Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. PC20070414
SCOTLAND, P. J.
Charity Boyle appeals from an order prohibiting her from contacting or harassing her coworker, Jennifer Pierce. Boyle contends there is no substantial evidence that she engaged in any harassing conduct warranting injunctive relief, and the trial court impermissibly based the injunction on constitutionally protected conduct. We shall affirm the order (judgment).
FACTS
We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 787), and discuss conflicting evidence only as relevant to our analysis of Boyle’s contention that no substantial evidence supports the judgment.
Pierce’s request for an injunction stems from an ongoing conflict with Boyle, who apparently believed that Pierce was involved with Jon DeRoca, a customer whom Boyle had previously dated. Around the middle of 2006, DeRoca came into the Cameron Park Safeway store where Pierce worked, and had Pierce listen to a voicemail message on his telephone. Pierce heard Boyle’s voice state she wanted to “bash [Pierce’s] head in.” Thinking Boyle needed help, Pierce contacted Renee Torres, who is Boyle’s cousin and Pierce’s coworker.
Torres testified that in December 2006, Boyle said she carried a baseball bat in her car in case she found DeRoca with another woman. Torres, who thought that Boyle had been behaving irrationally, related this information to Pierce because she was concerned for Pierce’s safety. In Torres’s opinion, Boyle was capable of stalking someone, and Torres believed that Boyle had been stalking DeRoca.
Several months after Torres told Pierce about Boyle’s baseball bat, Boyle came through Pierce’s check stand at work and accused her of telling DeRoca that Boyle had dated a man named Rod Hemman. Pierce denied this occurred and suggested that Boyle discuss the matter with Torres. Boyle swore at Pierce and stormed off when Torres appeared.
In late 2006 or early 2007, Boyle, who also worked for Safeway, transferred to the Cameron Park store where Pierce worked. Torres asked Boyle why she would want to transfer stores given that DeRoca shopped at the Cameron Park Safeway and told people he thought Boyle was crazy.
Pierce learned from Torres that Boyle was saying she would do whatever it took to get Pierce fired. Pierce expressed concern to the human resources department about working with Boyle, but then decided she could “deal with it.” Subsequently, Boyle asked Pierce to attend a meeting with their boss, Kim Gibber. At the meeting, Boyle made accusations about Pierce and also said “mean things” about Torres. Gibber eventually stopped the meeting and told Pierce and Boyle to stay away from one another. When Pierce was on the phone 10 minutes later, Boyle walked by and said “that better not be about us, or else.”
On July 6, 2007, Boyle became upset with Pierce and stated, “[I’ll] take care of [you] later.” Pierce was too scared to leave the store when her shift ended and had someone escort her to her car. Two days after that, Hemman told Pierce that he had been on the phone with Boyle and her demeanor worried him. He wanted to warn Pierce that he was concerned for her safety. According to Pierce, Hemman said he hoped that Boyle “doesn’t have access to a gun.” Thereafter, Pierce applied for a restraining order.
Boyle denied threatening Pierce’s physical safety, denied she thought Pierce had a sexual relationship with DeRoca, and intimated that Hemman was a drunk. Boyle conceded, in her words, “because of [Pierce] bringing HR in, making [Boyle] look the way she was making [Boyle] look at work,” Boyle “was going to go further with HR -- or the union . . . .” Boyle did not care if either one of them lost their jobs.
The trial court granted Pierce’s petition for an injunction. It expressly found that Boyle had made credible threats of violence to Pierce, and implicitly found that Boyle had engaged in a continuing course of conduct designed to harass and annoy Pierce.
DISCUSSION
I
Boyle contends there is no clear and convincing evidence that she threatened Pierce with violence or engaged in a harassing course of conduct directed at Pierce within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. (Further section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.)
Section 527.6 establishes a procedure for expedited injunctive relief to persons suffering harassment. A temporary restraining order may be obtained upon an affidavit showing reasonable proof of harassment (§ 527.6, subd. (c)), after which a hearing is held on the request for a longer injunction. (§ 527.6, subd. (d).) “At the hearing, the judge shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent inquiry.” (§ 527.6, subd. (d), italics added.) “Testimony” may be taken by affidavit (or declaration under penalty of perjury, see §§ 2003, 2015.5), by deposition, or by oral testimony. (§ 2002; Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners’ Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 733, fn. 6 (hereafter Schraer).) Section 527.6 does not expressly limit “testimony” to oral testimony. (Schraer, supra, at p. 733, fn. 6.)
“If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an injunction shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (d).) But where the trial court determines that a party has met the “clear and convincing” burden, that heavy evidentiary standard disappears, and we review the evidence in accordance with customary rules of appellate review. (Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1111, fn. 2; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 371, p. 428.)
A trial court’s decision to grant an injunction rests within its sound discretion and will not be disturbed without a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. (Shapiro v. San Diego City Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.) In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we review the court’s findings under the substantial evidence standard, resolving all factual conflicts and questions of credibility in the respondent’s favor and drawing all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment. (Ibid; Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762.) Even if the evidence at the hearing is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, we may not reweigh the evidence or choose among alternative permissible inferences. (Howard v. Owens Corning (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 631.) Thus, we do not substitute our deductions for those of the trial court. (Shapiro v. San Diego City Council, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 912.)
For purposes of section 527.6, “harassment” is defined as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b).)
A “credible threat of violence” is defined as “a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(2).)
A “course of conduct” is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail, fax, or computer e-mail. . . .’” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
Boyle contends there was no credible evidence she threatened Pierce with violence or engaged in a course of conduct designed to seriously alarm, annoy, or harass Pierce. She portrays the matter as nothing more than a mere squabble between coworkers who dislike each other. This is one interpretation of the evidence but not the only one.
The trial court observed the parties testify and was in a better position to assess their credibility. It chastised Boyle about her demeanor and apparently found that Pierce was the more credible witness. Pierce presented evidence that over a period of about a year and a half, Boyle threatened to bash her head in; carried a baseball bat to attack any woman she found with DeRoca; believed Pierce was sleeping with DeRoca; threatened to take care of Pierce later; and threatened to ensure that Pierce lost her job. Both Torres and Hemman were concerned about Pierce’s safety, as was Pierce. This constitutes substantial evidence that supports the court’s decision to issue an injunction.
II
Boyle also claims the trial court improperly based the injunction on conduct protected by the First Amendment. In her view, the court’s primary justification for the issuance of the order was “Ms. Boyle’s admission, some attempt or belief on her behalf that perhaps she should do whatever she needs to do to get Ms. Pierce fired from her job, and those are things that are not allowed.” Boyle contends she is free to report unflattering facts and opinions to Pierce’s employer, and the employer can do what it wants with the information. She further asserts that even if the statements are false, Pierce’s remedy is an action for defamation rather than a limitation on Boyle’s freedom. We disagree.
Speech between purely private parties, about purely private parties, on matters of purely private interest that is for the purpose of harassment is not protected speech. (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 134; Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1409-1410; Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1250.) Here, the trial court properly relied on Boyle’s admission as evidence that she intended to continue harassing Pierce, and perhaps to explain why the court found Pierce more credible. The trial court did not err in considering Boyle’s speech in determining whether to issue injunctive relief pursuant to section 527.6. (Brekke v. Wills, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1409.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MORRISON, J., ROBIE, J.