Deposit of the money or property in controversy into court was a requirement in actions of interpleader also at common law. This requirement has been relaxed in many cases where no statute modifying the common law was involved, State of Texas v. State of Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 59 S.Ct. 563, 830, 83 L.Ed. 817, 121 A.L.R. 1179; Baldwin v. Constantine, 214 Ala. 446, 108 So. 345; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 68 A. 993; Nash v. Smith, 6 Conn. 421; Webster v. McDaniel, 2 Del. Ch. 297; Smith v. Nicholson, 221 Mo.App. 428, 289 S.W. 349, certiorari quashed State ex rel. Bradley v. Trimble, 316 Mo. 97, 289 S.W. 922; C.F. Duke Storage Warehouse, Inc., v. Keller, 141 N.J. Eq. 43, 55 A.2d 901; see note approving Duke case, 1 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 459, and in other jurisdictions by rule or statute (e.g., Penna. Rule Civ. Proc. 2303(a)(3), Penna.Stat.Ann.

Jacobs v. Jacobs, 170 Md. 405, 414, 185 A. 109. Hence, notwithstanding that the granting or withholding of an injunction rests largely in the sound discretion of the chancellor, and his decree will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly discloses an improvident exercise of judicial discretion, nevertheless his decree will be reversed by the Court of Appeals if it clearly appears that there has been an abuse of discretion showing a disregard of the facts or an obvious error in the application of the principles of equity. Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 68 A. 993; Smart v. Boston Wire Stitcher Co., 50 R.I. 409, 148 A. 803; Gemmell v. Fox, 241 Pa. 146, 88 A. 426; 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions, Secs. 35, 328. It is now too late to grant an injunction in this case but there are substantive rights to be determined. Before the temporary injunction was issued, the complainant was required to give a bond in the penalty of $1,000 to indemnify the defendants for any costs and damages occasioned by the issuance of the injunction in the event the injunction was rescinded. If we do not determine the primary right of the complainant to a writ of injunction, then the complainant will not have prosecuted the cause with effect, and the liability under the bond would become fixed for costs of suit as well as possible damages; whereas our determination now that the complainant was entitled to an injunction would discharge the bond.

Again in Waterbury Lumber Coal Co. v. Hinckley, 75 Conn. 187, 190, 52 A. 739, it is said: "The record of the court in which the judgment was rendered . . . was the only proper evidence . . . that such record was lost or destroyed." See also Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 433, 68 A. 993. "It is in the judgment-file one must look to ascertain the facts upon which the judgment rests."

If it had so found, such a finding would have been outside of the issues framed. But while a mere memorandum of decision may, under certain limitations and to aid an appeal, be resorted to as indicating a conclusion of law controlling the decision ( Cummings v. Hartford, 70 Conn. 115, 124, 38 A. 916; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 433, 69 A. 993), it cannot, unless made a part of the record, be treated as a finding of facts. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, supra. In the absence of any finding of facts, we can look only to the judgment-file to determine what issues the Superior Court says it decided, and we must look to the issues themselves to determine whether such finding supports the judgment rendered.

This statute has allowed the stakeholder to be awarded counsel fees and expenses from the funds on deposit. Chase v. Benedict, 72 Conn. 322, 328 (1899); Union Trust Company v. Stamford Trust Company, 72 Conn. 86, 93, 96 (1899); Phoenix Insurance Company v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 431 (1908). Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC has made the claim for attorneys fees and costs in both the May 1, 2012 Bill of Interpleader (# 100.31) and in its amended Statement of Claim dated July 26, 2017 (# 206.00).