Opinion
Case No. 01-2440-JWL
June 21, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed suit against defendant alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. This matter is presently before the court on defendant's motion for partial summary judgment (doc. #29). Specifically, defendant moves for summary judgment on the vast majority of plaintiff's claims on the grounds that such claims are time barred. As set forth in more detail below, the court grants in part and denies in part defendant's motion.
Defendant's motion expressly excludes plaintiff's claim that defendant failed to promote him in October or November 2000.
I. Facts
The following facts are either uncontroverted or related in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party. On May 7, 2001, plaintiff, a black male, filed a charge of race discrimination and retaliation against defendant, his employer. In his subsequent complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant refused to provide training to plaintiff on several types of equipment; that defendant refused to reimburse plaintiff for certain classes while paying for others to take classes; and that defendant failed to promote plaintiff on several occasions. Plaintiff's complaint also sets forth general allegations of harassment and retaliation. Finally, plaintiff stated in his complaint that the wrongs alleged in the complaint were continuing to occur at the time he filed his complaint.
In January 2002, defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint based in part on plaintiff's alleged failure to file timely his charge of discrimination. On February 26, 2002, the court denied the motion on those grounds because the record was unclear as to when the alleged unlawful employment practices occurred. Defendant was then permitted to conduct discovery limited to the issue of the timeliness of the filing of plaintiff's charge of discrimination. In that regard, defendant deposed plaintiff with respect to when the alleged acts of discrimination occurred.
In his deposition, plaintiff testified that he was wrongfully disciplined in July 1995; in September 1995; and in May 1996. He further testified that defendant failed to promote him on various occasions between 1993 and 1999. With respect to plaintiff's claim that he was denied training, he testified that although he was initially denied training on certain equipment ( i.e., the IML; dehumidifiers; blow molding machine; Scott power pack; and belt splicing equipment), he eventually received training on these machines between 1995 and 1997. Plaintiff testified, however, that he has still not received training on the "smart box" machine. Plaintiff also testified in his deposition that union president Jack Roper started an argument with plaintiff in 1995 allegedly in retaliation for plaintiff's having written an inflammatory memorandum to his union coworkers. Similarly, plaintiff testified that his supervisor Barry Zimmerman started an argument with plaintiff in 1992 or 1994 allegedly in retaliation for plaintiff's decision to complain directly to the plant production manager rather than to Mr. Zimmerman concerning defendant's refusal to properly train plaintiff. With respect to his claim that defendant refused to reimburse plaintiff for the cost of a class, plaintiff testified that defendant made that decision in January or February 2000. Finally, with respect to his harassment claim, plaintiff testified that "things have really gotten worse" since he returned to work from back surgery in August 1999 and that he had been consistently harassed for the past 15 years of his employment. He affirmed in his deposition that the harassment continued "through and after" August 1999. While it is unclear from the record whether plaintiff is still employed with defendant, his deposition testimony simply does not suggest that the alleged harassment has ceased.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and that it is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir. 2002). A fact is "material" if, under the applicable substantive law, it is "essential to the proper disposition of the claim." Wright ex rel. Trust Co. of Kansas v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998)). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way." Adler, 144 F.3d at 670 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Spaulding, 279 F.3d at 904 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). In attempting to meet that standard, a movant that does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the other party's claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential element of that party's claim. Adams v. American Guarantee Liability Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Adler, 144 F.3d at 671).
Once the movant has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Spaulding, 279 F.3d at 904 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The nonmoving party may not simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; accord Eck v. Parke, Davis Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1017 (10th Cir. 2001). Rather, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant." Mitchell v. City of Moore, Oklahoma, 218 F.3d 1190, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Adler, 144 F.3d at 671). To accomplish this, the facts "must be identified by reference to an affidavit, a deposition transcript, or a specific exhibits incorporated therein." Adams, 233 F.3d at 1246.
Finally, the court notes that summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut;" rather, it is an important procedure "designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).
III. Discussion
Defendant's motion is based solely on the timeliness of plaintiff's claims. Under Title VII, a plaintiff must file an administrative charge with the EEOC within 300 days "after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." See Goodwin v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Martin v. Nannie the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir. 1993)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). A claim is time barred if it is not filed within these time limits. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, ___ U.S. ___, 2002 WL 1270268, at *5 (U.S. June 10, 2002). The court's task on defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, then, is to determine what specific unlawful employment practices are alleged by plaintiff and when those practices "occurred."
The 300-day time period is utilized in those states that have entities with the authority to grant or seek relief with respect to unlawful employment practices and an employee files a grievance with that agency; in all other states, the charge must be filed within 180 days. See National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, ___ U.S. ___, 2002 WL 1270268, at *5 (U.S. June 10, 2002)
The starting point (and, in fact, the ending point as well) of the court's analysis is the Supreme Court's recent decision in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, ___ U.S. ___, 2002 WL 1270268 (U.S. June 10, 2002). In Morgan, the Supreme Court considered whether, and under what circumstances, a Title VII plaintiff may file suit on events that fall outside the 300-day statutory time period. Id. at *3. Ultimately, the Court determined that the answer varies depending upon whether the alleged unlawful employment practice is "a discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act" or a hostile work environment. Id. at *6. As plaintiff here has alleged both discrete acts and harassment, the court first addresses plaintiff's claims concerning discrete acts.
A. Discrete Retaliatory and Discriminatory Acts
According to the Supreme Court in Morgan, Title VII "precludes recovery for discrete acts of discrimination or retaliation that occur outside the statutory time period." Id. at *3. Specifically, the court held:
A discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act "occurred" on the day that it "happened." A party, therefore, must file a charge within either 180 or 300 days of the date of the act or lose the ability to recover for it.Id. at *6. The Court further emphasized that "discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges." Id. at *7. The Court noted, however, that the statute does not bar an employee from using time-barred acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim. Id.
Bearing these rules in mind, the court turns to plaintiff's claims concerning discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Morgan, only those acts that occurred no more than 300 days before May 7, 2001, the day that plaintiff filed his charge, are actionable. Thus, plaintiff's claims that he was wrongfully disciplined in July 1995; in September 1995; and in May 1996 are not actionable. See id. at *8 (suggesting that disciplinary write-ups constitute discrete discriminatory acts). Similarly, plaintiff's claims that defendant failed to promote him on various occasions between 1993 and 1999 are not actionable. See id. (identifying "failure to promote" as a discrete act). With respect to plaintiff's claim that he was denied training on several machines, he admits that he received training on the IML in 1995 or 1996; that he received training on the dehumidifiers in 1997; and that he received training on the blow molding machine, Scott power pack, and belt splicing equipment six months to one year after he filed a grievance in April 1996. Plaintiff's claims based on these machines, then, are time barred. See id. (suggesting that failure-to-train is a discrete act). Finally, plaintiff's claims of specific retaliatory acts-namely, his argument with Jack Roper in 1995 and his argument with Barry Zimmerman in 1992 or 1994-are time barred, as is his claim that defendant failed to reimburse the cost of a class in January or February 2000. In short, then, all discrete discriminatory or retaliatory acts occurring more than 300 days prior to May 7, 2001 are untimely filed and no longer actionable.
The court concludes, however, that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to whether plaintiff's claim that defendant failed to train him on the "smart box" is time barred. According to plaintiff, defendant to this day has not trained plaintiff on the "smart box." It is unclear, however, whether plaintiff has repeatedly asked to receive such training and defendant has continued, into the relevant time period, to deny such training. In other words, if the evidence at trial demonstrates that defendant, during the 300-day window, reiterated its alleged refusal to train plaintiff on the "smart box," then a reasonable jury could conclude that this specific claim was timely filed. Thus, defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied with respect to this claim.
B. Hostile Work Environment
In Morgan, the Court noted that "[h]ostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts" because "[t]heir very nature involves repeated conduct." Id. Based on this distinction, the Supreme Court held that "consideration of the entire scope of a hostile work environment claim, including behavior alleged outside the statutory time period, is permissible for the purposes of assessing liability, so long as any act contributing to that hostile environment takes place within the statutory time period." Id. at *3.
As the Court explained:
The "unlawful employment practice" therefore cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own. Such claims are based on the cumulative affect of individual acts.Id. at *8. (citation omitted).
Significantly, the Court also rejected the defendant's argument that "recovery for conduct taking place outside the time period for filing a timely charge should be available only in hostile environment cases where the plaintiff reasonably did not know such conduct was discriminatory or where the discriminatory nature of such conduct is recognized only in light of later events." Id. at *9 n. 11. As the Court emphasized:
It is precisely because the entire hostile work environment encompasses a single unlawful employment practice that we do not hold, as have some of the Circuits, that the plaintiff may not base a suit on individual acts that occurred outside the statute of limitations unless it would have been unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on such conduct. The statute does not separate individual acts that are part of the hostile environment claim from the whole for the purposes of timely filing and liability.Id. at *10. The Court noted, however, that equitable defenses may be available to employers in the face of unreasonable and prejudicial filing delays. See id. at *12.
Plaintiff alleges that he has been harassed by defendant's agents for years, that the harassment intensified in 1999 after he returned to work from back surgery, and that he continued to be harassed into 2002. In its motion for partial summary judgment, defendant contends that summary judgment is appropriate because plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he knew since at least the mid-1990s that he was being unlawfully harassed and yet failed to file a charge. This argument, however, was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Morgan. In short, then, a reasonable jury could conclude that some act contributing to plaintiff's harassment claim took place within the 300-day window and that other acts upon which his claim depends that occurred outside the 300-day window are part of the same actionable claim. Summary judgment on this point is denied.
Defendant, in its reply brief, contends that the court should disregard plaintiff's response in its entirety (particularly plaintiff's contention in his response that the alleged harassment continued into 2002) because plaintiff's response does not comply with Local Rule 56.1 and because plaintiff's response makes no reference to admissible evidence. However, even a reading of the materials submitted by defendant-namely, plaintiff's deposition transcript-reflects plaintiff's contention that the harassment was continuous.
Defendant's argument is not couched in terms of an equitable defense and defendant makes no argument that it has been prejudiced in any way by plaintiff's delayed filing.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendant's motion for partial summary judgment (doc. #29) is granted in part and denied in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.