Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-00500-RBH-JDA
02-23-2022
Matthew Pickens, a/k/a Matthew T. Pickens, a/k/a Matthew Thomas Pickens, Jr., Plaintiff, v. S.C. Dept. of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
Matthew Pickens (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this civil action purportedly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (“Defendant”) violated his rights under the United States Constitution. Plaintiff filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons explained below, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff asserts Defendant has denied his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and has denied his due process rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment depriving him of a meaningful opportunity to obtain parole release. [Id. at 4.]
In April 1988, when Plaintiff was seventeen, he was indicted in Anderson, South Carolina, for first degree burglary and first degree criminal sexual conduct. [Id. at 8.] Plaintiff was convicted by a jury of both charges on September 21, 1988. [Id.] He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree burglary charge and to thirty years for the criminal sexual conduct charge to be served consecutively. [Id.]
In 2002, Plaintiff was released from prison on parole. [Id.] However, he was subsequently convicted for check fraud and obtaining goods by false pretenses and again incarcerated in 2006. [Id.] His parole was revoked at that time. [Id.] On September 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for resentencing. [Id. at 9.] After a hearing, his motion for resentencing was dismissed on August 3, 2017. [Id.]
Since Plaintiff's parole was revoked in 2006, he has received seven parole hearings, with the most recent hearing taking place on February 23, 2020. [Id.] At that hearing, the parole board unanimously rejected his request for parole. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that his “juvenile life sentence is the functional equivalent to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as applied to [him] because he has been repeatedly denied parole for the last thirteen (13) years without any consideration of the hallmark of youth.” [Id.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff contends he has suffered from physical and psychological torture, mental depression, and anxiety. [Id. at 10.] Plaintiff further contends he has been subjected to assault while in prison, exposed to the coronavirus, and kept away from his family and friends. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff requests that he be released from incarceration and be resentenced. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute, which authorizes the district court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
DISCUSSION
As noted, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
Plaintiff's action is duplicative
First, Plaintiff's Complaint filed in this case raises claims similar to those asserted in at least two other cases previously filed by Plaintiff in this Court. See Pickens v. S.C. Dep't of Prob. Parole & Pardon Servs., No. 2:09-cv-2127-RBH (D.S.C. Aug. 13, 2009), and Pickens v. Michael McCall, Warden, No. 2:08-cv-3907-RBH (D.S.C. Dec. 1, 2008). Significantly, Plaintiff is attempting to re-assert the same claims against the same Defendant under nearly the same facts as in his case at number 2:09-cv-2127.
A court may take judicial notice of its own records. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Because the present action is duplicative of Plaintiff's other cases, which have all been dismissed, this action also warrants dismissal. “[R]epetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as frivolous.” Paul v. de Holczer, No. 3:15-cv-2178-CMC-PJG, 2015 WL 4545974, at *6 (D.S.C. July 28, 2015) (holding that “the instant Complaint should be summarily dismissed as a frivolous duplicate filing in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency”), aff'd 631 Fed.Appx. 197 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016); see also Cox v. Cartledge, No. 3:13-cv-481-TMC, 2013 WL 1401684 (D.S.C. Mar. 13, 2013), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 1401674 (D.S.C. Apr. 8, 2013) (same). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that, “[b]ecause district courts are not required to entertain duplicative lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).” Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142, 2000 WL 1144623, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug.14, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (citing Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1992) (“district courts may dismiss duplicative complaints under section 1915”)); Wilkins v. Harley, Case No. 6:11-cv-3463-MBS-KFM, 2012 WL 256566, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 12, 2012) (“this duplicate § 1983 Complaint is frivolous and subject to summary dismissal”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 260159 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2012). Therefore, in the interests of judicial economy and efficiency, because the present lawsuit is a meritless duplicate of Plaintiff's prior lawsuits, the present case is frivolous and subject to summary dismissal. See Lester v. Perry Corr. Inst., No. 4:12-cv-971-TMC-TER, 2012 WL 1963592, at *3 (D.S.C. May 10, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 1963566 (D.S.C. May 31, 2012), aff'd, 479 Fed.Appx. 509 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (“The District Court clearly had the right to take notice of its own files and records and it had no duty to grind the same corn a second time. Once was sufficient.”).
Defendant is entitled to dismissal
Additionally, the sole Defendant named in this action is entitled to dismissal because it is not considered a “person” under § 1983. It is well settled that inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds do not qualify as “persons” and cannot act under color of state law. See Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (noting the detention center was a building that was not amenable to suit under § 1983); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”). Similarly, the staff of an organization is not considered a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and groups of people may not be sued under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Dalton v. SCDC, No. 8:09-cv-260-CMC-BHH, 2009 WL 823931, at *2 (D.S.C. March 26, 2009) (dismissing the medical staff of SCDC and Prison Health Services as defendants because they were not persons). As such, “[t]he South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services is not a ‘person' subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Rutledge v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., No. 4:07-cv-1797-DCN-TER, 2007 WL 2736530, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 17, 2007). Accordingly, the Complaint against Defendant should be dismissed.
Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought
Finally, Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he seeks in this § 1983 action. The crux of this action appears to be a challenge to Plaintiff's parole revocation, and he seeks to overturn his sentence and be released from incarceration. However, release from custody is not an available remedy in this civil rights action.
For his relief, Plaintiff appears to seek only resentencing and release from custody. However, to the extent he also intends to seek money damages in this action, any such claim is barred by the Heck doctrine because his convictions and sentences have not been invalidated. In Heck, the Supreme Court explained that,
. . . in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Heck, 512 U.S. at 481. Further, the Supreme Court stated that,
. . . when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Id. This is known as the “favorable termination” requirement, which Plaintiff has not alleged he has satisfied. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008). Courts have held that Heck is applicable to parole and probation revocation proceedings. See Phagan v. Webber, No. 8:18-cv-00564-TMC-JDA, 2018 WL 4573098, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 8, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 3100018 (D.S.C. June 25, 2018); Crow v. Penry, 102 F.3d 1086, 1087 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting Heck “applies to proceedings that call into question the fact or duration of parole or probation” (internal citation omitted)); McGrew v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting preclusive rule of Heck is applicable to parole revocation proceedings); Harris v. Miller, No. 94-7067, 1994 WL 704891, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec.19, 1994) (“To the extent Appellant is challenging his parole revocation, or the procedures used to revoke his parole, such a claim is not cognizable because his parole revocation has not been invalidated.”); Brown v. Lemacks, No. 8:09-cv-2160-CMC-BHH, 2010 WL 2179492, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 28, 2010) (“The Supreme Court's ruling in Heck also applies to probation and parole violation proceedings.” (internal citations omitted)), Report and Recommendation adopted by, 2010 WL 2179490 (D.S.C. May 27, 2010); Graham v. Webber, No. 8:15-cv-04231-DCN-BM, 2016 WL 403622, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2016), Report and Recommendation adopted by, 2016 WL 374942 (D.S.C. Feb. 1, 2016). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that his conviction has been invalidated, for example, by a reversal on direct appeal or a state or federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. A favorable determination on the merits of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim would imply that his conviction and sentence were invalid. Thus, this § 1983 claim should be dismissed because a right of action has not accrued.
Instead, “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus).
RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324-25.
The undersigned notes that any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the Complaint would be futile for the reasons stated herein. In light of the allegations in the Complaint, together with the state court records and Plaintiff's prior cases filed in this Court, the undersigned finds that no set of facts can support Plaintiff's asserted claims for relief. Accordingly, the District Court should dismiss this action without affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his Complaint. See Workman v. Kernell, No. 6:18-cv-00355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 4826535, at *2 n.7 (D.S.C. Oct. 2, 2018) (declining to grant an opportunity to amend where amendment would be futile); Young v. Santos, No. GLR-16-cv-1321, 2018 WL 1583557, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2018) (same).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).