The Superior Court herein acts "as an appellate court of probate" which "as an appellate court" is "incompetent to award damages" and "the jurisdiction of probate courts over testamentary trusts is purely statutory." Phillips v. Moeller, 147 Conn. 482, 486, 487. The Superior Court cannot exercise a primary jurisdiction reposed in the Probate Court. Reiley v. Healey, 122 Conn. 64. That case states (p. 79): "Ordinarily, where a Court of Probate has refused to allow an account as a whole and an appeal has been taken, the Superior Court may, so far as it can without exercising a power vested exclusively in the Court of Probate, proceed to settle the account. . . . But the Superior Court cannot exercise a discretion vested in the Court of Probate; it can only review the exercise of the discretion to determine whether it has been reasonably and legally exercised.

A probate court remains without power to award money damages if an accounting indicates that damages are due, and it cannot adjudicate complex legal questions that are subject to the broad jurisdiction of a general court of equity. Palmer v. Hartford National Bank Trust Co., supra, 279 A.2d at 734; Phillips v. Moeller, 147 Conn. 482, 163 A.2d 95, 98 (1960). In Connecticut, control over the trust corpus and the quasi in rem fiction have been accorded less weight than the policy of adjudicating the trust issues in one competent forum.

A court of probate is unable to award damages. Phillips v. Moeller, 147 Conn. 482, 488-89, 163 A.2d 95. It would, therefore, be inappropriate to allow a court to entertain an action in which it is without the power to grant the relief requested. Further, in an equitable action, facts must often be found.

See Preston v. Preston, [supra] . . . The enactment of an amendment to General Statutes 45-267 [now 45a-175] providing that such accounts "may" be submitted to the Probate Court was intended to give the probate courts jurisdiction over the subject matter concurrent with the Superior Court, as in the case of testamentary trusts. Public Acts 1963, No. 480; see Phillips v. Moeller, 147 Conn. 482, 489 [ 163 A.2d 95 (1960)]. It was not intended to oust the Superior Court of its historical jurisdiction in this field, nor could such a result be achieved by legislation alone. Walkinshaw v. O'Brien, 130 Conn. 122, 142 [ 32 A.2d 547 (1943)].

The trial court correctly acknowledged, however, that its jurisdiction was limited to that conferred on the Probate Court; Palmer v. Hartford National Bank Trust Co., 160 Conn. 415, 428, 279 A.2d 726 (1971); and that the plaintiffs' claims for money damages and equitable relief against the defendant should be brought in a court of general, rather than limited, jurisdiction. See id., 428-29; Carten v. Carten, 153 Conn. 603, 614, 219 A.2d 711 (1966); Phillips v. Moeller, 147 Conn. 482, 488-89, 163 A.2d 579 (1960). The court made its probable cause determination for the sole purpose of determining whether it should accept the defendant's final account, or refuse to accept it pending the resolution of the plaintiffs' claims in a court of general jurisdiction.

Applying these principles to the counterclaim, we conclude that it is in essence a challenge to a proposed trust account and is therefore equitable. See Parsons v. Lyman, 18 F. Cas. 1263, 1266, 32 Conn. 566, 575 (C.C.D. Conn. 1863) (No. 10780); Phillips v. Moeller, 147 Conn. 482, 488, 163 A.2d 95 (1960); Second National Bank of New Haven v. Harris Trust Savings Bank, supra; Bogert, Law of Trusts (5th Ed. 1973) 142. Count two relates directly to specific items claimed in the plaintiff's account. Counts one and six, because they seek enforcement of the terms of the trust agreement concerning distribution, are likewise based in equity.

We have decided to consider the case as presented by the parties. See Phillips v. Moeller, 147 Conn. 482, 484, 163 A.2d 95; Schwartz v. Chapel Realty Co., 134 Conn. 100, 101, 55 A.2d 113; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. 42. Section 78 of the Practice Book, as amended in 1969, reads in relevant part: "In any action for legal or equitable relief, any defendant may file cross claims against any codefendant provided each such . . . cross claim arises out of the transaction or one of the transactions which is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint."

Courts of Probate have primary jurisdiction over the accounts of testamentary trustees. General Statutes 45-4, 45-267; see Phillips v. Moeller, 147 Conn. 482, 487, 163 A.2d 95. All testamentary trustees, unless excused by the will creating the trust, are required to render an annual account to the Probate Court having jurisdiction. General Statutes 45-268.

It has been extended through the years. See Phillips v. Moeller, 147 Conn. 482, 485, 163 A.2d 95; Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., 121 Conn. 388, 391, 185 A. 82. It has not, however, been extended to the adjudication of complex legal questions which pertain to the management and operations of a business corporation. Problems of internal administration, proper corporate reserves for working capital and replacement of wasting assets, dividend policy, exercise of business judgment and assumption of business risks may, in a proper case, be the subject of the broad jurisdiction of a general court of equity.

The court was not in error in sustaining each of the demurrers. Whether the defendants could have raised the same claims in any other manner, as by a plea in abatement on the ground of another action pending, is a matter not before us. See cases such as Phillips v. Moeller, 147 Conn. 482, 487, 163 A.2d 95; Cole v. Associated Construction Co., 141 Conn. 49, 54, 103 A.2d 529. It is unnecessary to consider the other grounds of demurrer or the other claims of the parties.