Opinion
36416.
DECIDED OCTOBER 31, 1956.
Assault with intent to murder. Before Judge Hicks. Floyd Superior Court. July 27, 1956.
John A. Frazier, Jr., for plaintiff in error.
Chastine Parker, Solicitor-General, James Maddox, contra.
The evidence is ample to sustain the verdict. The trial court made no error of law in refusing to admit certain evidence; neither did the court err in refusing the request to charge, since the point had been covered sufficiently elsewhere in the charge of the court.
DECIDED OCTOBER 31, 1956.
The defendant was convicted of assault with intent to murder. His motion for a new trial on the statutory grounds, and as amended, was denied, and the case is here for review.
The evidence shows substantially that Nelson, the prosecutor, was married to the divorced former wife of the defendant; that there was a child by the first marriage, who was in custody of the defendant's wife at the time of the difficulty which gives rise to the situation presented by the record; that Nelson went to a school house in Floyd County to pick up the child; that the defendant was also there to pick up the child to take her home to the mother; that while both men were there an argument arose as to whom the little girl would accompany. A shooting resulted, which is the subject matter of the case now before this court.
1. The evidence is somewhat lengthy, much of it concerning the relationship of the parties previous to the shooting. Suffice it to say that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the findings of the jury. The jury were able to see the principals in the case, the witnesses, and to arrive at an impartial verdict. The contentions of counsel for the defendant are not a basis for reversal on the general grounds.
2. Special ground 1 assigns error because the court refused to allow the defendant to make a supplemental statement, over objections of the solicitor-general. A reading of the material which was sought to be brought out by the supplemental statement discloses that substantially the same evidence had been brought out in other testimony, — which testimony was elicited in a more direct manner. In our opinion this additional statement would have added nothing material to the defense. Tolbert v. State, 12 Ga. App. 685 ( 78 S.E. 131). It is within the discretion of the court to determine whether or not a defendant shall be allowed to make a supplemental statement. Dixon v. State, 116 Ga. 186 ( 42 S.E. 357). To be allowed to make a supplemental statement is not a matter of right for the defendant. Newberry v. State, 25 Ga. App. 30 ( 102 S.E. 368) and Drury v. State, 211 Ga. 888 ( 89 S.E.2d 513) relied upon by counsel for the plaintiff, concern allowing or disallowing material contained in a defendant's statement. We have examined the original record of those cases, and find that the facts are in no wise similar to the facts in the instant case, and therefore are not cause for a reversal of the instant case. This special ground shows no cause for reversal.
3. Special ground 2 assigns error because the court refused to admit testimony regarding a fight not involved in the instant case. The record shows that this ground concerns a matter never ruled upon directly by the court. Counsel discussed the proposition as to what he could prove by one Myrtice Hightower but he did not produce the witness. In the absence of a direct ruling by the court upon which exceptions could be based, there is nothing for this court to do except decide that this special ground is not properly before this court, and therefore, has no value as a basis for a reversal.
4. Special ground 3 assigns error because the court refused to charge as follows: "On trial for assault with intent to murder by use of deadly weapon, burden is on State to show (1) the assault, (2) deadly character of weapon, (3) intent to take life, and (4) commission of assault under such circumstances that had death ensued, party making assault would have been guilty of murder." A reading of the full charge of the court will disclose that this was fully covered elsewhere, and the trial court did not err in refusing to charge as requested. This ground shows no cause for reversal.
Judgment affirmed. Townsend and Carlisle, JJ., concur.