Phillips v. State

7 Citing cases

  1. Davenport v. State

    763 S.E.2d 130 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)

    Cronkite v. State, 293 Ga. 476, 479, n. 4, 745 S.E.2d 591 (2013). See also Davenport II, 289 Ga. at 400–401, 711 S.E.2d 699; Phillips v. State, 324 Ga.App. 728, 732–733, 751 S.E.2d 526 (2013). Likewise, Davenport's contention that her Confrontation Clause rights have been violated has also been decided against her. Phillips, 324 Ga.App. at 733, 751 S.E.2d 526.

  2. Davenport v. State

    328 Ga. App. 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 1 times

    Cronkite v. State, 293 Ga. 476, 479, n. 4, 745 S.E.2d 591 (2013). See also Davenport II, 289 Ga. at 400–401, 711 S.E.2d 699 ; Phillips v. State, 324 Ga.App. 728, 732–733, 751 S.E.2d 526 (2013). Likewise, Davenport's contention that her Confrontation Clause rights have been violated has also been decided against her. Phillips, 324 Ga.App. at 733, 751 S.E.2d 526.

  3. MacMaster v. State

    809 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 7 times
    Recognizing that an affirmative response to the implied consent notice does not automatically mean actual voluntary consent to a blood test

    Additionally, our Supreme Court and this Court have previously rejected Confrontation Clause challenges relating to State-administered chemical tests. See Rackoff v. State , 281 Ga. 306, 309 (2), 637 S.E.2d 706 (2006) (introduction of inspection certificate for breath testing machine did not violate Confrontation Clause); Smith v. State , 338 Ga. App. 635, 639 (4), 791 S.E.2d 418 (2016) (State not required under Confrontation Clause to name inspector of breath testing machine as a witness); Phillips v. State , 324 Ga. App. 728, 733, 751 S.E.2d 526 (2013) (Confrontation Clause does not apply to machines like a breath testing machine). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress or motion in limine, appellate courts construe the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's factual findings and judgment, and "all relevant evidence of record, including evidence introduced at trial, as well as evidence introduced at the motion to suppress hearing, may be considered."

  4. Smith v. State

    338 Ga. App. 635 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 6 times

    Because an inspection certificate is not testimonial in nature, a defendant has no right to confront the inspector who produced it and the State need not produce the inspector as a witness at trial in order to introduce the certificates into evidence. Phillips v. State , 324 Ga.App. 728, 733, 751 S.E.2d 526 (2013). Thus, Smith has not shown that the trial court erred in admitting the certificates on the ground that the State failed to name as a witness the person who inspected the Intoxilyzer.

  5. Holowiak v. State

    774 S.E.2d 229 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)

    As the trial court did not rule on the constitutional issues Holowiak now asserts, they cannot be considered on appeal. See Young, supra, 324 Ga.App. at 132(2), 749 S.E.2d 423. 3. Given our disposition in Division 1, we need not determine whether the trial court was authorized to set aside its conditional grant of a new trial based on a determination that the Kentucky court, although it had not ruled on Holowiak's specific subpoena request, would not compel the attendance of a witness from CMI or the production of the source code. Compare Phillips v. State, 324 Ga.App. 728, 751 S.E.2d 526 (2013) (concluding that trial court did not abuse discretion in requiring defendant in DUI case to proceed to trial after Kentucky Circuit Court issued an order declining to compel attendance of a witness from CMI in his Georgia criminal proceeding). Judgment affirmed.

  6. Sanders v. State

    760 S.E.2d 636 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014)

    The alleged violations of Sanders' constitutional right to due process and confrontation have already been considered by this court in recent decisions involving nearly identical facts. See Smith v. State, 325 Ga.App. 405, 410(4), 750 S.E.2d 758 (2013) and Phillips v. State, 324 Ga.App. 728, 751 S.E.2d 526 (2013). For the reasons articulated in Smith and Phillips, we find no merit in Sanders' appeal and therefore affirm.

  7. Smith v. State

    750 S.E.2d 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 4 times

    "It is imperative ... that in cases implicating a defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial, the trial court enter findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with Barker v. Wingo. Absent such findings, there is no exercise of discretion for this Court to review." Accordingly, we affirm the finding of guilt in light of our rulings above, and we remand for entry of a proper order addressing the speedy trial motion pursuant to Barker v. Wingo. 324 Ga.App. 728, 751 S.E.2d 526 (2013). To the extent that Smith argues that the materials he sought from CMI constituted Brady material, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and that his failure to obtain them violated his due process rights, he has failed to demonstrate that the State possessed evidence favorable to the defense; that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.