Gorman nevertheless claims that, even if the easement were appurtenant, severance of Caples' property in 1960 would have extinguished any appurtenant right as to the Deane property. See Stiefel v. Lindemann, supra, 33 Conn.App. at 813, 638 A.2d 642 (โwhere an easement is appurtenant to any part of a dominant estate, and the [dominant] estate is subsequently divided into parcels, each parcel may use the easement ... if the easement directly abuts on the new parcel, or ... if the owner of the new parcel can reach the easement by traveling over intervening land over which the owner has a legal right of passageโ [citation omitted] ), citing Phoenix National Bank v. United States Security Trust Co., 100 Conn. 622, 630, 124 A. 540 (1924). According to Gorman, although the Kahn property would have retained the benefit of the appurtenant right-of-way over the Gorman property upon severance in 1960 because the two properties were adjacent, the Deane property would not have retained the benefit of the appurtenant right-of-way over the Gorman property if this court concludes that the Deane property does not enjoy a legal right of passageโan easement by necessityโover the Kahn property.
An easement appurtenant must be of benefit to the dominant estate but the servient estate need not be adjacent to the dominant estate. Phoenix National Bank v. United States Security Trust Co., 100 Conn. 622, 124 A. 540 (1924); Graham v. Walker, 78 Conn. 130, 135, 61 A. 98 (1905); 25 Am. Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses ยง 11. An easement in gross is one which does not benefit the possessor of any tract of land in his use of it as such possessor. Hartford National Bank Trust Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 164 Conn. 337, 341, 321 A.2d 469 (1973).
An easement appurtenant must be of benefit to the dominant estate but the servient estate need not be adjacent to the dominant estate. Phoenix National Bank v. United States Security Trust Co., 100 Conn. 622, 124 A. 540 (1924); Graham v. Walker, 78 Conn. 130, 135, 61 A. 98 (1905); 25 Am.Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses 11. An easement in gross is one which does not benefit the possessor of any tract of land in his use of it as such possessor. Hartford National Bank Trust Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 164 Conn. 337, 341, 321 A.2d 469 (1973).
This is true even where, as in the instant case, the subdivision separates one of the subdivided parts from the passageway. Phoenix National Bank v. United States Security Trust Co., 100 Conn. 622; 8 A.L.R. 1368. The owner of the dominant tenement may extinguish the easement appurtenant by specifically excluding it from a conveyance of the dominant tenement. Cadwalader v. Bailey, supra. There is no evidence in this case that the right in question was ever extinguished in this manner, nor do we perceive herein any other basis upon which it could be concluded that the easement appurtenant to complainant Crawford Realty Company's lot was ever destroyed.
We said (p. 667): "That which is taxed is the special use or enjoyment which is being made of the property upon which the advertisement is located by the person maintaining it in the exercise of his right as property owner, lessee or otherwise." The right of visibility as related to the use of land for advertising, whether it be of a business located on the premises or one not so located, is in the nature of an easement appurtenant which attaches to the land and every part of it; that right is within the protection of constitutional guaranties; Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121, 49 Sup. Ct. 50; and one who leases the whole or a part of the land for the purpose of erecting a billboard on it acquires the same right the owner had. Phoenix National Bank v. United States Security Co., 100 Conn. 622, 630, 124 A. 540; Sieger v. Riu, 123 Conn. 343, 347, 195 A. 735. As the trial court did not have before it sufficient facts to enable it to determine whether or not the plaintiffs were entitled to relief, we must remand the case for further proceedings.
( Seidler v. Waln, 266 Pa. 361, 109 A. 643, 8 A.L.R. 1363, 1367; 9 R.C.L. 803.) In Phoenix Nat. Bank v. United States Security Trust Co., 100 Conn. 622, 124 A. 540, 34 A.L.R. 963, 969, it is said that the rule governing the rights of the purchaser of only a portion of the dominant estate is well-established and quotes the rule from the leading case of Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige 254, 24 Am. Dec. 218, 220, as follows: "As the right is annexed to the estate, for the benefit of which the easement or servitude is created, the right is not destroyed by a division of the estate to which it is appurtenant. And the owner or assignee of any portion of that estate may claim the right, so far as it is applicable to his part of the property, provided the right can be enjoyed as to the separate parcels without any additional charge or burden to the proprietor of the servient tenement.
While the common grantor did not specifically reserve a right of way over this road in his deed to the defendants, its existence was necessary to the enjoyment of the reserved parcel, it was an important landmark on the ground and was used by everyone, both before and after the division into two parcels was made. The rule as stated in Hills v. Miller, 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 254, 257, was adopted by us in Phoenix National Bank v. United States Security Trust Co., 100 Conn. 622, 630, 124 A. 540: "As the right is annexed to the estate, for the benefit of which the easement or servitude is created, the right is not destroyed by a division of the estate to which it is appurtenant. And the owner or assignee of any portion of that estate may claim the right, so far as it is applicable to his part of the property, provided the right can be enjoyed as to the separate parcels without any additional charge or burden to the proprietor of the servient estate.
Full discussions of this question are so readily available in the decided cases that it is not thought necessary to deal further with it here, but citations are given from which the law on the subject can be exhausted without difficulty. Henrie v. Johnson, 28 W. Va. 190; Phoenix National Bank v. United States Security Trust Company, 100 Conn. 622, 124 A. 540, 34 A.L.R. 963, and note; Doten v. Bartlett, 107 Me. 351, 78 A. 456, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1075, and note; Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102, 35 Am. Dec. 302; Dawson v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co., 15 Minn. 136, 2 Am. Rep. 109. This brings us to consider the question of whether such an easement has arisen from prescriptive use of the land in controversy by Blankenship and his successors in title.
The fact that no road was actually wrought and constructed until the defendant did so, after 1919, does not suffice to negative the previous existence of such a way, as we understand the appellant to claim, especially in view of the use disclosed by the finding and consequent physical evidences thereof. Phoenix National Bank v. United States Security Trust Co., 100 Conn. 622, 635, 124 A. 540. However, in the absence of facts affording wider significance, rights therein would enure only to purchasers of land owned and sold by the creators of the way, and in order to entitle the plaintiffs to the benefit of it they must establish that title to the lots now owned by them was in Lodowick and Julia Leeds, or one of them. Therefore the finding that in 1893 the title to all of the properties here involved was in these Leeds is vital, but it is questioned on this appeal and we find it to lack essential support from evidence so far as concerns land lying northerly of Ray Street. The descriptions in the mortgages, which afford the only evidence of the extent and boundaries of the properties owned by Lodowick and Julia Leeds, do not cover any land north of that street.
In the absence of actual notice of the existence of an easement or of physical facts which would put him upon inquiry, one purchasing property may rely upon the land records to disclose the existence of such a charge upon the property. Whiting v. Gaylord, supra; Phoenix National Bank v. United States Security Trust Co., 100 Conn. 622, 636, 124 A. 540; Ricci v. Naples, 108 Conn. 19, 24, 142 A. 452. A bona fide purchaser of land without knowledge or actual or constructive notice of the existence of an easement takes title relieved of the burden of the easement. 9 R. C. L. 805; 19 C. J. 940; see cases in annotations in 41 A. L. R. 1442, 74 A. L. R. 1250; 2 Tiffany, Real Property, 1304; Jones, Easements, ยง 123.