Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:15-CV-693-WKW [WO]
09-24-2015
RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Plaintiff, an indigent state inmate incarcerated at the J.O. Davis Correctional Facility in Atmore, Alabama. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a prisoner may not bring a civil action or proceed on appeal in forma pauperis if he "has, on 3 or more occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
In Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731 (1998), the Court determined that the "three strikes" provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which requires frequent filer prisoner indigents to prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts may consider their cases and appeals, "does not violate the First Amendment right to access the courts; the separation of judicial and legislative powers; the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law; or the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, as incorporated through the Fifth Amendment." In Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007), the Supreme Court abrogated Rivera but only to the extent it compelled an inmate to plead exhaustion of remedies in his complaint as "failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA . . . and inmates are not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints." --------
I. DISCUSSION
Court records establish that Plaintiff, while incarcerated or detained, has on at least three occasions had civil actions and/or appeals dismissed as frivolous, as malicious, for failure to state a claim and/or for asserting claims against defendants immune from suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The cases on which this court relies in finding a § 1915(g) violation are: (1) Pickett v. Gaither, et al., Case No. 2:98-CV-1343-ID (M.D. Ala. 1999) (appeal frivolous); (2) Pickett v. McAliley, et al, Case No. 2:98-CV-1330-WHA (M.D. Ala. 1999) (appeal frivolous); (3) Pickett v. Thompson, et al, Case No. 2:93-CV-642-ID (M. D. Ala. 1993); (4) Pickett v. Esdale, et al, Case No. 2:93-CV-294-ID (M. D. Ala. 1993); and (5) Pickett v. Phelps, et al, Case No. 2:92-CV-1289-TMH (M.D. Ala. 1992). This court, therefore, concludes that the summary dismissals place Plaintiff in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
In the instant civil action, Plaintiff complains that Defendants conspired to house him in an overcrowded and hazardous environment causing him to contract latent tuberculosis. Neither the challenge to actions of state officials nor the general and conclusory allegations regarding his exposure to the tuberculosis virus in the prison setting adequately demonstrates Plaintiff was "under imminent danger of serious physical injury" when he filed this cause of action as required to meet the exception preventing application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 1999).
"General allegations that are not grounded in specific facts which indicate that serious physical injury is imminent are not sufficient to invoke the exception to § 1915(g)." Niebla v. Walton Corr. Inst., 2006 WL 2051307, *2 (N.D. Fla. July 20, 2006) (citing Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 1050 (8th Cir. 2003). "The plaintiff must allege and provide specific fact allegations of ongoing serious physical injury, or a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical injury, and vague allegations of harm and unspecific references to injury are insufficient." Id. (citing Martin, supra, and White v. State of Colorado, 157 F.3d 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted). The "imminent danger" exception is available "for genuine emergencies," "where time is pressing" and "a threat . . . is real and proximate." Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002).
The court has carefully reviewed the claims in the instant action. Even construing all allegations in favor of Plaintiff, his claims do not entitle him to avoid the bar of § 1915(g) because they do not allege nor indicate that he was "under imminent danger of serious physical injury" when he filed this cause of action as required to meet the imminent danger exception to the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Medberry, 185 F.3d 1189. See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 315 (3d Cir. 2001) ("By using the term 'imminent,' Congress indicated that it wanted to include a safety valve for the 'three strikes' rule to prevent impending harms, not those harms that had already occurred.").
Based on the foregoing, the court concludes this case is due to be summarily dismissed without prejudice as Plaintiff failed to pay the requisite filing and administrative fees upon his initiation of this case. Dupree, 284 F.3d at 1236 (emphasis in original) ("[T]he proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss the complaint without prejudice when [an inmate is not entitled] to proceed in forma pauperis [due] to [violation of] the provisions of § 1915(g)" because the prisoner "must pay the filing fee at the time he initiates the suit."); Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001) (same).
II. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:
1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2) be DENIED; and
2. This case be DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff's failure to pay the filing and administrative fees upon his initiation of this case.
It is further
ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said Recommendation on or before October 8, 2015. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Stein v. Lanning Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.
Done this 24th day of September, 2015.
/s/ Wallace Capel, Jr.
WALLACE CAPEL, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE