L.Ed. 937, 45 S.Ct. 497. A distinction is sometimes made as to the duty of exercising diligence to learn the truth between cases where the claim of estoppel is based on mere silence or inaction, as here, and those where it is based on affirmative representation or conduct, the view being taken that the availability of a means of knowing the true state of facts, as by reference to the public records, bars a claim of estoppel in cases of the former class. Eltinge v. Santos, 171 Cal. 278, 152 P. 915; Davidson v. Jennings, 27 Colo. 187, 60 P. 354, 48 L.R.A. 340, 83 Am. St. Rep. 49; Cox v. Simmerman, 243 Ky. 474, 48 S.W.2d 1078; Williams v. Reid (Mo.) 37 S.W.2d 537; Crest v. Jack, 3 Watts (Pa.) 238, 27 Am. Dec. 353; Peterson v. Bergman Cabinet Mfg. Co., 145 Wn. 664, 261 P. 381, 55 A.L.R. 989; but not those in the latter class; Graham v. Thompson, 55 Ark. 296, 18 S.W. 58, 29 Am. St. Rep. 40; Westerman v. Corder, 86 Kan. 239, 119 P. 868, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 500, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 60. See, also, Pierce v. Jones et al., 182 Okla. 515, 78 P.2d 677; Martin Coal Coke Co. et al. v. Brewer, Rec., et al., 185 Okla. 169, 90 P.2d 653. Reversed, with directions to enter judgment in conformity with the views herein expressed.
HURST, J. This cause is an outgrowth of Pierce v. Jones, 182 Okla. 515, 78 P.2d 677. Morris was by the trial court appointed receiver of the property in that case, and upon his appointment he removed the drilling rig involved in that action to Oklahoma City, and stored it upon a vacant lot adjoining the property used by Jones in conducting a trucking business. Later he sold some of the property at a receiver's sale.