When money belonging to a defendant is attached in the hands of a third party by process of foreign attachment, the garnishee cannot safely pay it over to either party pending the continuance of the suit in which it is attached, but must hold it to abide the result of the action. If he is not under contract to pay interest and makes no use of the money, but retains it as a mere stakeholder, he will not be liable for interest until the result of the suit determines to which party he shall pay it. Candee v. Skinner, 40 Conn. 464, 468; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 id. 426, 432, 68 A. 993. But when he mingles the money attached with his own and has the use of it, he is liable for the interest on it. Woodruff v. Bacon, 35 Conn. 97, 104. Where, as in the present case, no attachment is made, the reason for the rule fails. The debt in question was not the property of Goldreyer at the time the factorizing process was served upon the defendant.

If it had so found, such a finding would have been outside of the issues framed. But while a mere memorandum of decision may, under certain limitations and to aid an appeal, be resorted to as indicating a conclusion of law controlling the decision ( Cummings v. Hartford, 70 Conn. 115, 124, 38 A. 916; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 433, 69 A. 993), it cannot, unless made a part of the record, be treated as a finding of facts. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, supra. In the absence of any finding of facts, we can look only to the judgment-file to determine what issues the Superior Court says it decided, and we must look to the issues themselves to determine whether such finding supports the judgment rendered.

We hold, upon appeal, that the memorandum of decision may be resorted to by this court for the purpose of ascertaining the rulings of the trial court upon questions of law, and for interpreting the findings of the judgment-file, or those made for the purposes of the judgment. Rogers v. Hendrick, 85 Conn. 260, 267, 82 A. 586; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 433, 68 A. 993; Cummings v. Hartford, 70 Conn. 115, 124, 38 A. 916; Styles v. Tyler, 64 Conn. 432, 439, 30 A. 165. Our rules require the memorandum of decision to be printed in all cases. Practice Book (1908) p. 275, § 23.

In the light of these facts, the only reasonable inference was that credit was given to the defendant, Louis Wein, as the apparent owner of the store where these goods were sold and delivered. A memorandum of decision may "be resorted to as indicating a conclusion of law controlling the decision." Rogers v. Hendrick, 85 Conn. 260, 267, 82 A. 586; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 433, 434, 68 A. 993. In this connection it is of interest to quote from the memorandum of decision, made a part of the record in this case, in which the trial court states that the plaintiff, "evidently, did not inquire as to the ownership of the store, nor did he know, apparently, if you judge from the record evidence, to wit, his first charges in the book, who owned the store, except that it was owned by a Wein and it doesn't appear that he ever made any inquiries, nor that he was ever told by anybody that the defendant owned that store or claimed to own the store, and, when he brought the action in the present suit, he made no inquiries but simply assumed, on the strength of what he had seen, that the defendant and not his father was the owner of the store."

Again in Waterbury Lumber Coal Co. v. Hinckley, 75 Conn. 187, 190, 52 A. 739, it is said: "The record of the court in which the judgment was rendered . . . was the only proper evidence . . . that such record was lost or destroyed." See also Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 433, 68 A. 993. "It is in the judgment-file one must look to ascertain the facts upon which the judgment rests."

Citing: Memphis Cold Storage Co. v. Woodson, 1 Tenn. App. 340; Daniels Chy. P. P. (5 Ed.) Vol. II, p. 1493 (Cooper's revision); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lane, 151 Fed., 276; Pettus v. Hendricks, 113 Va. 326; 2 Daniels Chy. Pr. (5th Ed.), 1570; Pomeroy's Eq. Rem. Sec. 59; Miller v. Watts, 4 Duer (N.Y.), 203; Canfield v. Morgan, 1 Hopkins Ch. (N.Y.), 222; Woodmen of World v. Wood, 100 Mo. App. 655; Swiger v. Hayman, 56 W. Va. 123; 107 Am. St. Rep., 899; Bedell v. Hoffman, 2 N.Y. Chy., 199. Citing and Differentiating: Daniel v. Fain, 73 Tenn. (5 Lea), 258; Helmken v. Meyer, 118 Ga. 657; Knights of Honor v. Selby, 153 N.C. 203; Temple v. Lawson, 19 Ark., 148; Modern Woodmen v. Conner, 129 Ill. App. 651; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kinsley, 192 Ill. App. 229; Chapin v. Dake, 57 Ill. 295; Insurance Co. v. Corbin, 12 Phila., 257; 33 Corpus Juris, p. 470; Dunlap v. Hubbard, 19 Ves., 205; Dawson v. Hardcastle, 1 Ves., 389; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426; Morse v. Stearns, 131 Mass. 389; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 627, 26 L.Ed., 1157; State Fur. Co. v. Gennett, 1 Tenn. Chy., 100; Louisiana Lottery Co. v. Clark, 16 Fed., 20; Thomas Kay Woolen Mill Co. v. Sprague, 259 Fed., 338. 2. EQUITY.

Such fee to eventually fall on the defendant who was in the wrong and made the litigation necessary. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Farmers and Mechanics National Bank of Cad'z., Ohio, 173 Fed.R. 390; Pettus v. Hendricks, 113 Va. 326, 74 So. E. R. 191; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 68 Atl. R. 993; Eves v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., 153 Mo. App. 347, 133 So. W. R. 657; Wright v. Grand Lodge K. P. (Tex.Civ.App.) 173 So. W. R. 270; Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 26 L.Ed. 1157; Morse v. Stearns, 131 Mass. 389; Grooms v. Mullett, 133 Mo. App. 477, 113 So. W. R. 683; Daniel v. Fain, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 258; 33 C. J. 470 and cases cited.

The authorities, as we read the cases, are to the effect that neither party claiming money which is directed to be deposited in court pending the outcome of litigation is entitled to interest on such money pending the litigation. Deering v. Schreyer, 185 N.Y. 560, 78 N.E. 75; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 68 A. 993; Delta Pine Land Co. v. Sherwood, 187 Ill. App. 167; Kinney v. Hynds, 7 Wyo. 22, 49 P. 403, 52 P. 1081. It has also been held that, "where a particular fund is paid into court in compliance with its order of interpleader, and various claimants litigate between themselves as to their rights to the fund, a decree distributing the fund will not bear interest, and an intervening claimant who prosecutes error to that decree in good faith, and gives a supersedeas bond to stay execution, cannot be compelled, in a suit on the bond, to pay interest on the fund or any part of it." The foregoing quotation is from the syllabus of the case of Franklin Bank v. Bruns, 84 Ohio St. 12, 95 N.E. 385, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1002.

The evidence is not printed and we cannot say from the finding that that discretion was abused. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 431, 68 A. 993. Interest, in a case of this kind, is allowed on the theory that money has been wrongfully retained. The named defendant was directed to "hold said money, subject to the further and final order of this court" and cannot be said to have retained it wrongfully.

Jacobs v. Jacobs, 170 Md. 405, 414, 185 A. 109. Hence, notwithstanding that the granting or withholding of an injunction rests largely in the sound discretion of the chancellor, and his decree will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly discloses an improvident exercise of judicial discretion, nevertheless his decree will be reversed by the Court of Appeals if it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion showing a disregard of the facts or an obvious error in the application of the principles of equity. Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 68 A. 993; Smart v. Boston Wire Stitcher Co., 50 R.I. 409, 148 A. 803; Gemmell v. Fox, 241 Pa. 146, 88 A. 426; 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions, Secs. 35, 328. It is now too late to grant an injunction in this case but there are substantive rights to be determined. Before the temporary injunction was issued, the complainant was required to give a bond in the penalty of $1,000 to indemnify the defendants for any costs and damages occasioned by the issuance of the injunction in the event the injunction was rescinded. If we do not determine the primary right of the complainant to a writ of injunction, then the complainant will not have prosecuted the cause with effect, and the liability under the bond would become fixed for costs of suit as well as possible damages; whereas our determination now that the complainant was entitled to an injunction would discharge the bond.