Opinion
April 29, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Jones, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs payable to the appellants appearing separately and filing separate briefs, the motions are granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as it is asserted against the appellants, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.
Although we are aware of the general rule that negligence cases do not easily lend themselves to being decided on motions for summary judgment (see, Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361), we nevertheless conclude that, based upon the record before us, it cannot reasonably be inferred that the defendants breached any duty to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's decedent, who was nearly 19 years old at the time, was playing shortstop for a Connie Mack summer league baseball team when he was struck and killed by lightning on the evening of August 7, 1984. The plaintiff contends, inter alia, that the defendants were negligent in "allowing a baseball game to continue when threatening weather became apparent". However, by electing to continue to play baseball in weather conditions which were readily apparent (at some point in the game, thunder was heard and some lightning was seen in the distance), the plaintiff's decedent assumed the risks inherent in continued play (see, Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 439; Gallagher v. Town of N. Hempstead, 144 A.D.2d 637).
Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that the decedent was ordered to continue to play or that there existed an economic compulsion or other circumstance which impelled the decedent to continue to play. Therefore, there has been no showing of an "inherent compulsion" which would negate a voluntary assumption of the risk (see, Benitez v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 N.Y.2d 650). Thompson, J.P., Brown, Kunzeman and Balletta, JJ., concur.