Piazza v. D'Anna

5 Citing cases

  1. Gustke v. Nickerson

    159 A.D.3d 1573 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)   Cited 8 times

    Contrary to plaintiff's contention on appeal, the court properly granted the motions of Nickerson and Foley. "[I]n multiple-car, chain-reaction accidents the courts have recognized that the operator of a vehicle which has come to a complete stop and is propelled into the vehicle in front of it as a result of being struck from behind is not negligent inasmuch as the operator's actions cannot be said to be the proximate cause of the injuries resulting from the collision" ( Mohamed v. Town of Niskayuna, 267 A.D.2d 909, 910, 700 N.Y.S.2d 551 [3d Dept. 1999] ). Here, both Nickerson and Foley established their entitlement to summary judgment inasmuch as they both came to a complete stop before Lipome's vehicle rear-ended Foley's vehicle, which was then propelled into Nickerson's vehicle, and, in opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (seeZielinski v. Van Pelt [Appeal No. 2], 9 A.D.3d 874, 875–876, 781 N.Y.S.2d 549 [4th Dept. 2004] ; Piazza v. D'Anna, 6 A.D.3d 1161, 1162, 776 N.Y.S.2d 427 [4th Dept. 2004] ). We agree with plaintiff, however, that he is entitled to partial summary judgment on negligence to the extent that Lipome's vehicle rear-ended Foley's vehicle, thereby starting the chain-reaction accident.

  2. Prine v. Santee

    101 A.D.3d 1601 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)

    Plaintiff was able to bring his vehicle to a safe stop, but it was then rear-ended by a vehicle owned and operated by defendant Adam M. Santee, which was fourth in the chain. We conclude that defendant met her burden of establishing her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law ( see Piazza v. D'Anna, 6 A.D.3d 1161, 1162, 776 N.Y.S.2d 427;Betts v. Marecki, 247 A.D.2d 916, 916–917, 668 N.Y.S.2d 422), and plaintiff and the other defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Zielinski v. Van Pelt [Appeal No. 2], 9 A.D.3d 874, 875–876, 781 N.Y.S.2d 549). Here, defendant met her initial burden by establishing that she had brought her vehicle to a safe stop and that she did not rear-end or strike any vehicle. Plaintiff and the other defendants failed to raise any inference of negligence on the part of defendant with respect to any of the rear-end collisions that occurred behind defendant after she had brought her vehicle to a stop.

  3. Frizzell v. Giannetti

    34 A.D.3d 1202 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 4 times

    In support of the cross motion, plaintiffs submitted the deposition testimony of both plaintiff and Giannetti in which they testified that Mulligan rear-ended plaintiff's vehicle and that, after the initial collision, Giannetti struck Mulligan's vehicle, causing Mulligan's vehicle to rear-end plaintiff's vehicle a second time. However, plaintiffs also submitted the deposition testimony of Mulligan in which she testified that she applied her brakes as she approached the intersection and that, when her vehicle was a few feet from plaintiff's vehicle, her vehicle was rear-ended, causing her vehicle to strike plaintiff's vehicle only once. Plaintiffs' submissions thus raised a triable issue of fact whether Mulligan was negligent ( see generally Negros v Brown, 15 AD3d 994; Piazza v D'Anna, 6 AD3d 1161).

  4. Negros v. Brown

    15 A.D.3d 994 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 3 times

    The court erred, however, in denying the motion of Provenzola for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against him, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. In support of his motion, Provenzola submitted his own deposition testimony as well as plaintiff's deposition testimony, in which both Provenzola and plaintiff testified that Provenzola's vehicle had come to a complete stop before plaintiff collided with it. Provenzola established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based on that undisputed deposition testimony, and plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of fact ( see id. at 875-876; Piazza v. D'Anna, 6 AD3d 1161, 1162; Betts v. Marecki, 247 AD2d 916). The fact that Provenzola's vehicle may have struck Brown's vehicle before plaintiff's vehicle rear-ended Provenzola's vehicle is of no moment where, as here, there is no showing that any negligence on Provenzola's part caused plaintiff's injuries ( see Smith v. Cafiero, 203 AD2d 355, 356). "[W]hether or not [Provenzola's] actions may have caused damage to the other parties, h[is] actions were not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries" ( id.).

  5. Zielinski v. Van Pelt

    9 A.D.3d 874 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 2 times

    Finally, defendant Joseph F. David's vehicle, in which plaintiff was a passenger, collided with the rear of Wood's vehicle. We conclude with respect to appeal No. 1 that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion of the Smiths and the cross motion of Van Pelt to bifurcate the trial inasmuch as "[p]laintiff established that the liability issue presented herein is uncomplicated and that a trial on both liability and damages would be brief" ( Di Pirro v. Thompson, 289 AD2d 1025, 1026; see Mazur v. Mazur, 288 AD2d 945, 946). Nevertheless, we conclude with respect to appeal No. 2 that the court erred in denying the motion of the Smiths for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and cross claims against them ( see Piazza v. D'Anna, 6 AD3d 1161; Betts v. Marecki, 247 AD2d 916; Smith v. Cafiero, 203 AD2d 355, 356; Sollecito v. Scott, 188 AD2d 824). "The papers submitted by the [Smiths] clearly showed [their] entitlement to summary judgment" ( Smith, 203 AD2d at 356) by demonstrating that Stephanie Smith had brought her vehicle to a complete and safe stop when it was rear-ended by Wood's vehicle ( see Piazza, 6 AD3d at 1162; Arrastia v. Sbordone, 225 AD2d 375). In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Piazza, 6 AD3d at 1162; Randolph v. Crane, 278 AD2d 913). "The papers submitted by the plaintiff fail to show any [conduct by Stephanie Smith] from which it could be inferred that any negligence on her part caused the plaintiff's accident" ( Smith, 203 AD2d at 356; see Betts, 247 AD2d at 916; Rehak v. Kwan, 242 AD2d 267; Arrastia, 225 AD2d 375).