Opinion
Civ. No. 00-2447 (RJL).
March 28, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
William Pierce, a pro se plaintiff, brings this action to challenge alleged constitutional violations arising out of a traffic stop. On September 27, 2001, Judge Gladys Kessler issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motions to dismiss, leaving the plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Montgomery County and the District of Columbia ("the District") to be decided. The Court allowed the plaintiff to pursue discovery to develop, if possible, facts and information that would reveal an unconstitutional practice or policy by Montgomery County or the District, which violated § 1983. The case was subsequently transferred to this Court on April 4, 2002. Now, before this Court is the District's motion for summary judgment regarding the remaining claim against it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the District's motion for summary judgment.
Analysis
For a full recitation of the facts, see Judge Kessler's opinion in Pierce v. Montgomery County, No. 00-2447, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2001).
The plaintiff alleges that the District of Columbia violated § 1983 because it implemented a policy, practice, or custom that results in unconstitutional arrests and a failure to train officers of the Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD"). Pl. Opp. at 14-15. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Supreme Court has held that § 1983 "imposes liability on a government that, under color of some official policy, `causes' an employee to violate another's constitutional rights." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). Section 1983, however, does not "impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor. . . . Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent." Id. The standard for imposing liability on a municipality under § 1983 requires that a plaintiff: (1) show a deprivation of constitutional rights resulting in injury, and (2) establish a causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged deprivation. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
The plaintiff's arguments focus on the second part of this standard and attempt to demonstrate that the District of Columbia's failure to train the MPD officers amounted to a policy that caused the plaintiff's injury. Pl. Opp. at 11-14. Failure to train can be a basis for § 1983 liability "only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police came into contact." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. Therefore, the plaintiff must show that the District of Columbia's policy is the "moving force [behind] the constitutional violation." See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see also Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that "municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where — and only where — a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by city policymakers." City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff has shown neither.
Here, the plaintiff has failed to meet the standards set forth in both Monell and City of Canton. His claim not only fails to specify the nature and substance of an unconstitutional District policy that caused his injuries, but falls short of illustrating any "deliberate indifference" by the District. In addition, the plaintiff has shown neither a causal connection between the alleged inadequate training and the individual acts of the MPD officers, nor sufficient evidence that additional training would have prevented his injury. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91 (noting that an officer's insufficient training will not alone suffice to hold a city liable since the officer's shortcomings may have resulted from other factors). Accordingly, even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is insufficient evidence to establish the necessary District policy, let alone the necessary causal connection between any policy and the alleged injuries suffered by the plaintiff, to sustain an action under § 1983. Therefore, the District's motion for summary judgment is granted.
Although Judge Kessler found that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a policy or custom to survive a motion to dismiss, she indicated that the plaintiff had "not identified the policy, practice or custom with precision." Pierce, slip op. at 8. Accordingly, Judge Kessler permitted the plaintiff to conduct discovery to determine whether such a policy or custom existed. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate or support his contention that a policy, practice, or custom exists.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, it is this 28 th day of March, 2005, hereby
ORDERED that the District of Columbia's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 54] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.