Opinion
11-P-321
11-21-2011
SANDRA K. PIERSON v. JOEL STEMBRIDGE & others. [FN1]
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Sandra Pierson appeals from a Suffolk Superior Court judgment allowing the defendants' motion for summary judgment on her claims of discrimination based on age, race, and disability, retaliation, and malicious interference with employment relations. We affirm.
This claim is against Joel Stembridge individually.
Discussion. The facts of this case may be found in the Superior Court judge's well-written, thorough decision granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. We agree with the reasoning and conclusions contained therein. We review the judge's decision de novo, Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007), and look to the summary judgment record to determine 'whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120 (1991).
We note that the entire summary judgment record has not been reproduced.
A. Age and race discrimination. Summary judgment is generally disfavored in cases alleging discrimination because 'the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent is a factual question.' Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 440 (1995). However, summary judgment is appropriate if a defendant's brief demonstrates that 'the plaintiff is unable to offer admissible evidence of the defendant's discriminatory intent, motive, or state of mind.' Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 426 Mass. 122, 127 (1997).
Here, Pierson adduced no evidence to controvert Stembridge's deposition testimony, the four interim evaluations, and the other documentary evidence showing that Pierson was terminated because of her poor performance. Indeed, the record demonstrates that Pierson's claims of race and age discrimination are not based upon facts supported by admissible evidence as required by Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(e), 365 Mass. 825 (1974), but upon her opinion alone. Pierson's allegations that she was disciplined and terminated while younger, minority teachers who were also tardy were not miss the mark, not only because Pierson was not terminated because of her tardiness, but because nothing in the record indicates that other tardy teachers were not disciplined. Pierson cannot satisfy her burden of demonstrating pretext by providing 'merely 'sketchy evidence lacking a sufficient foundation for a legally relevant comparison' of allegedly similarly situated employees.' Id. at 131 n.6, quoting from Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1108 (1995).
At her deposition, Pierson acknowledged that she had no firsthand knowledge of several of the allegations contained in the verified complaint and that other allegations were based entirely upon her own opinion.
B. Disability discrimination. There was no error in the judge's analysis of Pierson's disability discrimination claim. He correctly concluded that the defendants had no duty to accommodate Pierson because she did not request accommodations until after she was notified of the decision to terminate her. Even viewing the June 9, 2005, letter as a request for reasonable accommodations under G. L. c. 151B, Pierson testified that she never told Stembridge that she was suffering from depression or requested accommodations for that depression. Her failure to request accommodations is 'fatal to her claim.' Russell v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 437 Mass. 443, 457 (2002).
Pierson testified that she did not contact the Boston public schools' equity department in the 2004-2005 school year (which was coming to a close when Pierson wrote the June 9, 2005, letter to her colleagues, which she contends was her request for accommodation under G. L. c. 151B), and, when asked whether she specifically requested accommodation for her depression in the 2005-2006 school year, Pierson stated that she contacted the equity department in the spring of 2006. The record shows that Pierson contacted the equity department and requested specific accommodations on May 8, 2006, forty-one days after Stembridge notified her of his intent to dismiss her.
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C. Remaining claims. Pierson's remaining claims fail for similar reasons. In order to prevail on her retaliation claim, Pierson must show, among other things, 'that the [defendants'] desire to retaliate against her was a determinative factor in [their] decision to terminate her employment.' Tate v. Department of Mental Health, 419 Mass. 356, 364 (1995). Pierson presented no evidence that the defendants terminated her for any reason other than her poor performance, and the record shows that she did not request accommodations until after the decision to terminate her was made. Summary judgment on the retaliation claim was therefore appropriate. Ibid.
Finally, because '[t]he record shows that [Pierson] cannot reasonably expect to show that, in terminating [her] employment, [Stembridge] acted with an improper motive,' there was no error in the judge's conclusion that Pierson's failure of proof on the issue of the defendant's discriminatory intent was dispositive of her claim against Stembridge for malicious interference with employment relations. Brunner v. Stone & Webster Engr. Corp., 413 Mass. 698, 705-706 (1992).
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Green, Hanlon & Carhart, JJ.),