Picou v. J.B. Luke's Sons

16 Citing cases

  1. Boyer v. Johnson

    360 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1978)   Cited 77 times
    In Boyer v. Johnson, 360 So.2d 1164, 1168-69 (La. 1978), the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that, although violation of a criminal statute does not automatically create civil liability, the statute could be used as a guideline for determining an analogous standard of due care in a civil case.

    1, prohibiting employment during school hours without a proper work certificate were obviously designed to prevent interference with a child's education and not to promote safety. Picou v. J. B. Luke's Sons, 204 La. 881, 16 So.2d 466 (1943); 6 La.L.Rev. 209. LSA-R.S. 23:161(4), prohibiting the employment of a minor to transport explosives, was obviously designed to restrict employment creating a risk of explosion.

  2. Laird v. Travelers Insurance Company

    263 La. 199 (La. 1972)   Cited 93 times
    In Laird v. Travelers Insurance Co., 263 La. 199, 267 So.2d 714 (1972), another traffic accident case, we found foreseeability to be a more appropriate test when only a single actor is involved.

    We must determine whether the prohibition in the statute is designed to protect from the harm or damage which ensues from its violation. Lopes v. Sahuque, 114 La. 1004, 38 So. 810 (1905); Picou v. J. B. Luke's Sons, 204 La. 881, 16 So.2d 466 (1943); Perkins v. Texas and New Orleans Railroad Company, 243 La. 829, 147 So.2d 646 (1962); Lee v. Carwile, 168 So.2d 469 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1916) (cf. Alexander v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 140 La. 54, 72 So. 806 (1916)); 26 La.L.Rev. 518.

  3. Theunissen v. Guidry

    244 La. 631 (La. 1963)   Cited 33 times
    In Theunissen v. Guidry, 153 So.2d 869 (La. 1963), the court held that contributory negligence is simply negligence and is measured by the same test, whether statutory or otherwise, as primary negligence; moreover, contributory negligence, being relative, is necessarily dependent upon the facts in each case.

    We have also held that to impose liability for an injury claimed to be the result of a violation of statute or ordinance, it must appear that compliance therewith would have prevented the injury. Picou v. J. B. Luke's Sons, 204 La. 881, 16 So.2d 466; Martin v. Jonesboro Drug Co., 7 La. App. 262. We conclude that Guidry's compliance with the Ordinance of the City of Jennings, by according to Theunissen the right-of-way in crossing the intersection, would have prevented the accident and the injuries and damage for which Theunissen seeks recovery.

  4. State v. Bishop

    128 S.E.2d 914 (S.C. 1962)   Cited 2 times

    ) 50 N.W.2d 270; 150 Ohio St. 53, 80 N.W.2d 868; (Tex.App.) 258 S.W.2d 98; 229 N.C. 434, 50 S.E.2d 33; 238 N.C. 577, 78 S.E.2d 38; 239 N.C. 120, 79 S.E.2d 264; 191 Ga. 241, 12 S.E.2d 636; 59 Ga. App. 729, 2 S.E.2d 184; (La.) 11 So.2d 38, Aff. 16 So.2d 466, 204 La. 881; 144 N.Y.S.2d 859. 286 App. Div. 1060; (Tex.Civ.App.) 140 S.W.2d 932; 190 Ga. 684, 10 S.E.2d 186; 351 U.S. 12, 100 L.Ed. 891, 76 S.Ct. 585; 360 U.S. 252; 257 U.S. 214, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269, 78 S.Ct. 1061; 271 F.2d 659; 191 S.C. 1, 3 S.E.2d 257; 172 S.C. 411, 174 S.E. 234; 77 S.C. 236. Messrs. John H. Nolen, Solicitor, and Claude A. Taylor,Jr., Assistant Solicitor, of Spartanburg, for Respondent, cite: As to the denial of the appellant's motion for a freetranscript not being an abuse of the trial judge's discretion: 38 Words and Phrases 268; 80 S.E. 470, 96 S.C. 290.

  5. Bagala v. Kimble

    225 La. 943 (La. 1954)   Cited 13 times

    See Great American Ins. Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Great American Indemnity Co.), La.App., 15 So.2d 241; Federal Ins. Co. v. Employers' Liability Ins. Corp., La.App., 4 So.2d 626; Grasser v. Cunningham, La.App., 200 So. 658; Michelli v. Rheem Mfg. Co., La.App., 34 So.2d 264; Picou v. J. B. Luke's Sons, 204 La. 881, 16 So.2d 466. "3 and 4

  6. Pitzer v. Tompkies

    67 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1951)   Cited 17 times
    Overruling Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Coal Co., 68 W. Va. 405, 69 S.E. 857

    See Terry Dairy Co. v. Nalley, supra; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Ausbrooks, supra. Defendant cites the case of Picou v. J. B. Luke's Sons et al. (La.), 16 So.2d 466. There, the action of the plaintiff against her decedent's employer was not grounded upon the violation of a statute prohibiting child labor, but was premised upon a failure by the decedent's employer to obtain an age and employment certificate under a statute authorizing the issuance by certain officials of such certificates. It was there held that the issuance of such a certificate would not have prevented the accident giving rise to plaintiff's action, and hence there was no causal connection between the neglect to obtain the certificate under the statute and the accident.

  7. Valenti v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co.

    435 So. 2d 1088 (La. Ct. App. 1983)

    Mr. Rodriguez testified the National Building Code had been adopted by ordinance of the City-Parish. An older Louisiana case held that to impose liability for an injury claimed to be the result of a violation of a statute it must appear that compliance therewith would have prevented the injury. Picou v. J.B. Luke's Sons, 204 La. 881, 16 So.2d 466 (La. 1943). In this case we cannot conclude that had the ceiling (and the light fixture) been a mere two inches higher the injury would not have occurred.

  8. Fabre v. B. F. Goodrich Company

    218 So. 2d 617 (La. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 4 times

    Scott v. Claiborne Electric Cooperative, La. App., 13 So.2d 524; Cavaretta v. Universal Film Exchanges, La. App., 182 So. 135. If, in the sequence of events between the original negligence and the injury, an entirely independent cause intervenes which is of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the accident, the second cause is the proximate cause of the accident and the original negligence is not the proximate cause. Picou v. J. B. Luke's Son, 204 La. 881, 16 So.2d 466. Here appellant's negligence, which we have pointed out above, was an entirely independent and intervening cause of the accident in suit.

  9. Landry v. Flaitz

    184 So. 2d 311 (La. Ct. App. 1966)

    We feel that the failure of the Supreme Court to mention the question of attorneys' fees was caused by the fact that this was not set up as an error in plaintiffs' application for writs, and that they evidently considered this point abandoned. We feel that the case of Picou v. J. B. Luke's Sons 204 La. 881, 16 So.2d 466 at page 470 is indicative and decisive of the issues in this case. Picou v. Luke's Sons, supra, holds as follows:

  10. Courville v. Anchor Gasoline Corporation

    174 So. 2d 680 (La. Ct. App. 1965)   Cited 4 times
    In Courville v. Anchor Gasoline Corporation, 174 So.2d 680 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1965), the setting of bond in a pauper case was held not to negate the order allowing the plaintiff to proceed in forma Pauperis. Here the reverse is true. The rescission could only be revoked by another pauper order after a review of new supporting affidavits as required by LSA-C.C.P. art. 5183.

    Muller v. Johnson, 140 La. 902, 74 So. 189. Accordingly, a district court errs in exacting an appeal bond of an in forma pauperis party statutorily entitled to appeal without bond; further, such an improper bond requirement is treated as surplusage in the order of appeal, and the pauper party's appeal will be treated as perfected by the order granting the appeal even if no bond is filed in accordance therewith, and the appeal will be considered on the merits by the appellate court as in the case of all other perfected appeals. Succession of Jones, 189 La. 693, 180 So. 489; Picou v. J. B. Luke's Sons, La. App. 1 Cir., 11 So.2d 38, affirmed 204 La. 881, 16 So.2d 466. Under LSA-CCP Art. 2088, an appeal is perfected by the timely filing of an appeal bond, "or if no bond is required, upon the granting of the order of appeal."