The next contention of defendant is that of error in directing a verdict in favor of plaintiff. This is the vital question involved in this appeal. The defendant cites and relies upon Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Newell, 60 Okla. 207, 159 P. 1127; Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Long, 93 Okla. 129, 219 P. 926, and J.R. Watkins Co. v. Jennings, 131 Okla. 295, 269 P. 265, as supporting his contention in this respect. We are of the opinion, however, that the above cases will not bear the interpretation which the defendant seeks to place thereon.

It is a well-known and oft-repeated rule of this court that questions of fact are to be determined by the jury under proper instructions of the court. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Newell et al., 60 Okla. 207. 159 P. 1127; Haddock v. Sticelber Mong, 65 Okla. 254, 165 P. 1158; Oklahoma Auto Co. v. Goulding, 73 Oklahoma. 176 P. 400; Matthews et al. v. Mounts. 81 Okla. 245, 197 P. 708. The court took the view that the written contract for 1919 was of such a nature that a contract for 1920 could not he made by the parties without the same was in writing.

"The question presented to a trial court on a motion to direct a verdict is whether, admitting the truth of all the evidence which has been given in favor of the party against whom the action is contemplated, together with such inferences and conclusions as may be reasonably drawn from it, there is enough evidence to reasonably sustain a verdict, should the jury find in accordance therewith." Solts v. Southwestern Cotton Oil Co., 28 Okla. 706, 115 P. 776; Duncan Cotton Oil Co. v. Cox, 41 Okla. 633, 139 P. 270; Chestnutt-Gibbons Grocer Co. v. Consumers' Fruit Co., 44 Okla. 318, 144 P. 591; Frick-Reid Supply Co. et al. v. Hunter, 47 Okla. 151, 148 P. 83; Phoenix Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Newell et al., 60 Okla. 207, 159 P. 1127. "If the inference to be drawn from the evidence is a reasonable one, although not necessary one, the court will not invade the province of the jury by taking from it the right to pass on the facts to be deduced from such inference."

Even where there is no provision automatically terminating coverage, it has been held to be a breach of good faith to maintain the agent in a position of trust after discovering his defalcations without notifying the fidelity carrier and giving it an opportunity to decide whether or not it desires to continue as insurer. See Aetna Insurance Co. v. Fowler, 108 Mich. 557, 66 N.W. 470 (1896), and Phoenix Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Newell, 60 Okla. 207, 159 P. 1127 (1916). Larson v. Peerless Ins. Co., 362 S.W.2d 863 (Tex.Civ.App. 1962); First Fed. Sav. Loan Ass'n v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 115 Ga. App. 756, 156 S.E.2d 101 (1967); Verneco, Inc. v. Fid. Cas. Co., 253 La. 721, 219 So.2d 508 (1969); U.S.F. G. Co. v. Constantin, 247 Miss. 812, 157 So.2d 642 (1963); Miners Sav. Bank v. Royal Indemnity Co., 336 Pa. 428, 9 A.2d 543 (1939); Supreme Ruling, F.N.C. v. National Surety Co., 114 App. Div. 689, 99 N YS. 1033 (1906); Roseville Trust Co. v. National Surety Co., 95 N.J.L. 138, 112 A. 337 (1920); Guarantee Co. of N.A. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank and Trust Co., 183 U.S. 402, 22 S.Ct. 124, 46 L.Ed. 253 (1902); and Alabama Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Alabama Penny Svgs. Bank, 200 Ala. 337, 76 So. 103 (1917).

I. Cited and discussed the following authorities. Alabama Fidelity Casualty Co. v. Alabama Penny Saving Bank (Ala.), 76 So. 103; American Life Ins. Co. v. Mahone, 56 Miss. 180; General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Williams, 194 Miss. 375, 13 So.2d 19; Guarantee Co. of N.A. v. Mechanics Savings Bank Trust Co., 183 U.S. 402, 46 L.Ed. 253; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Casey, 191 S.W. 1072; McGee v. Maryland Casualty Co., 240 Miss. 447, 127 So.2d 656; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Newell, 159 P. 1127; Yazoo M.V.R. Co. v. Lamensdorf, 180 Miss. 426, 178 So. 80. ETHRIDGE, J.

But this rule does not apply where there is a question of moral turpitude involved, or where the principal is guilty of conduct indicating dishonesty, or bad faith, or utter unfitness for trust, after the knowledge of such conduct has come to the obligee's attention. 21 R. C. L. pp. 1071-72, sec. 111; Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Newell, 60 Okla. 207, 159 P. 1127; Screwman's Ben. Ass'n v. Smith (Tex.) 7 S.W. 793. "If, however, the obligation of the surety is a continuing one, and the extent of the liability of the principal rests entirely within the knowledge of the obligee, notice of the principal's default must be given to the sureties within a reasonable time, or they will be discharged."

The evidence in this case was sufficient to constitute a question of fact to go to the jury, and it was error therefore to instruct a verdict for the plaintiff. The record in this case brings it within the rules applied in the cases of Great Southern Life Insurance Co. v. John J. Long et al., 93 Okla. 129, 219 P. 926; Phoenix Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Newell, 60 Okla. 207, 159 P. 1127; Chicago Crayon Co. v. Rogers, 30 Okla. 299, 119 P. 630; Guardian Fire and Life Assurance Co. v. Thompson et al. (Cal.) 9 P. 1. The cases cited apply the rule that where knowledge of embezzlement by the agent is brought home to the principal, it is the duty of the latter to notify the sureties on the bond, and a failure to so do after acquiring such knowledge, releases the sureties. This rule of law rests upon the supposition that a reasonably prudent business man in the conduct of his ordinary business affairs would not continue an agent in his employ after knowledge of the agent's embezzlement had come to his attention.

Cole v. Missouri, K. O. R. Co., 20 Okla. 227, 94 P. 540; St. Louis S. F. R. Co. v. Jamieson, 20 Okla. 654, 95 P. 417. The trial court cannot direct a verdict where it is necessary to weigh the evidence to determine where the preponderance lies. Missouri, O. G. R. Co. v. Smith, 55 Okla. 12, 155 P. 233; Phoenix Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Newell, 60 Okla. 207, 159 P. 1127; Freeman-Sipes v. Henson, 26 Okla. 799, 110 P. 909. The jury might have found from the evidence of the defendant that he paid the sum of $1,200 on the notes in 1912, and if it had been so found, the verdict could rightfully have been permitted to stand.

The jury having returned their verdict in favor of the school district and there being sufficient evidence to support it, and it having received the approval of the trial court, this court will not disturb the verdict of the jury. Taylor v. Ins. Co. of North America, 25 Okla. 92, 105 P. 354; Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Stegall et al., 25 Okla. 92, 111 P. 389; Midland Saving Loan Co. v. Sutton et al., 30 Okla. 448, 120 P. 1007; Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spaulding, 50 Okla. 307, 150 P. 494; Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Owens, 50 Okla. 629, 151 P. 198; Phoenix Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Newell et al., 60 Okla. 207, 159 P. 1127; National Council of Knights and Ladies of Security v. Fowler, 66 Oklahoma, 168 P. 914. The measure of damages that school district No. 10 would be entitled to recover under the statute would be the same amount it would be entitled to recover under the policy of insurance had the insurance policy been issued.