Opinion
C. A. 30401
07-26-2023
ASHLEY PHILLIPS, Appellant v. REGINA HEALTH CENTER, et al., Appellees
NATALIE GRUBB and MARK E. OWENS, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant. BRIAN F. LANGE and BETH A. SEBAUGH, Attorneys at Law, for Appellees.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CV-2021-01-0164
NATALIE GRUBB and MARK E. OWENS, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.
BRIAN F. LANGE and BETH A. SEBAUGH, Attorneys at Law, for Appellees.
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
DONNA J. CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Ashley Phillips appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court reverses and remands the matter for proceedings consistent with this decision.
I.
{¶2} Ms. Phillips was employed by Defendant-Appellee Regina Health Center as a State Tested Nurse's Aide ("STNA") beginning in February 2017. During her employment at Regina Health Center, Ms. Phillips had health insurance through her job. She testified that she paid $43 for the coverage every two weeks. The insurance coverage was administered through Defendant-Appellee Catholic Diocese of Cleveland. Ms. Phillips left her job at Regina Health Center on or about January 16, 2018.
{¶3} An employee of Catholic Diocese of Cleveland indicated that on January 24, 2018, a letter was mailed to Ms. Phillips at the address where she then resided. The letter informed Ms. Phillips that she may be eligible to continue health coverage for a period of up to 18 months. The letter also reflected that Ms. Phillips' health coverage would cease on January 31, 2018 unless she was eligible for, and made an election to continue, the coverage. The letter then listed requirements for eligibility, payment terms, and when payment was due if she elected to continue coverage. The letter included an enclosure whereby Ms. Phillips could indicate her decision. Ms. Phillips denied receiving the documents and her coverage lapsed. She nonetheless asserted that she would have opted to maintain coverage had she been made aware that she could do so. Ms. Phillips obtained health insurance coverage again in late 2018.
{¶4} In January 2021, Ms. Phillips filed a four-count complaint against Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland. In count one, Ms. Phillips alleged that Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland violated R.C. 3923.38 by failing to provide her with the required notices about her right to continue health care coverage. In count two, Ms. Phillips asserted that Regina Health Center breached express and/or implied contractual obligations contained in an employee handbook by failing to notify Ms. Phillips of her right to continue health care coverage at the time she left employment. Ms. Phillips argued in count three that Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland were liable under promissory estoppel for promising to provide Ms. Phillips and others with the opportunity to continue health care coverage upon separation from employment and failing to follow through on that promise. Finally, in count four, Ms. Phillips asserted that Catholic Diocese of Cleveland breached a fiduciary duty to Ms. Phillips by failing to provide notice of her right to continue health care coverage at the time she left employment with Regina Health Center and by failing to provide a continuation of health care coverage. Both Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland filed answers in response.
{¶5} On April 13, 2022, Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland filed a combined motion for summary judgment. Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland stated that "[t]he primary focus of this Motion for Summary Judgment is that Plaintiff Ashley Phillips cannot establish any damages thereby eliminating the need to address in detail the complexities of federal preemption or any dispute over Plaintiffs receipt of the January 24, 2018 letter." Thus, as to all of the claims, Regina Health Center and Diocese of Cleveland argued that Ms. Phillips could not establish that she was damaged given the timing of her post-employment medical appointments, the timing when she regained insurance coverage, and the amount of her bills. With respect to count two, Regina Health Center additionally asserted that the employee handbook was not a contract. As to count three, Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland maintained that Ms. Phillips could not demonstrate detrimental reliance upon any false representations because Ms. Phillips had no awareness of her ability to continue coverage. Catholic Diocese of Cleveland indicated that it was also entitled to summary judgment on count four because it complied with its duty.
{¶6} Ms. Phillips filed a brief in opposition and Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland filed a reply. Ultimately, the trial court granted summary judgment to Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland on Ms. Phillips' claims.
{¶7} Ms. Phillips has appealed, raising four assignments of error for our review, which will be addressed together to facilitate our analysis. Within their brief, Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland have raised a cross-assignment of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THAT APPELLEES MET THEIR BURDEN AS TO COUNT I FOR VIOLATION OF R.C. []3923.38 AND []1751.53 (OHIO "MINI" COBRA STATUTE) BECAUSE IT FOUND THAT APPELLEES MAILED APPELLANT NOTICE OF HER RIGHT TO CONTINUED HEALTH COVERAGE ON JANUARY 24, 2018, DESPITE A LACK OF TESTIMONY, INITIALS OR OTHER EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THE PURPORTED MAILING.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THAT APPELLEES MET THEIR BURDEN AS TO COUNT II FOR BREACH OF EXPRESS AND/OR IMPLIED CONTRACT BECAUSE IT FOUND THAT APPELLEES MAILED APPELLANT NOTICE OF HER RIGHT TO CONTINUED HEALTH COVERAGE ON JANUARY 24, 2018, DESPITE A LACK OF TESTIMONY, INITIALS OR OTHER EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THE PURPORTED MAILING, AND WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THAT APPELLEES MET THEIR BURDEN AS TO COUNT III FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL BECAUSE IT FOUND THAT APPELLEES MAILED APPELLANT NOTICE FO HER RIGHT TO CONTINUED HEALTH COVERAGE ON JANUARY 24, 2018, DESPITE A LACK OF TESTIMONY, INITIALS OR OTHER EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THE PURPORTED MAILING, AND WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THAT APPELLEES MET THEIR BURDEN TO COUNT IV FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BECAUSE IT FOUND THAT APPELLEES MAILED APPELLANT NOTICE OF HER RIGHT TO CONTINUED HEALTH COVERAGE ON JANUARY 24, 2018, DESPITE A LACK OF TESTIMONY, INITIALS OR OTHER EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THE PURPORTED MAILING, AND WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED.
CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT COULD HAVE GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT ASHLEY PHILLIPS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF APPELLEES' ALLEGED FAILURE TO PROVIDE NOTIFICATION OF HER ELIGIBILITY FOR CONTINUATION OF COVERAGE UNDER HER HEALTH PLAN[.]
{¶8} Ms. Phillips argues in her first assignment of error that the trial court erred in its analysis of R.C. 3923.38 and that genuine issues of material fact remained. As to her remaining assignments of error, Ms. Phillips asserts that the trial court erred in considering them under the same analysis it applied to the first count. Additionally, Ms. Phillips maintains that genuine issues of material fact are present which prevent summary judgment from being appropriate. In their cross-assignment of error, Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland contend that the trial court could have granted summary judgment on the basis of the absence of damages and noted that "the Trial Court declined to address all of Appellees' arguments supporting Summary Judgment."
{¶9} This Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). This Court applies the same standard as the trial court, viewing the facts in the case in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolving any doubt in favor of the non-moving party. Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co., 13 Ohio App.3d 7, 12 (6th Dist.1983).
{¶10} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper if:
(1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977).
{¶11} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and pointing to parts of the record that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293 (1996). Specifically, the moving party must support the motion by pointing to some evidence in the record of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. Once a moving party satisfies its burden of supporting its motion for summary judgment with acceptable evidence pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), Civ.R. 56(E) provides that the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the moving party's pleadings. Id. at 293. Rather, the non-moving party has a reciprocal burden of responding by setting forth specific facts, demonstrating that a "genuine triable issue" exists to be litigated at trial. State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 449 (1996).
{¶12} In the entry granting summary judgment, the trial court concluded that "there [wa]s no genuine issue of material fact remaining for trial because [Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland] mailed Plaintiff notice of her right to continued health coverage on January 24, 2018. Regina [Health Center] was not required to notify Plaintiff of her right to continued health coverage on January 16, 2018 because it was Plaintiff that notified Regina [Health Center] that her employment was ending as opposed to Regina [Health Center] notifying Plaintiff that it was terminating her employment." In so doing, the trial court cited to R.C. 3923.38(C)(2), which states that "[t]he employer shall notify the employee of the right of continuation at the time the employer notifies the employee of the termination of employment. The notice shall inform the employee of the amount of contribution required by the employer under division (C)(4) of this section."
{¶13} Thus, the trial court determined that notice was sent to Ms. Phillips and that it was timely sent. While certainly those are factual issues in the case, they are not issues that Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland raised as the bases to support their motion for summary judgment. As noted above, at the beginning of their brief, Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland informed the trial court that "[t]he primary focus of this Motion for Summary Judgment is that Plaintiff Ashley Phillips cannot establish any damages thereby eliminating the need to address in detail the complexities of federal preemption or any dispute over Plaintiffs receipt of the January 24, 2018 letter." The additional arguments raised by Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland in support of their motion for summary judgment likewise did not address the issues upon which the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The fact that the trial court went outside the bounds of the motion for summary judgment in ruling is further supported by Regina Health Center's and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland's own cross-assignment of error which maintains that they are entitled to summary judgment for the reasons that they actually argued below.
{¶14} "A party seeking summary judgment must specifically delineate the basis upon which summary judgment is sought in order to allow the opposing party a meaningful opportunity to respond. Granting summary judgment on a basis not raised deprives the party opposing summary judgment of any opportunity to respond." (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Shaffer v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011440, 2019-Ohio-5022, ¶ 28. Thus, as this Court has consistently held, it is error for a trial court to award summary judgment on a ground not specified in the motion for summary judgment." Id.
{¶15} Further, as this Court's role is that of a reviewing court, we decline to consider Regina Health Center's and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland's summary judgment arguments which were not first analyzed by the trial court. See Four Elyria Co., LLC v. Brexton Constr., LLC, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 20CA011694, 20CA011695, 2022-Ohio-2989, ¶ 72; Smith v. Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29754, 2021-Ohio-3016, ¶ 31.
{¶16} Ms. Phillips' assignments of error are sustained to the extent discussed above and the cross-assignment of error is not properly before us at this time.
III.
{¶17} Ms. Phillips' assignments of error are sustained, and the cross-assignment of error is not properly before us at this time. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and the matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellees.
HENSAL, P. J. CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
{¶18} I do not agree with the lead opinion that the trial court went outside the bounds of the motion for summary judgment when it considered whether Ms. Phillips received notice of her right to continue healthcare coverage. Although that issue was not the primary focus of Regina's motion, Regina alleged that Ms. Phillips received notice multiple times throughout its motion and memorandum in support.
{¶19} I agree that the trial court's judgment must be reversed, however, because it did not correctly apply Civil Rule 56(C) when it reviewed the motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court failed to construe the evidence "most strongly" in Ms. Phillips's favor. Civ.R. 56(C). The court accepted as true Regina's allegation that it mailed notice to Ms. Phillips, but discounted Ms. Phillips's testimony that she did not receive it because her testimony was self-serving. "This Court has held that a non-moving party may rely upon a self-serving affidavit to satisfy [her] reciprocal Dresher burden so long as the affidavit points to a genuine issue of material fact." Estate of Henderson v. Henderson, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011301, 2018-Ohio-5264, ¶ 9, quoting Carpenter v. New Age Logistics, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27689, 2016-Ohio-281, ¶ 22. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Regina mailed Ms. Phillips notice of her right to continue her health benefits, I agree that this matter must be remanded for further proceedings.
FLAGG LANZINGER, J. DISSENTING.
{¶20} I respectfully dissent from the judgment reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland. I would affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Ms. Phillips suffered damages. To that end, Ms. Phillips failed to establish that she suffered damages given the timing of her post-employment medical appointments, the timing of when she regained insurance coverage, and the amount of her bills.
{¶21} In reaching this conclusion, I acknowledge that the trial court based its decision on the fact that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Ms. Phillips received notice of her right to continued health coverage. Unlike the lead opinion, however, I would conclude that Regina Health Center and Catholic Diocese of Cleveland sufficiently raised this issue as a basis to support their motion for summary judgment. But even if they did not, I would affirm the trial court's decision based upon the lack of a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Ms. Phillips suffered damages. See In re Estate of Baker, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 07CA009113, 2007-Ohio-6549, ¶ 15 ("An appellate court shall affirm a trial court's judgment that is legally correct on other grounds, that is, one that achieves the right result for the wrong reason, because such an error is not prejudicial."). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.