Opinion
111,378.
10-31-2014
Toby F. PHILLIPS, Appellant, v. KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Appellee.
Roger D. Struble, of Blackwell & Struble, LLC, of Salina, for appellant. Donald J. Cooper, of Kansas Department of Revenue, for appellee.
Roger D. Struble, of Blackwell & Struble, LLC, of Salina, for appellant.
Donald J. Cooper, of Kansas Department of Revenue, for appellee.
Before McANANY, P.J., ARNOLD–BURGER, J., and LARSON, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Toby J.F. Phillips appeals from the district court's order affirming the Kansas Department of Revenue's (KDR) decision to suspend his driver's license. He contends that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to request an evidentiary breath test under the Kansas implied consent law. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the district court's order affirming the KDR's suspension of Phillips' driver's license.
The parties are well acquainted with the facts, and we need not recount all of them here. It suffices to say that Phillips was stopped at 11:30 p.m. for failing to signal before making a turn. Phillips' actions appeared to be clumsy and slow as he attempted to retrieve his driver's license. There was a strong odor of alcohol coming directly from him. Phillips had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and he appeared to be confused as the officer gave him instructions. Phillips was uncooperative and argumentative. He was unsuccessful in the walk-and-turn field sobriety test. All this occurred before the officer arrested Phillips for DUI and requested an evidentiary breath test, which Phillips refused.
All of this provides substantial evidence to support the district court's finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to ask Phillips to submit to the breath test. We do not reweigh the evidence in reaching this conclusion. See Hodges v. Johnson, 288 Kan. 56, Syl. ¶ 7, 199 P.3d 1251 (2009).
Phillips relies on City of Hutchinson v. Davenport, 30 Kan.App.2d 1097, 54 P.3d 532 (2002), in arguing that the odor of alcohol, without more, does not establish a reasonable suspicion that a person is intoxicated or too impaired to drive. Davenport does not apply. As noted above, there was much more evidence present in our case than the mere odor of alcohol.
Phillips also relies on State v. Blair, 26 Kan.App.2d 7, 974 P.2d 121 (1991), in which the driver admitted she had been drinking, arguing that there was no such admission here. No such admission was needed to establish reasonable suspicion based on the observations of Phillips at the scene.
Here, the officer made a legitimate traffic stop and had probable cause to arrest Phillips for DUI and reasonable grounds to request that he take a breath test. The district court did not err in upholding the suspension of Phillips' driver's license.
Affirmed.