Opinion
Civil Action No: SA-04-CA-288-XR
April 29, 2004
ORDER
On this date, the Court considered its jurisdiction over this case. Defendants removed this case from state court on April 6, 2004, alleging ERISA preemption as the basis for federal-question removal jurisdiction. The Court concludes that the removal was improper because this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The Court therefore remands the case to state court.
The party removing the case has the burden to establish facts that show federal jurisdiction exists. Wilson v. Repub. Iron Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921). "United States District Courts . . . have the responsibility to consider the question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte . . . and to dismiss any action if such jurisdiction is lacking." Giannakos v. M/V Bravo Trader, 762 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiffs are employees of Defendants alleging they "sustained injuries while working in Defendants' premises when they were caused in inhale mineral oil dust." Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached the duty of ordinary care owed to Plaintiffs by failing to provide notice and warnings that oil mist used in its business operations would cause them to become sick, exposing Plaintiffs' lungs to oil mist, failing to use oil mist in its business operation, failing to adequately ventilate the premises to prevent oil exposure; failing to provide Plaintiffs with a safe place to work, and failing to provide Plaintiffs with adequate equipment and devices to safeguard them from exposure to oil mist. Plaintiffs allege that they "were caused to suffer, and to endure anxiety, pain, and illness resulting in damages more fully set forth below." Plaintiffs allege the following damages: past and future reasonable medical care and expenses; past and future physical pain and suffering; past and future mental anguish; past loss of earnings; loss of earning capacity; physical impairment and disability; and loss of services and consortium.
Defendants contend that "Plaintiffs attempt to conceal the fact that they are asserting an ERISA action. Nevertheless, their petition undeniably concerns the administration of an ERISA plan and the right to receive benefits under that plan." Defendants contend that, during their employment, Plaintiffs were covered by an Employee Safety Program Benefit Plan, an ERISA plan, that provided Plaintiffs 100 percent coverage for medical benefits, including all reasonable and necessary charges for hospital confinement, physicians' services, prescription drugs, and physical rehabilitation as a result of injuries or occupational diseases occurring in the course and scope of Plaintiffs' employment. They further contend that, "Because Plaintiffs did not, prior to filing this civil action against Defendants, seek medical benefits under Defendants' ERISA plan, but now seek past and future medical expenses for injuries, which were covered under the plan, Plaintiffs' claim raise[s] a federal question." Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' allegations both "relate to" an ERISA plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) and state an ERISA cause of action under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
In a case similar to this one, the Fifth Circuit held that an employee's common-law occupational injury claims do not relate to an ERISA plan and thus ERISA does not preempt such claims. Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 1994). The court notes that Plaintiffs' negligence claim is indistinguishable from the claim that the Fifth Circuit in Hook stated was not preempted by ERISA because it affected only the employer/employee relationship and not the administrator/beneficiary relationship with the company. Hook, 38 F.3d at 783. Courts have consistently held that common-law negligence claims are not preempted by ERISA. See, e.g., Tex. Health Enters., Inc. v. Reece, 44 F.3d 243, 244 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[A]n employee's common law occupational injury claims . . . do not relate to an employer's ERISA plan."); Noyola v. Oasis Car Wash, Inc., 220 F. Supp.2d 638, 643-44 (E.D. Tex. 2002); Lazo v. Inland Sales Co., 925 F. Supp. 463 (N.D. Tex. 1995); McCabe v. Henpil, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Westbrook v. Beverly Enters., 832 F. Supp. 188 (W.D.Tex. 1993); Pyle v. Beverly Enters., 826 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Tex. 1993); Gibson v. Wyatt Cafeterias, 782 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Tex. 1992); Nunez v. Wyatt Cafeterias, 177 F. Supp. 165, 168 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
Although Defendants argue that ERISA preempts Plaintiffs' claims because they seek medical care and expenses, which would be available under the plan, this same argument was advanced and rejected in Westbrook v. Beverly Enterprises, 832 F. Supp. 188, 190-91 (W.D. Tex. 1993), a case cited by the Fifth Circuit to support its holding in Hook. Thus, even assuming that the plan in question is an ERISA plan, Plaintiffs' claims are not preempted by ERISA. The cause of action involves only the employer/employee relationship and not the administrator/beneficiary relationship with the company. The cause of action would exist even if the plan did not exist, and is thus totally independent from the existence and administration of the ERISA plan.
Plaintiffs' complaint in this action makes no statement that ties together their tort claims with any claim under the plan, nor have Defendants demonstrated any connection between the two that allows the Court to find that the Plaintiffs' claims relate to the plan. The Court therefore concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this removed case, and remands to the state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
It is therefore ORDERED that this case is REMANDED to the state district court, 131st Judicial District, Bexar County, Texas.