Opinion
No. 1:01-CV-336
July 24, 2002
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
Currently before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant in this case, General Electric Company ("GE"), on May 17, 2002. GE contends that the pro se Plaintiff, Andrew J. Picco ("Picco") failed to file his suit against GE within the ninety day limitations period set forth under the Indiana Uniform Arbitration Act, Ind. Code § 34-57-2-13. Picco responded to GE's motion to dismiss on June 12, 2002 and GE replied on June 25, 2002. On July 2, 2002, Plaintiff filed a sur-response. GE has indicated that it does not intend to make a further filing. For the reasons set forth herein, GE's motion to dismiss will be DENIED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In August 2000, Picco and GE participated in an arbitration proceeding stemming from Picco's dismissal as a GE employee. On April 29, 2001, Arbitrator Charles P. Fischbach ("Fischbach") issued an award (the "April 29, 2001 Award") in favor of GE and against Picco. This April 29, 2001 Award was faxed to the parties on May 1, 2001. The parties agree that the April 29, 2001 Award was incomplete and that a more complete order, setting out more fully the reasons for the award, was promised to be issued by July 6, 2001. In fact, the more complete award (the "Sepetmber 6, 2001 Award") was not issued until September 6, 2001.
On July 30, 2001, Picco filed an "appeal" to vacate the Arbitrator's award and a complaint for damages, naming only the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") and Fischback as defendants. Picco did not name GE in his July 30, 2001 Complaint. However, on September 5, 2001, Picco filed an amended "appeal" and complaint for damages, naming GE as a party. GE now moves to have Picco's claims dismissed as time-barred.
APPLICABLE STANDARD
The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits of the case. Under the "simplified notice pleading" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court considers whether relief would be possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent with the allegations in the complaint. See Venture Associates Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems, 987 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1993). Generally, "mere vagueness or lack of detail does not constitute grounds for a motion to dismiss." See Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1985).
When considering a defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court must view the complaint's allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). All well-pleaded facts and allegations in the plaintiff's complaint must be taken to be true, see Ed Miniat, Inc. v. Globe Life Ins. Group, Inc., 805 F.2d 732, 733 (7th Cir. 1986), and the plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. With this posture, the Court reviews GE's motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSION
Picco relies on the Indiana Uniform Arbitration Act, Ind. Code § 34-57-2-13, in seeking to vacate the Arbitrator's award entered against him and to recover for alleged damages. Section 13(a) of that Act provides, in relevant part:
Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an [arbitration] award where:
(1) the award was procured by corruption or fraud;
(2) there was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party. . . .
In addition, section 13(b) of Indiana's Arbitration Act provides:
An application under this section [to vacate an arbitration award] shall be made within ninety (90) days after the mailing of a copy of the award to the applicant, except that, if predicated upon corruption or fraud or other undue means, it shall be made within ninety (90) days after such grounds are known or should have been known.
Here, Picco's first complaint against GE was filed on September 5, 2001 — clearly more than ninety days after the April 29, 2001 Award was faxed on May 1, 2001. However, Picco seeks to have the arbitration award vacated on grounds that Arbitrator Fischbach displayed personal animus toward Picco and that this animus is evidence of Fischbach's impartiality and corruption. Moreover, Picco states that he did not become aware of this animus until July 6, 2001. Under the Indiana Arbitration Act, then, Picco would have ninety days from July 6, 2001 to file his claim against GE.
Picco does not contend that the limitations period began to run only when the more complete September 6, 2001 Award was issued. Therefore, the Court does not consider this line of argument.
GE responds that "Picco has not submitted any evidence even suggesting corruption, fraud, or other undue means [by the Arbitrator]," which would qualify him for the exception to the limitations period set forth in section 13(b). (Defendant General Electric Company's Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss p. 2). However, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, unlike a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff is not required to submit any evidence. See Celotex Asbestos Settlement Trust v. International Ins. Co., 1999 WL 284783 (N.D.Ill. 1999). Rather, as stated above, the Court must decide if relief could be granted on any set of facts consistent with the plaintiff's allegations. Here, Picco has alleged that Fischbach acted with personal animus and impartiality and that Picco did not become aware of this impartiality until July 6, 2001. Taking these allegations to be true, the Court is satisfied that Picco's complaint against GE was timely filed on September 5, 2001. GE's motion to dismiss will be DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant GE's motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED.