Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 04-690, SECTION "A" (1).
June 17, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 11) filed by plaintiff Piazza's Seafood World, L.L.C. ("Piazza"). Defendant, Bob Odom, individually and in his capacity as Commissioner of the Louisiana Department of Agriculture and Forestry ("the Commissioner"), opposes the motion. The motion, set for hearing on May 19, 2004, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument.
Piazza moves the Court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for partial summary judgment on the grounds that Louisiana Revised Statute § 3:4617(C) is unconstitutional and/or preempted by federal law. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.
Background
Piazza imports seafood, including fish. Piazza sells its imported fish primarily through large national distributors. The distributors then sell the product to restaurants in Louisiana that serve it to diners. One of the food products imported by Piazza is a catfish grown in China. According to Piazza, these Chinese-grown catfish are members of the family Ictaluridae and are biologically identical to domestic catfish that belong to that same family. Piazza asserts that its Chinese-grown catfish are direct descendants of Alabama catfish.In March 2004, the Commissioner served three businesses in Jefferson, Orleans, and Baton Rouge parishes with ACS Stop Orders. Pla. Exhs. 2, 3, 4. The ACS Orders ordered the businesses not to "sell, offer for sale, apply, move, or remove" any of the fish purchased from or stored on behalf of Piazza due to violations of section 4617(C). Id. Section 4617, entitled Fraud by vendor or by purchaser, provides in pertinent part:
No one shall misrepresent the name, or type of any fruit, vegetable, grain, meat, or fish, including catfish, sold or offered or exposed for sale, to any actual or prospective consumer. "Catfish" shall mean only those species within the family Ictaluridae or the family Anarhichadidae and grown in the United States of America.
La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 3:4617(C) (West Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). Piazza's labels designate the package contents as "catfish." Pla. Exh. 7. The phrase "Cajun Boy" is written in large lettering to the left of "catfish." The phrase "Product of China" is located immediately below Piazza's New Orleans address.
Discussion
Pizza argues that La.R.S. 3:4617(C) is invalid on three grounds. First, Piazza argues that the statute is inconsistent with the federal catfish labeling scheme, and is therefore preempted. Second, Piazza argues that the statute impermissibly discriminates against interstate and foreign commerce, and is therefore violative of the dormant Commerce Clause. Finally, Piazza argues that La.R.S. 3:4617(C) violates the Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution.
In opposition, the Commissioner points out that through the efforts of the American catfish industry, the term "catfish" has come to be known as an American, indeed a Southern delicacy. The Commissioner asserts that the legislature enacted section 4617(C) in order to prevent the exploitation of the term "catfish" by foreign producers seeking to capitalize on the consumer awareness associated with American catfish. Thus, according to the Commissioner, La.R.S. 3617(C) is intended to address the deception inherent in calling certain fish "catfish" — in other words, fish that may be catfish in a biological sense but that are not "catfish" as the American consumer thinks of that term. The Commissioner asserts that the statute is also designed to "facilitate consumer value comparisons" and to encourage the American catfish industry. Def.'s Oppo. at 6.
Having considered the applicable law, evidence of record, and arguments presented by able counsel for both parties, the Court concludes that no material issues of fact exist so as to preclude summary judgment at this time. The Court therefore moves to the legal arguments presented by both parties.
1. Preemption Challenge
Piazza argues that La.R.S. 3:4617(C) is inconsistent with 21 U.S.C. § 343, and is therefore preempted. Section 343, entitled Misbranded food, of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, provides in pertinent part: "A food shall be deemed to be misbranded . . . [i]f it purports to be or is represented as catfish, unless it is fish classified within the family Ictaluridae. " 21 U.S.C.A. § 343(t) (West 1999 Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). Piazza argues that La.R.S. 3:4617(C) and 21 U.S.C. § 343(t) are mutually exclusive because Piazza cannot simultaneously comply with both. Piazza asserts that the federal statute permits sellers of Chinese-grown fish within the family Ictaluridae to label them as "catfish" but that such labeling would be in violation of section 4617(C). Piazza also asserts that section 4617(C) is an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress's objectives in enacting its food labeling law.
In opposition, the Commissioner asserts that section 4617(C) does not conflict with federal law because the statute does not preclude Piazza from using the term "catfish." Rather, according to the Commissioner, it is the unqualified use of the term "catfish" that section 4617(C) targets when the fish are grown outside of the United States. The Commissioner asserts that an actual conflict between § 343(t) and section 4617(C) would occur only if the federal statute required foreign Ictaluridae to be called "catfish" The Commissioner also asserts that Piazza has failed to demonstrate that section 4617(C) frustrates Congress's objective because Piazza has failed to put forth any evidence as to what the purposes and objectives of Congress might have been in adopting 21 U.S.C. § 343(t).
The concept of preemption has its roots in the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Hurley v. Lederle Labs., 863 F.2d 1173, 1176 (5th Cir. 1988) (citingHillsborough County v. Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-14 (1985)). The Supreme Court has recognized that preemption is "fundamentally a question of congressional intent," and the Court has defined three circumstances in which a congressional enactment will preempt state law. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990) (quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988)). First, Congress can make its intent to preempt state law known through explicit statutory language. Id. at 78 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-98 (1983)). Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is preempted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the federal government to occupy exclusively.Id. at 79. Congress's intent to legislate exclusively in an area is generally inferred where a "scheme of federal regulation . . . [is] so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it." Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see, e.g., Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 293 (explaining sales of natural gas in interstate commerce are one such area that Congress has completely occupied via the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717, et seq.). "Field preemption" can also be inferred where a congressional enactment "touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Id. (quotingRice, 331 U.S. at 230) (alteration in original).
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
The third circumstance under which preemption will occur is when state law actually conflicts with federal law. Id. For instance, preemption will be found where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements or where the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
It is undisputed that Congress has not explicitly preempted section 4617(C) because the federal statute contains no preemptive language whatsoever. Nor is the Court persuaded by Piazza's contention that the scheme of federal law regarding the labeling of farm-raised fish is so pervasive so as to support the inference that Congress intended to legislate exclusively in this area. However, the Court is persuaded that section 4617(C) as written has an actual conflict with § 343(t).
By enacting § 343(t) Congress has clarified that under federal law, fish within the family Ictaluridae are "catfish." Piazza's fish are within the family Ictaluridae and are therefore considered catfish under federal law. The Supremacy Clause does not allow the State of Louisiana to legislate away what Congress has deemed to be appropriate in the realm of food labeling. In light of § 343(t), the Commissioner clearly cannot preclude Piazza from calling its Ictaluridae fish "catfish."
For purposes of the instant motion, the Court will assume that Piazza's fish (both the current shipments and any future shipments) fall within the family Ictaluridae.
In defense of section 4617(C), the Commissioner asserts that the statute precludes only the unqualified use of the term "catfish" for those fish not grown in the United States. For instance, the Commissioner suggests that Piazza can comply with La.R.S. 3:4617(C) by calling its product "Chinese catfish," thereby creating a harmony between § 343(t) and section 4617(C). But the Commissioner's contention ignores the plain text of the statute which in no way suggests that the legislature was aiming only at the unqualified use of the term "catfish." The statute as written attempts to define the term "catfish" and it does so on a basis far more restrictive than what Congress has done.
Furthermore, even if the Court were to conclude that section 4617(C) calls only for qualification of the term "catfish," the Court is still not convinced that the statute would be enforceable in light of potential Commerce Clause problems. The Commerce Clause has long been recognized as a self-executing limitation on the power of the states to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on interstate and foreign commerce. S. Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 88 (1984) (citingLewis v. BT Invest. Mgrs, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980); Hughes v. Okla., 441 U.S. 322 (1979); H.P. Hood Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852)). Although Commerce Clause problems most often arise where states target interstate or foreign commerce for discriminatory tax burdens, see, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), problems can also arise where non-financial regulatory burdens on foreign products make those products unattractive to the market when compared with similar domestic offerings. See Int'l Packers Ltd. v. Hughes, 271 F. Supp. 430 (S.D. Iowa 1967); Armour Co. v. Nebraska, 270 F. Supp. 941 (D. Neb. 1967); Tupman Thurlow Co. v. W.F. Moss, 252 F. Supp. 641 (1966). In International Packers Ltd., Armour Co., and Tupman Thurlow Co., supra, the district courts invalidated state laws that imposed labeling requirements on foreign meat products. In those cases the courts concluded that the labeling requirements were not only discriminatory in that they applied only to foreign meat products, but they were also so burdensome so as make foreign meat unattractive to retailers. See, e.g., Armour Co., 270 F. Supp. at 943. The district courts concluded that a state's attempt to protect the domestic meat market by imposing labeling requirements which restrained the market for foreign meets was violative of the Commerce Clause. Id. The reasoning employed in those decisions is consistent with the well-settled principles that have emerged from the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
"The Congress shall have the Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
In this case, section 4617(C) is discriminatory on its face because it applies only to foreign products. Assuming arguendo that the statute requires only qualification of the term "catfish," the statute is nevertheless broadly written such that any retailer selling Piazza's product to a consumer would be required to qualify the name of the product. Such a requirement would surely be burdensome to businesses that serve both domestic and foreign catfish because such businesses would be forced to segregate their food inventories for labeling purposes. Conceivably, menus in restaurants would have to be updated according to which catfish inventory is being used at the time of service. Such regulations would surely make foreign catfish unattractive to the marketplace. Absent strong evidence that this statute's true purpose is something other than protectionism, or a complete lack of evidence that the statute would create the burdens envisioned by the Court, the Court sees serious potential Commerce Clause problems with the Commissioner's interpretation of section 4617(C).
In sum, the Court concludes that section 4617(C) has an actual conflict with federal law and therefore must give way under the Supremacy Clause.
2. Constitutional Challenges
In light of the Court's finding that federal law preempts section 4617(C), the constitutional challenges are now moot and need not be decided.
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 11) filed by plaintiff Piazza's Seafood World, L.L.C. should be and is hereby GRANTED. The Commissioner is hereby ENJOINED from enforcing Louisiana Revised Statute § 3:4617(C).