To the same effect, see In re Estate of Troy, 1 Cal.App.2d 732, 37 P.2d 471; Smith v. Hensen, 89 Kan. 792, 132 P. 997; Winter v. Dunlap, 84 Kan. 519, 114 P. 1057; Oil Well Supply Co. v. Cremin, 143 Okla. 57, 287 P. 414, 68 A.L.R. 1417; White House Lumber Co. v. Howard, 142 Okla. 163, 286 P. 327; Yoder v. Kalona Sav. Bank, 142 Iowa, 219, 119 N.W. 147; Globe Merc. Co. v. Perkeypile, (Ind.) 121 N.E. 844; Sylvanus v. Pruett, 36 N.M. 112, 9 P.2d 142. The trial court apparently relied upon the language used in the cases of McMillan v. Davenport, 44 Mont. 23, 118 P. 756, Ann. Cas. 1912d 984; Piccolo v. Tanaka, 78 Mont. 445, 253 P. 890; Isom v. Larson, 78 Mont. 395, 255 P. 1049; Johannes v. Dwire, 94 Mont. 590, 23 P.2d 971. In each of these cases the court stated that the lien of a judgment did not attach to an equitable interest, undisclosed of record.

One who purchases land with knowledge of such facts as would put a prudent man upon inquiry, which, if prosecuted with ordinary diligence would lead to actual notice of rights claimed adversely to his vendor, is guilty of bad faith if he neglects to make such inquiry and is chargeable with the actual notice he would have received. ( Cooper v. Flesner, 24 Okla. 47, 20 Ann. Cas. 29, 23 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1180, 103 P. 1016; Webb v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 162 Ind. 616, 66 L.R.A. 632, 69 N.E. 1006. See, also, Piccolo v. Tanaka, 78 Mont. 445, 253 P. 890; 41 C.J. 552, 553; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., 4th ed., sec. 626.) "Whatever puts a party on inquiry amounts, in law, to notice.

" Wayt v. Patee, 205 Cal. 46, 53, 269 P. 660, 663 [emphasis in original]. Our own court has defined the word "conveyance," as used in sections 73-201 and 73-203 to include . . . a contract for sale of land, Piccolo v. Tanaka, 78 Mont. 445, 451, 253 P. 890. . . . Kosel, 146 Mont. at 222-23, 404 P.2d at 896-97 (emphasis added).

" Wayt v. Patee, 205 Cal. 46, 53, 269 P. 660, 663. Our own court has defined the word "conveyance," as used in sections 73-201 and 73-203 to include a certificate of sale issued by the sheriff, Lepper v. Home Ranch Co., 90 Mont. 558, 565, 4 P.2d 722; a contract for sale of land, Piccolo v. Tanaka, 78 Mont. 445, 253 P. 890; a lease, Estate of Tuohy, 23 Mont. 305, 308, 58 P. 722; a mortgage, Angus v. Mariner, 85 Mont. 365, 278 P. 996; a reservation of a royalty, Pluhar v. Guderjahn, 134 Mont. 46, 328 P.2d 129; real estate mortgage extension agreement, Hastings v. Wise, 91 Mont. 430, 8 P.2d 636. See also Annotation in 4 A.L.R.2d 1419, "Agreement between realestate owners restricting use of property as within contemplation of recording laws."

An imperative duty is laid upon him to ascertain all the instruments which constitute essential parts of his title, and to inform himself of all that they contain." Quoted with approval by this court in Piccolo v. Tanaka, 78 Mont. 445, 451, 253 P. 890. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court [4] must be modified by: (1) Quieting title in the plaintiff by reason of the mesne conveyances rather than by adverse possession; (2) Adjudging plaintiff's title to the land subject to the ten percent royalty reservation owned by defendant.

Benedict v. Co., (Calif.) 147 P. 486; Schriner v. Craft, (Ala.) 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 450. Where one party makes the entire concession and receives nothing in return, the transaction is not binding. Lumbr. Co. v. Beall, (Ga.) 62 S.E. 1056; Robison v. Glendale, 187 P. 741; Oliver v. Enriquez, 124 P. 798. Brown had knowledge of the invalidity of the Merrill assignment. Piccolo v. Tanaka, (Mont.) 253 P. 890; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. 626; Lombardi v. Sinanides, (Cal.) 235 P. 455, 20 R.C.L. 353. One purchasing lands is chargeable with recitals in the title record, casting doubt upon the title. Knowles v. Williams, (Kans.)

The result is that she took said property with constructive notice of the outstanding mortgages given by the record, and in addition she had actual notice of the mortgages from the recitals in her deed. Since this deed excepted all mortgages of record, it necessarily included the mortgages here involved, which were in fact of record, and put her upon her inquiry as to the contents of these instruments. ( Guerin v. Sunburst Oil etc. Co., 68 Mont. 365, 218 P. 949; Piccolo v. Tanaka, 78 Mont. 445, 253 P. 890; Angus v. Mariner, 85 Mont. 365, 278 P. 996.) It is alleged in the complaint and must be taken as true for the purposes of this appeal that the defendant Keller had actual notice of the execution of the above agreement at the time she took her conveyance.

No error was committed in excluding proof of the filing of the assignment. This holding is not in conflict with the rule laid down in Piccolo v. Tanaka, 78 Mont. 445, 253 P. 890. 16. Defendant offered to prove by one Stratton that West [16] admonished Stephenson, prior to the sale of the coach to Parsons, not to dispose of the coach until the contract had been paid or satisfied.