" Public Acts 1887, c. 110 3. "This statute has been construed by us as imposing upon any single item of a person's real estate a lien for only that amount of his taxes which was assessed upon the valuation of such single item. Meyer v. Burritt, 60 Conn. 117, 124, 22 A. 501." Phillips v. Sturm, 91 Conn. 331, 336, 99 A. 689. After 1887, any piece of real estate which is by law set in the owner's tax list could be subject to a lien only for such part of the total taxes of the owner as was due on that particular piece. The act of 1887, as amended at various times, is our present lien statute.
See Practice Book 721. On these facts, and in the absence of any evidence to support the plaintiff's allegations of readiness, willingness and ability to perform its promises as contained in the agreement, the court concluded, on the authority of Phillips v. Sturm, 91 Conn. 331, 335, 99 A. 689, that the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment. This was a correct conclusion.
It therefore required, "as a condition of judicial enforcement or redress for breach at the complaint of either, such readiness and willingness on his part, or a showing of sufficient excuse for their absence. Phillips v. Sturm, 91 Conn. 331, 335, 99 A. 689; Smith v. Lewis, 24 Conn. 624, 635." Stierle v. Rayner, 92 Conn. 180, 183, 102 A. 581; Lunde v. Minch, 105 Conn. 657, 659, 136 A. 552. Therefore here, if the plaintiffs on their part were prevented by the decedent from completing the contract, they were entitled to bring their action for damages for her breach of it. Valente v. Weinberg, 80 Conn. 134, 135, 67 A. 369; Dadio v. Dadio, 123 Conn. 88, 92, 192 A. 557; Restatement, 1 Contracts, 295, Conn. Annot., 295.
This attitude on the part of the defendant relieved the plaintiff from the obligation to make full preparation for performance. It was enough if, as alleged in his complaint, he was "ready, willing and able." Smith v. Lewis, 24 Conn. 624, 636; Phillips v. Sturm, 91 Conn. 331, 335, 99 A. 689; Romanoff v. De Santo, 101 Conn. 504, 511, 126 A. 694. The charge of the court held the plaintiff to the required standard. No good purpose would be served by an analysis of the other assignments of error under this head.
Such taxes may be collected by levy under 1225 and 1232 of the General Statutes, or by action as for the recovery of a debt under 1231, but the property assessed is not subject to lien prior to the institution of such proceedings to enforce the collection of the tax. Phillips v. Sturm, 91 Conn. 331, 336, 99 A. 689; 3 Cooley, Taxation (4th Ed.) 1233. The constable levied upon the property and took it into his possession on September 17th, 1931, under an alias warrant for the collection of the taxes due on the list of 1930. This action created no lien upon the property for the taxes on the list of 1931 which had not then been laid. A supplemental alias warrant was issued by the collector on February 10th, 1932, commanding the collection of the taxes levied upon the property upon the list of 1930 and the list of 1931, it being stated in the warrant that the latter were due and payable "on demand." The tax rate upon that list had not then been determined and of necessity the collector had not then received a warrant authorizing him to collect the taxes on that list.
Smith v. Lewis, 24 Conn. 624. That being so, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to show that they were excused from taking those steps which ordinarily would be necessary to put the defendants in default. Phillips v. Sturm, 91 Conn. 331, 335, 99 A. 689. The excuse upon which the plaintiffs rely is the inability of the defendants to convey the premises free and clear of all incumbrances by reason of the existence of certain restrictions upon the use of the property.
These were mutual and dependent covenants demanding of each of the parties readiness and willingness to perform, and requiring, as a condition of judicial enforcement or redress for breach at the complaint of either, such readiness and willingness on his part, or a showing of sufficient excuse for their absence. Phillips v. Sturm, 91 Conn. 331, 335, 99 A. 689; Smith v. Lewis, 24 Conn. 624, 635. Readiness to perform on the plaintiff's part meant readiness to convey an unincumbered title.
It is well settled that "[l]egal excuses for not performing contract obligations as agreed cannot be based upon the occurrence of an event or the existence of a condition or a circumstance for which the party's claiming excuse is himself responsible, either because his conduct gave rise to it or because the risk of its occurrence or existence is allocated to him, by the contract or by custom . . . Where a party who has neither performed his contractual obligations nor tendered performance under the contract has no valid legal excuse for not performing the contract as agreed to, he is not entitled to recover unpaid fees as damages in an action for breach of contract. Phillips v. Sturm, 91 Conn. 331, 99 A. 689 (1917)." David M. Somers Associates, P.C. v. Busch, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 03 0822125 (April 10, 2006, Sheldon, J.) [ 41 Conn. L. Rptr. 332], aff'd, 283 Conn. 396, 927 A.2d 832 (2007).
Where a party who has neither performed his contractual obligations nor tendered performance under the contract has no valid legal excuse for not performing the contract as agreed to, he is not entitled to recover unpaid fees as damages in an action for breach of contract. Phillips v. Sturm, 91 Conn. 331, 99 A. 689 (1917). In this case, there is no question that the defendant engaged the plaintiff to enter into a contract to perform a single, indivisible task, to wit: to represent her, from start to finish, in an action to obtain the dissolution of her marriage.