Opinion
# 2013-041-501 Claim No. 107819
01-10-2013
JOHN PIEROTTI v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
Claim for damages for the alleged wrongful conduct of defendant in failing to provide "proper conditions" to accommodate inmate-claimant's alleged disabilities is dismissed after trial for failure to provide proof of medical malpractice and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction to review defendant's administrative acts or omissions. Case information
UID: 2013-041-501 Claimant(s): JOHN PIEROTTI Claimant short name: PIEROTTI Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): THE STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote (defendant name) : Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant(s): Claim number(s): 107819 Motion number(s): Cross-motion number(s): Judge: FRANK P. MILANO JOHN PIEROTTI Claimant's attorney: Pro Se HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General Defendant's attorney: By: Belinda Wagner, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: January 10, 2013 City: Albany Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
Claimant seeks damages for the alleged wrongful conduct of defendant in failing to provide him with conditions better equipped to accommodate his disabilities while incarcerated at Clinton Correctional Facility (Clinton). More particularly, the claim alleges that from January 12, 2001 to June 20, 2002 defendant negligently failed to "acknowledge my disabilities and transfer me or provide the proper conditions necessary for me to exist without suffering."
Trial of the claim was conducted on September 19, 2012. As a consequence of the trial being conducted by means of a three-location teleconference, the parties each marked trial exhibits and moved their introduction into evidence at trial, subject to post-trial review and objection by the adversary party and subject further to the Court's post-trial review of offered exhibits and consideration of party objections, all prior to the Court, post-trial, ruling on the admissibility of the offered exhibits. The Court rendered its evidentiary rulings by Order dated December 10, 2012.
Claimant was his only trial witness. Although claimant's trial testimony and other trial proof encompassed a wide-ranging series of complaints about defendant's care and custody of him while incarcerated, his allegations of defendant's negligence ultimately reduced to the manner in which defendant addressed (or failed to address) his physical disabilities related to his hearing and walking.
Claimant testified to having been terribly injured in a boating accident in 1993, which rendered him unable to walk without difficulty, and that upon initial incarceration, he required crutches to walk.
While subsequently incarcerated at Clinton between January 12, 2001 and June 20, 2002, his complaints were several and included:
1. His crutches were confiscated, resulting in repeated falls.
2. He was denied a "medical feed in" pass which would have enabled him to take his meals in his cell, obviating the need for him to visit the mess hall which, again, resulted in falls.
3. The Clinton medical staff failed to diagnose and treat him for Meniere's disease, an inner ear affliction which can negatively affect hearing and balance.
4. The Clinton medical staff refused to classify claimant as "disabled," a designation claimant testified he had received in December, 1994 by the Social Security Administration.
5. Claimant's repeated requests to be transferred to other correctional facilities to more suitably accommodate his physical limitations, and specifically, to be transferred to a facility to accommodate the hearing impaired, were denied.
6. Claimant's allegations of medical mistreatment and deficient medical care, as detailed above, were directed at "Dr. Lee," one of Clinton's medical care providers, whose medical care and assessment of claimant resulted in, according to claimant, claimant's failure to receive treatment of and/or accommodation for his disabilities, to which he was entitled.
7. Dr. Lee's repeated refusals to acknowledge claimant's disabilities and refusal to document claimant's complaints or injuries denied claimant the ability to receive a "hardship transfer."
8. By reason of all of the foregoing, claimant alleges having endured a variety of injuries and deprivations, including physical falls, missing meals, loss of opportunity to participate in prison programs, loss of opportunity for prison jobs, and missing opportunities to visit church, the recreation yard, mental health sessions and other prison activities.
Claimant adequately presented the facts underlying his claim. Both in direct testimony and in response to clarifying questions of the Court, he specifically articulated the actions or inactions of defendant of which he complains and the resultant negative consequences he allegedly endured. Less precise however, either in his filed claim or in his trial presentation, is the legal basis or theory of recovery by which claimant seeks judgment.
A fair review of the trial record suggests that claimant is seeking to hold defendant accountable either by reason of medical malpractice, through commission or omission, or by reason of defendant's failure to appropriately accommodate claimant's disabilities at Clinton or at a more suitable facility to which claimant desired to be transferred.
To sustain a cause of action for medical malpractice, a claimant must prove two essential elements: (1) a deviation or departure from accepted practice, and (2) evidence that such departure was a proximate cause of claimant's injury (Bennett v State of New York, 31 AD3d 1069 [3d Dept 2006]).
Conclusory allegations of medical malpractice, unsupported by competent evidence establishing its essential elements, are insufficient to state a prima facie case. Through a medical expert, it must be shown that defendant deviated from the standard for good and acceptable care in the locality where the treatment occurred and that the deviation was the proximate cause of the injury (Torns v Samaritan Hosp., 305 AD2d 965, 966 [3d Dept 2003]; Yamin v Baghel, 284 AD2d 778, 779 [3d Dept 2001]; Bracci v Hopper, 274 AD2d 865, 867 [3d Dept 2000]).
The fact that claimant proceeded pro se does not excuse the need for expert medical opinion to demonstrate a deviation from the applicable standard of care (Duffen v State of New York, 245 AD2d 653, 653-654 [3d Dept 1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 810 [1998]).
No expert medical proof establishing the standard of care owed to claimant was presented. Moreover, while Exhibit C, comprised of some thirty-four pages of claimant's Ambulatory Health Records, details defendant's provision of health care to claimant during the involved time period at Clinton, claimant additionally failed to provide expert medical proof to establish that the medical care provided to him by defendant was substandard or that it fell short of the care to which he was entitled. As such, the claim, to the extent that it is founded in medical malpractice, fails.
To the extent that the claim is founded upon allegations that defendant's actions or inactions failed to appropriately accommodate claimant's disabilities, either at Clinton or by transferring claimant to a more suitable facility, it fails for a different reason: Subject matter jurisdiction of such a claim lies in Supreme Court in the context of a CPLR Article 78 proceeding.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is invoked where money damages are the essential object of the claim, unlike an instance where the principal claim is equitable in nature (such as to review action or inaction by a state agency), with monetary relief being incidental to the principal claim (see Harvard Fin. Servs. v State of New York, 266 AD2d 685, 685 [3d Dept 1999]; Matter of Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d 231, 236 [1988]).
In City of New York v State of New York (46 AD3d 1168, 1169-1170 [3d Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 705 [2008]), the court explains that:
"Two inquiries must be made to determine if the Court of Claims has subject matter jurisdiction. As that court has 'no jurisdiction to grant strictly equitable relief' (Psaty v Duryea, 306 NY 413, 416 [1954]), but may grant incidental equitable relief so long as the primary claim seeks to recover money damages in appropriation, contract or tort cases (see Ozanam Hall of Queens Nursing Home v State of New York, 241 AD2d 670, 671 [1997]), 'the threshold question is "[w]hether the essential nature of the claim is to recover money, or whether the monetary relief is incidental to the primary claim"' (Madura v State of New York, 12 AD3d 759, 760 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 704 [2005], quoting Matter of Gross v Perales, 72 NY2d 231, 236 [1988]). The second inquiry, regardless of how a claimant categorizes a claim, is whether the claim would require review of an administrative agency's determination--which the Court of Claims has no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain (see Hoffman v State of New York, 42 AD3d 641, 642 [2007]), as review of such determinations are properly brought only in Supreme Court in a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see Matter of Scherbyn v Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 NY2d 753, 757 [1991])."
Claimant challenges the administrative acts and/or omissions of defendant, which is quintessentially a dispute to be resolved in an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court (see Matter of O'Keefe v Goord, 43 AD3d 1249 [3d Dept 2007]).
In order to award claimant damages in this action, the Court would necessarily be required to review the administrative determinations of defendant in its care and custody of claimant which, as set forth above, it lacks jurisdiction to do (see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v State of New York, 86 AD3d 820 [3d Dept 2011]; Guy v State of New York, 18 AD3d 936 [3d Dept 2005]).
At the conclusion of claimant's case, defendant moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that the appropriate method by which to challenge defendant's actions or inactions was an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, not a claim for monetary damages in the Court of Claims. At that time, the Court reserved decision on defendant's application. The Court now grants defendant's application.
All other motions or applications not otherwise decided hereby are denied.
Accordingly, the claim is, in all respects, dismissed.
Let judgment be entered accordingly.
January 10, 2013
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims