Summary
granting protection under 4-103 "to the extent that [the plaintiff's] tort claim is based upon an alleged failure to provide sufficient personnel or supervision," but not to the extent that the claims were based on willful conduct
Summary of this case from Hoffman v. DuPage Cnty.Opinion
No. 04 C 3559.
December 14, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on Defendant Sheriff Michael Sheahan's ("Sheahan") motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, we grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Marie Pico ("Pico") alleges in her amended complaint that during the evening of January 2, 2004, she was a passenger in a vehicle and that she was arrested by Cook County police officers. Pico claims that she was transported to the Cook County Jail ("Jail") and that when she was taken to the Jail she informed the Jail custodian that she suffered from diabetes and required insulin medication. Pico claims that the Jail staff refused to give her the requested insulin. Pico claims that, as a result of the failure to provide her with insulin, she fell into a diabetic coma that lasted for approximately sixteen days and that she suffered extensive brain damage. Pico's amended complaint includes four Counts. Pico's amended complaint includes claims alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") by Sheahan in his individual and official capacity (Count I), a claim against Sheahan in his individual and official capacity alleging negligence falling within an exception to the Illinois Tort Immunity Act ("ITIA"), 745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq., (Count II), a claim against the County of Cook and the Cook County Board alleging a violation of Section 1983 (Count III), and a negligence claim against the County of Cook (Count IV). Sheahan has filed a motion to dismiss all claims brought against him.
LEGAL STANDARD
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must draw all reasonable inferences that favor the plaintiff, construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint. Thompson v. Illinois Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 300 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2002); Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1991). The allegations of a complaint should not be dismissed for a failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Nonetheless, in order to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege the "operative facts" upon which each claim is based. Kyle v. Morton High School, 144 F.3d 448, 445-55 (7th Cir. 1998); Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 1992). Under current notice pleading standard in federal courts a plaintiff "need to plead facts that, if true, establish each element of a "cause of action.'" See Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc, 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that a "[a]t this stage the plaintiff receives the benefit of imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint" and that "[m]atching facts against legal elements comes later."). The plaintiff need not allege all of the facts involved in the claim and can plead conclusions. Higgs v. Carter, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002); Kyle, 144 F.3d at 455. However, any conclusions pled must "provide the defendant with at least minimal notice of the claim," Id., and the plaintiff cannot satisfy federal pleading requirements merely "by attaching bare legal conclusions to narrated facts which fail to outline the bases of [his] claim." Perkins, 939 F.2d at 466-67.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1983 Individual Capacity Claims
Sheahan argues that the individual capacity claims brought against him should be dismissed because Pico has not alleged that Sheahan was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation. The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that "[t]he doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions. . . ." Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, an individual cannot be held liable under Section 1983 in his individual capacity unless he "participated directly in the constitutional violation." Hildebrandt v. Illinois Dept. of Natural Resources, 347 F.3d 1014, 1039 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that "Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation."). For a supervisor to be held liable under Section 1983 for acting in his supervisory role, a plaintiff must show that the supervisor directed the constitutional deprivation or that it occurred with his "knowledge and consent." Id. (indicating that a plaintiff must show that the supervisor knew "about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.").
We agree with Sheahan that Pico has not alleged that Sheahan had sufficient personal involvement with the alleged constitutional deprivations. Pico also acknowledges in his answer to the instant motion that he has no evidence that Sheahan was personally involved and Pico voluntarily moves in his answer to dismiss the Section 1983 individual capacity claim against Sheahan. (Ans. Par. 1-2). Therefore, we grant Sheahan's motion to dismiss the individual capacity claims brought against Sheahan. II. Illinois Tort Immunity Act Claim
Sheahan argues that the ITIA claim should be dismissed because Sheahan is provided with absolute immunity under 745 ILCS 10/4-103 ("Section 4-103") of the ITIA. The ITIA provides in part the following:
§ 4-103. Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to provide a jail, detention or correctional facility, or if such facility is provided, for failure to provide sufficient equipment, personnel, supervision or facilities therein. Nothing in this Section requires the periodic inspection of prisoners.745 ILCS 10/4-103. Pico responds by arguing that his tort claim can proceed in light of 745 ILCS 10/4-105 ("Section 4-105") which states the following:
§ 4-105. Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but this Section shall not apply where the employee, acting within the scope of his employment, knows from his observation of conditions that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and, through willful and wanton conduct, fails to take reasonable action to summon medical care. Nothing in this Section requires the periodic inspection of prisoners.745 ILCS 10/4-105. Section 4-103 of the ITIA provides a County Sheriff with "immunity for `failure to provide for and supervise" a prison facility. Tatum v. Davis, 1996 WL 388405, at *2-5 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (quoting in part Jefferson v. Sheahan, 664 N.E.2d 212, 213 (Ill.App.Ct. 1996)); Alvarez v. Riesche, 1999 WL 519383, at *8-10 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (indicating that Section 4-103 provides immunity for claims based upon an "alleged failure to provide sufficient personnel or supervision while [the plaintiff] was incarcerated. . . ."). Section 4-105 provides an exception to immunity in certain instances involving a wilful and wanton denial of immediate medical care to a prisoner. Id.; Williams v. City of Chicago, 1995 WL 88926, at *1-7 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Therefore, to the extent that Pico's tort claim is based upon an alleged failure to provide sufficient personnel or supervision, Sheahan is entitled to immunity under Section 4-103 and we grant the motion to dismiss to the extent that Pico's claims are based upon a failure to provide sufficient personnel or supervision.
Sheahan argues that regardless of Section 4-105's limitations on immunity, he is protected by absolute immunity for all tort claims in this action under Section 4-103. However, were that the case, there would be no reason for the existence of Section 4-105 if there is a blanket immunity in regards to all tort claims under Section 4-103. In fact, courts have addressed Section 4-103 claims and 4-105 claims in turn and, as indicated above, have made the distinction between what alleged misconduct that each section covers. Williams, 1995 WL 88926, at *1-7. Pico clearly alleges in his complaint that he was denied prompt medical care. Pico also alleges facts, which for the purposes of this motion to dismiss we must accept as true, Thompson, 300 F.3d at 753, and which could constitute willful and wanton misconduct by Defendants. Pico's allegations mirror exactly the subject matter mentioned in Section 4-105. Pico claims that at least one County "employee, acting within the scope of his employment" knew from observing Pico that he was "in need of immediate medical care" and that "through willful and wanton conduct," the County employee "fail[ed] to take reasonable action to summon medical care." 745 ILCS 10/4-105.
Sheahan argues that he is entitled to immunity on all claims under Section 4-103 and that Jefferson v. Sheahan, 664 N.E.2d 212 (Ill.App.Ct. 1996) is "directly on point and is dispositive. . . ." (Mot. 5). However, in Jefferson the facts were different than those in the case before us. In Jefferson, the plaintiff inmate claimed that he was attacked by another inmate and claimed that he was denied medical care for an hour. Jefferson, 664 N.E.2d at 213. As the court noted in Jefferson the plaintiff specifically alleged that the defendant "failed to adequately supervise" the area where the plaintiff was attacked. Id. at 214. The allegations in the instant action are not that Defendants failed to supervise the area where Pico was detained, but are that an employee of the County acting within the scope of employment failed to provide Pico with timely medical care.
Also, the court in Jefferson did not have cause to address 4-105 because the court's ruling cited by Sheahan was a ruling in response to the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion to certify certain issues for an immediate appeal. Id. The appeal before the court in Jefferson was limited to determining: 1) whether or not a court can create an exception for willful and wanton conduct for Section 4-103 despite the fact that the exception is not expressly stated in Section 4-103, Id., and 2) whether or not the allegations by the plaintiff were sufficient to plead willful and wanton conduct. Id. at 217. Thus, the court in Jefferson limited its inquiry to Section 4-103 and in fact the only mention of Section 4-105 was that Section 4-105 does have an exception to the immunity unlike Section 4-103. Id. at 215 n. 1. Therefore, we deny Sheahan's motion to dismiss Pico's claims to the extent that they are based upon Section 4-105. We note that we are not finding that Sheahan will ultimately be found liable in his individual capacity. We only find that at this motion to dismiss stage Pico has provided sufficient allegations to proceed.
III. Official Capacity Claim
Sheahan indicates in the instant motion that he is unclear as to whether Pico is bringing a claim against him in his official capacity. Pico indicates in his answer that he is bringing an official capacity claim against Sheahan. The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that "[a]n official capacity suit is the same as a suit against the entity of which the officer is an agent." DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage County, 209 F.3d 973, 974-75 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Sanders v. Sheahan, 198 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[a] claim against a government employee acting in his official capacity is the same as a suit directed against the entity the official represents."). Since Pico has already named the County of Cook as a Defendant in this action which is the entity that Sheahan represents in his official capacity, the official capacity claim against Sheahan is redundant and is hereby dismissed.