Opinion
22-ALJ-22-0059-AP
06-21-2022
William A. Pierce, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce and Lexington County School District 5, Respondents.
ORDER
Deborah Brooks Durden, Judge
STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter is an appeal by William A. Pierce (Appellant) from a January 11, 2022 decision of the South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce (Department) disqualifying Appellant from receiving unemployment benefits. The Department found Appellant voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to the employment. On appeal, Appellant argues he resigned due to Lexington County School District 5 (Lexington 5) paying his full stipend in exchange for resignation after Lexington 5 threatened to dismiss him from his employment. Appellant argues his resignation amounted to constructive discharge. The South Carolina Administrative Law Court (Court) has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. section 41-35-750 (2021). Upon consideration of the briefs and record, the Court affirms, finding substantial evidence supports the Department's decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Appellant worked for Lexington 5 from September 23, 2020, through December 18, 2020, as a wrestling coach. Appellant also worked as a substitute teacher through Kelly Services USA, LLC (Kelly Services). Appellant resigned his position on December 18 after Lexington 5 offered Appellant the opportunity to resign following a controversy involving Appellant's alleged conduct toward students. He filed for unemployment insurance benefits with the Department on July 20, 2021. The Department's claims adjudicator initially issued a determination on August 13, 2021, holding Appellant eligible for benefits effective July 18, 2021, finding he was unemployed from Kelly Services as a result of a vacation shutdown. Kelly Services appealed the determination, and a hearing was scheduled on September 13, 2021. On September 15, 2021, the Department reached out to Kelly Services for clarification on Appellant's dates of employment. On his application, Appellant had reported his dates of employment with Kelly Services as August 17, 2020, through June 4, 2021. Appellant had reported his dates of employment with Lexington 5 as August 17, 2020, through June 1, 2021. However, Kelly Services reported wages for Appellant of $14.50 for the first quarter of 2021. Lexington 5 had reported $4,200.00 for the first quarter of 2021. On September 15, 2021, Kelly Services clarified to the Department that Appellant had worked September 8, 2020, through November, 2020, and then worked again from March 21, 2021, through June 3, 2021.
On September 16, 2021, the Department's Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) mailed a decision dismissing Kelly Services' appeal, finding Kelly Services was not the proper separating employer for the claim and remanding the issue to the benefits division for corrective action. The Tribunal decision provided Appellant had ten days to appeal the decision if he disagreed with it. Appellant did not appeal this Tribunal decision. On September 16, 2021 the claims adjudicator issued a determination rescinding the August 13, 2021 determination that held Appellant eligible for benefits. Appellant did not appeal this determination.
On September 29, 2021, the claims adjudicator mailed a determination holding Appellant disqualified from receiving benefits for twenty weeks, from July 18, 2021, to December 4, 2021, holding Appellant was discharged for misconduct from Lexington 5. Appellant appealed and the Tribunal held a hearing on October 28, 2021. On October 29, 2021, the Tribunal mailed a decision holding Appellant voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to the employment and was therefore indefinitely disqualified from benefits effective July 18, 2021. Appellant appealed to the Department's Appellate Panel (Panel). On January 11, 2022, the Panel issued a decision affirming the Tribunal's decision. This appeal followed.
ISSUES
1. Did the Panel err in finding Lexington 5 was the proper separating employer for a determination of Appellant's claim for benefits?
2. Is the decision of the Panel disqualifying Appellant from unemployment insurance benefits upon a finding he voluntarily quit his employment without good cause supported by substantial evidence?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Department is an "agency" under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See Gibson v. Florence Country Club, 282 S.C. 384, 386, 318 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1984) (finding that the Employment Security Commission, a predecessor of the Department, was an agency within the meaning of the APA). Accordingly, the APA's standard of review governs appeals from decisions of the Department. See, SC Code Ann. §§ 1-23-380, 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2021); Gibson, 282 S.C. at 386, 318 S.E.2d at 367; McEachern v. S.C. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 370 S.C. 553, 557, 635 S.E.2d 644, 646-47 (Ct. App. 2006). The standard used by appellate bodies to review agency decisions is provided by section 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2021). See § 1-23-600(D) (directing administrative law judges to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in section 1-23-380(5)). That section states:
The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of an agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.§ 1-23-380(5).
A decision is supported by "substantial evidence" when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the agency. Friends of the Earth v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of S.C., 387 S.C. 360, 366, 692 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2010). The fact that the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Res. Conservation Comm'n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996). In applying the substantial evidence rule, "a reviewing court will not overturn a finding of fact by an administrative agency 'unless there is no reasonable probability that the facts could be as related by a witness upon whose testimony the finding was based.'" Sea Pines Ass'n for Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dept. of Natural Res., 345 S.C. 594, 603-04, 550 S.E.2d 287, 292 (2001) (quoting Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981)).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Separating Employer
Appellant argues the Panel erred when it determined Lexington 5 was Appellant's separating employer rather than Kelly Services. "[U]nder the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the decision of an administrative tribunal precludes the relitigation of the issues addressed by that tribunal in a collateral action." Bennett v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 305 S.C. 310, 312, 408 S.E.2d 230, 231 (1991). "An unappealed ruling is the law of the case and requires affirmance." Transp. Ins. Co. & Flagstar Corp. v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 389 S.C. 422, 431, 699 S.E.2d 687, 691 (2010). "A decision of the department, in the absence of an appeal from it as provided in this article, becomes final ten days after the date of notification or mailing of it, and judicial review is permitted only after a party claiming to be aggrieved by it has exhausted his administrative remedies as provided by Chapter 27 through 41 of this title." S.C. Code Ann. § 41-35-740 (2021).
Appellant did not appeal the September 16, 2021 decision of the Tribunal dismissing Kelly Services' appeal, finding Kelly Services was not the proper separating employer for the claim and remanding the issue to the benefits division for corrective action. Appellant also did not appeal the September 16, 2021 claims adjudicator's determination rescinding the August 13, 2021 determination that held Appellant eligible for benefits. These determinations are now the law of the case and may not be relitigated. Kelly Services is not the proper separating employer for this claim. Therefore, the Panel did not err when, consistent with the prior decision of the Tribunal, it held Lexington 5 rather than Kelly Services was Appellant's separating employer for the purposes of this benefits claim.
Eligibility for Benefits
Appellant argues the Panel's finding he voluntarily quit his most recent employment without good cause is erroneous in light of the evidence in the record. The Court disagrees. Section 41-35-120(1) of the South Carolina Code (2021) states a worker is ineligible for unemployment benefits if he left his most recent employment voluntarily, "without good cause." The phrase "good cause" as used in section 41-35-120(1) contemplates "a cause attributable to or connected with claimant's employment." Stone Mfg. Co. v. S.C. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 219 S.C. 239, 247, 64 S.E.2d 644, 647 (1951); see also, State-Record Pub. Co. v. S.C. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 254 S.C. 1, 9, 173 S.E.2d 144, 147 (1970) ("This court has heretofore, on more than one occasion, construed the phrase 'without good cause' as meaning without good cause connected with employment.").
A claimant has the burden to show that he has met the benefit eligibility conditions. Hyman v. S.C. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 234 S.C. 369, 373, 108 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1959). An employee who voluntarily leaves his employment has the burden of showing good cause for leaving. 76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 104 (updated Aug. 2013). "An employee who voluntarily resigns from employment without good cause is ineligible for unemployment benefits." Ex Parte S.C. Emp't Sec. Comm'n, 332 S.C. 286, 288, 504 S.E.2d 345, 346 (Ct. App. 1998). "An employee does not have good cause to leave employment in anticipation of discharge where no definite date for dismissal has been set." In re Greene, 176 A.D.2d 411, 573 N.Y.S.2d 999 (1991).
Here, the Panel found Appellant "resigned his position with [Lexington 5] for reasons best known to [Appellant]." There is no evidence showing Lexington 5 set a definite date on which Appellant would be dismissed from employment. Lexington 5 testified Appellant's letter of resignation did not provide a reason for his resignation. Appellant testified he resigned from Lexington 5, but he did not raise the argument he was constructively discharged. Appellant limited his argument at the October 28, 2021 hearing to the issue of whether Lexington 5 was the correct employer from which he separated. Appellant's argument that his resignation from Lexington 5 was for good cause because Lexington 5 paid him the full amount of his contract to resign was raised for the first time in his brief. "It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review." Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998). The evidence before the Panel could reasonably be interpreted to suggest Appellant voluntarily resigned for a reason other than one connected with his employment. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the Panel's conclusion Appellant voluntarily resigned without good cause.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Appellate Panel's decision is AFFIRMED. AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Robin E. Coleman, hereby certify that I have this date served this Order upon all parties to this cause by depositing a copy hereof, in the United States mail, postage paid, or by electronic mail to the address provided by the party(ies) and/or their attorney(s).
Robin E. Coleman, Judicial Aide to Judge Deborah Brooks Durden