again, after reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the Board's findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence or were clearly erroneous. ¶ 23 Although we have concluded that the Board's decision should be affirmed, we are compelled to address certain contentions raised by Pietrowski in his appellate briefs. Pietrowski states that "[t]he Board's speculation *** ignores Dr. Levin's assessment that Officer Pietrowski's complaints on September 8, 2011, were acute and that he had not had these complaints at least three months prior to this event, and in fact this event precipitated the symptoms he suffered." As noted above, Dr. Levin's exact language is as follows:
disorder or any disease which existed at the time the injury was sustained," the duty disability benefit is 50% of the officer's salary. (Emphasis added.) The statute does not include language stating that, even if an officer has a physical defect, mental disorder or disease prior to the subsequent on-duty injury, the officer is entitled to an duty disability pension of 75% of salary if 'but for' the on-duty injury the disability would not exist. Instead, under the statute, the officer will be given a duty disability pension of 50% of his salary if the disability 'resulted from' the preexisting condition, notwithstanding the effect the on-duty injury may have had on the preexisting condition. We also briefly note that while Samuels argues that 'it is an axiom in statutory construction that "resulted from" implies direct causation,' she cites to no authority in support of this statement and our research reveals none." Id. at 661-62.
"The examinee described to me that he had no complaints prior to September 8, 2011 referable to his lumbar spine. This is inconsistent with the medical records that I have reviewed above. Notwithstanding that, he does describe the event of September 8, 2011 when he was involved in an altercation with an arrestee. I am assuming that the complaints he had on September 8, 2011 were acute and that he had no complaints similar to that for at least 3 months prior to this event and that event precipitated the symptoms immediately therein. In that case, there is a causal connection by aggravation of the underlying condition."We are hard-pressed to see how Dr. Levin's explicit assumption constitutes an "assessment" of Pietrowski's complaints, as is urged by Pietrowski. Furthermore, the remainder of that paragraph from Levin's report references the inconsistency between Pietrowski's statements to Levin and the medical records reviewed by Levin—additional support for Board's decision. ¶ 24 Pietrowski also contends that "Dr. Lim's testimony and medical opinion were virtually ignored by the Board due to Dr. Lim's failure to appear at the hearing" and that the "Board rejected Dr. Lim's expert report." Based on our review of the record, this contention appears inaccurate. The Board's decision expressly states that the medical records were included in the record for the Board's review and consideration. Such records not only included documents relating to Pietrowski's evaluation and treatment by Dr. Lim, but also Dr. Levin's report in which he described and analyzed such evaluation, treatment and related matters. During the Board hearing, Dr. Orris testified, "All I would say is what Dr. Levin said, that at the injury in [2011], there seems to have been some problem before that, but it's undocumented in the record." A Board member then asked whether "Dr. Levin and Dr. Lim come to the same conclusion[,]" and Orris answered in the affirmative. Simply put, there is no indication that the Board "rejected" or "ignored" documentation relating to Dr. Lim. ¶ 25 Citing Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago, 234 Ill. 2d 446 (2009), Pietrowski repeatedly asserts that "[c]ourts of review have taken a dim view of this Board's unwarranted rejection of medical evidence offered by eminent physicians." In Kouzoukas, the Board denied the officer's claim for duty disability benefits, finding, in part, that "from the medical records and testimony offered[, Kouzoukas] does not have any objective findings of a back, spine, or SI joint injury; Kouzoukas' complaints of pain are subjective and do not prevent her full duty return to the [CPD]." Id. at 461. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's reversal of the Board's denial of duty disability benefits. Id. at 478. In so holding, the court noted that, other than one physician, "every doctor to have examined Kouzoukas believed that Kouzoukas sustained a work-related injury that resulted in a persistence of disabling lower back pain." Id. at 468. As noted above, we do not believe that the Board engaged in any "unwarranted rejection of medical evidence" as apparently occurred in Kouzoukas. Furthermore, the Kouzoukas court addressed a different question than the issue presented in the instant case, i.e., whether the officer was disabled versus whether the officer's disability resulted from a preexisting condition. Finally, the Kouzoukas court stated, contrary to the Board's finding, that the "overwhelming majority of the documentary evidence and expert testimony presented by Kouzoukas—including the testimony of the Board's own physician—supported her claim that she suffered from debilitating pain which prevented her return to full active duty" in the CPD. Id. In contrast, as discussed above, the record here contains sufficient evidence in support of the Board's finding that Pietrowski's disability "resulted from," i.e. "stems from" (Samuels, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 661), a preexisting physical condition. ¶ 26 Pietrowski also claims that the Board "ignore[d] its responsibility to bring Drs. Lim and Charletta to testify to substantiate their expert findings." Pietrowski asserts that this "obligation falls on the Board pursuant to" Section 5-156 of the Illinois Pension Code," which provides, in part:
"Proof of duty, occupational disease, or ordinary disability shall be furnished to the board by at least one licensed and practicing physician appointed by the board. In cases where the board requests the applicant to get a second opinion, the applicant must select a physician from a list of qualified licensed and practicing physicians who specialize in the various medical areas related to duty injuries and illnesses, as established by the board." 40 ILCS 5/5-156 (West 2012).We are unclear how the foregoing statutory language imposed any such obligation on the Board or why, as Pietrowski contends, the "the Board had a duty to require, or at the very least request, that Drs. Lim and Charletta appear for the purpose of assisting Officer Pietrowski's application." To the contrary, Illinois courts have consistently held that "the plaintiff in an administrative hearing bears the burden of proof and relief will be denied if the plaintiff fails to sustain that burden." Kouzoukas, 234 Ill. 2d at 464; Marconi, 225 Ill. 2d at 532-33; Cole, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 367. Indeed, the "Notice of Hearing" sent to Pietrowski prior to the Board proceedings discussed the presentation of "evidence including witnesses and exhibits" and expressly provided, in part:
"BE ADVISED IT IS YOUR OBLIGATION TO PROVE ENTITLEMENT TO THE BENEFITS WHICH YOU SEEK ***. THEREFORE YOU ARE¶ 27 Pietrowski further contends that the "Board made a specific factual finding that its decision in part was due to Pietrowski's offering no medical testimony in support of his application," a finding he claims is "not true." The relevant language from the Board's order, however, references "the medical reports unaccompanied by oral testimony (Pietrowski did not present any testimony from any treating physician)." We see no inaccuracy in the foregoing language. While there was documentary evidence of the assessment and treatment of Pietrowski by Dr. Lim and other medical professionals, Pietrowski did not present testimony by any treating physician.
ADVISED TO PRESENT TO THE BOARD FOR ITS CONSIDERATION ALL PROOFS WHICH YOU DEEM NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH ENTITLEMENT TO THE BENEFITS SOUGHT OR A CONTINUATION OF ANY BENEFIT PREVIOUSLY AWARDED."
¶ 28 CONCLUSION
¶ 29 Pietrowski contends that "[t]here is simply no testimony or documentary evidence in the record which would allow the Board to conclude, as it did, that [his] current disability resulted from a pre-existing physical defect." We disagree with this contention and conclude that the Board's decision is neither clearly erroneous nor against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm the circuit court's order affirming the Board's decision. ¶ 30 Board decision affirmed; circuit court order affirmed. ¶ 31 Affirmed.