This statute has allowed the stakeholder to be awarded counsel fees and expenses from the funds on deposit. Chase v. Benedict, 72 Conn. 322, 328 (1899); Union Trust Company v. Stamford Trust Company, 72 Conn. 86, 93, 96 (1899); Phoenix Insurance Company v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 431 (1908). Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC has made the claim for attorneys fees and costs in both the May 1, 2012 Bill of Interpleader (# 100.31) and in its amended Statement of Claim dated July 26, 2017 (# 206.00).

It is well settled that this statute allows the court to award a stakeholder reasonable attorneys fees and expenses. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 431, 68 A. 993 (1908). The trial court has a wide discretion in making its awards, subject to review only for an abuse of that discretion.

It is well settled that this statute allows the court to award a stakeholder reasonable attorneys fees and expenses. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 431, 68 A. 993 (1908). The trial court has a wide discretion in making its awards, subject to review only for an abuse of that discretion.

Even if the prerequisites to issuance of a temporary injunction exist, the court retains the discretion to decline or limit the relief afforded. Hartford v. American Arbitration Association, 174 Conn. 472, 477 (1978); Phoenix Ins. Co. V. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 431 (1908). The court orders the defendant to remove all items of personalty which he has placed on the plaintiffs' half of the ramp within thirty days. He is also ordered to remove any items on his portion of the ramp which interfere with pedestrian or vehicular passage on the ramp within thirty days.

It is well settled that this statute allows the court to award a stakeholder reasonable attorney's fees and expenses. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 431, 68 A. 993 (1908). The trial court has a wide discretion in making its awards, subject to review only for an abuse of that discretion.

The defendant's application, supported by and affidavit, alleged that the plaintiff had arranged to borrow $600,000 from the Beatrice Koizim Trust, assigning as collateral his interest in S K Associates. This action directly contravened the court's directive, set out in its memorandum of decision, that the plaintiff's interest in these assets not be encumbered or divested. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in issuing a temporary restraining order. See General Statutes 52-473; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 431, 68 A. 993 (1908). With respect to the ex parte contact, which consisted of a telephone conversation in which permission was sought to submit an application for the restraining order discussed above, it was entirely proper.

The stipulation filed in the trial court was merely a substitute for the regular legal evidence of the facts stated in it. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 434. Neither the stipulation nor the memorandum of decision nor both of them constituted a finding of facts such as is ordinarily required.

The construction which we place upon the finding is fortified by the memorandum of decision, which may be consulted in the interpretation of ambiguous or equivocal language in a finding. Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. (2d Ed.) 152;. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 433, 68 A. 993; Rowell v. Stamford Street Ry. Co., 64 Conn. 376, 380, 30 A. 131. In its memorandum, the court stated that "the plaintiff acting by . . . her agent, rescinded the sale and notified the defendants within a reasonable time and offered to return the truck.

Deposit of the money or property in controversy into court was a requirement in actions of interpleader also at common law. This requirement has been relaxed in many cases where no statute modifying the common law was involved, State of Texas v. State of Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 59 S.Ct. 563, 830, 83 L.Ed. 817, 121 A.L.R. 1179; Baldwin v. Constantine, 214 Ala. 446, 108 So. 345; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 68 A. 993; Nash v. Smith, 6 Conn. 421; Webster v. McDaniel, 2 Del. Ch. 297; Smith v. Nicholson, 221 Mo.App. 428, 289 S.W. 349, certiorari quashed State ex rel. Bradley v. Trimble, 316 Mo. 97, 289 S.W. 922; C.F. Duke Storage Warehouse, Inc., v. Keller, 141 N.J. Eq. 43, 55 A.2d 901; see note approving Duke case, 1 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 459, and in other jurisdictions by rule or statute (e.g., Penna. Rule Civ. Proc. 2303(a)(3), Penna.Stat.Ann.

The immediate motion is for a temporary injunction. An injunction does not lie as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the trier; Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426; Point O'Woods Assn., Inc. v. Busher, 117 Conn. 247, 250; is not granted to prevent an act possibly injurious in the future; Enfield Toll Bridge Co. v. Connecticut River Co., 7 Conn. 28, 50; and is never granted because of mere apprehensions. Goodwin v. New York, N. H. H.R. Co., 43 Conn. 494, 500.