Opinion
C.A. No. 06A-09-001.
Submitted: April 2, 2007.
July 20, 2007.
Eric M. Doroshow, Esquire, Nicole M. Evans, Esquire, Doroshow, Pasquale, Krawitz Bhaya, Milford, DE.
William D. Rimmer, Esquire, Robert J. Deary, Esquire, Heckler Frabizzio, Wilmington, DE.
Letter Opinion
Dear Counsel:
This is my decision on the appeal filed by Melvin Phillips ("Phillips") of the Industrial Accident Board's ("Board") decision terminating his total disability benefits. Phillips is a full-time night manager for Delhaize America, Inc., which does business as Food Lion ("Food Lion"). He injured his back while lifting boxes of juice containers on July 7, 2005. Phillips filed a Petition to Determine Compensation Due with the Board on September 30, 2005. A hearing officer held a hearing on Phillips' petition on April 7, 2006. The Board issued its written decision on April 21, 2006, finding Phillips' injury compensable and granting him total disability benefits.
Phillips' doctor, Dr. Mohammad Mehdi, released him to return to light-duty work on June 6, 2006. Phillips worked 11.73 hours in Food Lion's temporary alternate duty program from June 12, 2006 through June 17, 2006. Phillips was cleaning shelves, but stopped working because his back hurt from bending over to clean t he shelves. Food Li on stopped paying total disability benefits to Phillips on June 17, 2006.
Phillips was scheduled for a medical examination with Food Lion's doctor on July 24, 2006. When he did not appear, Food Lion's counsel wrote to the Board on July 24, 2006, asking it to hold an immediate "Legal Hearing" so that Phillips could be sanctioned for not going to the medical examination. Dr. Peter Coveleski put Phillips on no-work status on July 27, 2006. Food Lion started to file a Petition for Termination of Benefits with the Board on July 21, 2006, but was unable to do so because it never perfected service of the petition on Phillips. Phillips' counsel sent a Huffman demand to Food Lion's counsel on July 28, 2006. She also told Food Lion's counsel that Phillips had not signed the Final Receipt because Dr. Coveleski had put him back on no-work status. Food Lion's counsel wrote to Phillips' counsel on August 1, 2006, telling her that Food Lion was entitled to a Final Receipt because Phillips had gone back to work. He also told Phillips' counsel that she should file a Petition for Additional Compensation Due if she felt that Phillips was entitled to additional benefits. Lastly, he told Phillips' counsel that he would take all the issues up with the Board at the Legal Hearing. Food Lion scheduled Phillips for another medical examination on August 7, 2006. When he did not appear, Food Lion's counsel called Phillips' counsel on August 8, 2006, and wrote a confirming letter the same day. Food Lion's counsel demanded that the Final Receipt be signed and repeated his position that Phillips would have to file a Petition for Additional Compensation Due if he thought he was entitled to additional benefits. The Legal Hearing was continued from August 9, 2006 to August 16, 2006. Phillips' counsel wrote the Board on August 15, 2006, taking the position that the Legal Hearing should be limited to any sanctions for Phillips' failure to attend the medical examinations. The Board held a Legal Hearing on August 16, 2006. Food Lion's counsel presented the Board with a Termination Order, arguing that Phillips consented to the termination of his total disability benefits by returning to work on June 12, 2006. Phillips' counsel argued that Food Lion should file a Petition to Terminate Benefits in accordance with 29 Del.C. § 2347 if it wanted to terminate Phillips' total disability payments. The Board signed Food Lion's Termination Order, reasoning that by returning to work Phillips consented to the termination of his total disability benefits. The Board also granted Food Lion's request to sanction Phillips for not going to the medical examinations. Phillips then filed an appeal with this Court of the Board's decision to terminate his total disability benefits.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the Superior Court on appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Board is to determine whether the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the agency made any errors of law. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. Absent an error of law, the Board's decision will not be disturbed where there is substantial evidence to support it's conclusions.
General Motors v. Freeman, 164 A.2d 686 (Del. 1960).
Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (Del. 1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 517 A.2d 295, 297 (Del.Super. 1986), app. dism., 515 A.2d 397 (Del. 1986).
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965).
29 Del.C. § 10142(d).
Dellachiesa v. General Motors Corp., 140 A.2d 137 (Del.Super. 1958).
DISCUSSION
This matter has a rather unusual procedural history. It started when Food Lion's counsel wrote a letter to the Board asking it to schedule an immediate Legal Hearing so that Phillips could be sanctioned for not going to a medical examination. The lawyers for both parties then exchanged numerous letters and at least one phone call arguing over the proper procedure to either terminate or continue Phillips' total disability benefits, the Final Receipt, and the proper forum for entertaining a Huffman demand. Some of these letters were copied to the Board and some were not. The last letter exchanged was Phillips' counsel's letter to the Board asking that the Legal hearing be limited to Food Lion's request for sanctions. Thus, the two letters written directly to the Board dealt with Food Lion's request to sanction Phillips for not going to the medical examination and Phillips' request that the Legal Hearing be limited to that. It is not clear to me from the correspondence between the parties' attorneys exactly what they wanted or expected the Board to do at the Legal Hearing. In any event, there was a dispute between the parties as to the scope of the Legal Hearing. It is also not clear to me what a Legal Hearing covers. The IAB rules do not adequately explain it and the cases discussing a Legal Hearing are similarly unhelpful. At the Legal Hearing, the Board, even though it had been asked to do so by Phillips' counsel, never addressed the issue of the scope of the Legal Hearing. Instead, it entertained Food Lion's arguments and terminated Phillips' total disability benefits.The Board's proceedings are governed by both the requirements of due process and the Administrative Procedures Act. "In the exercise of quasi-judicial or adjudicatory administrative power, administrative hearings, like judicial proceedings, are governed by fundamental requirements of fairness which are the essence of due process, including fair notice of the scope of the proceedings and adherence of the agency to the stated scope of the proceedings." "Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." "Due process as it relates to the requisite characteristics of the proceedings entails providing the parties to the proceeding with the opportunity to be heard, by presenting testimony or otherwise, and the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of right in the matter involved in an orderly proceeding appropriate to the nature of the hearing and adapted to meet its ends." Further, "due process requires that the notice inform the party of the time, place, and date of the hearing and the subject matter of the proceedings." More specifically, due process requirements "are satisfied if the party proceeded against understood the issue and was afforded a full opportunity to justify its conduct."
19 Del.C. § 2301A (d), and 29 Del.C. § 10161.
Carousel Studio v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 1990 WL 91108 at *1 (Del.Super. June 26, 1990).
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902, 47 L.Ed2d 18 (1976).
Carousel Studio, 1990 WL 91180 at *1 ( Citing 2 Am.Jur. Administrative Law § 353, p. 166).
J.L.B. Corp. V. Delaware A.B.C.C., 1985 WL 189008, at *2 (Del.Super. June 7, 1985).
Id. See In Re Gresick, 1988 WL 116411 (Del.Super. Nov. 2, 1988).
Phillips and Food Lion agree that the Board's decision to terminate Phillips' total disability benefits was a "case decision" within the meaning of 29 Del.C. § 10102(3). They also agree that it was a decision on the merits that can be properly appealed to this Court. § 10122 requires the Board to send a notice to the parties in a proceeding before it containing certain things before proceeding to a case decision. Fundamental due process requires the same thing. In this case, the Board did not comply with either due process or the APA's notice requirements. The Board did not send any notice at all to Phillips and Food Lion about what it intended address at the Legal Hearing. Therefore, given the nature of the Board's decision as a final case dispositive decision involving important legal rights, I have decided to reverse the Board's decision and remand the case to the Board for the purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing on whether Phillips consented to the termination of his total disability benefits by going back to work for 11.73 hours over nearly a week.
IT IS SO ORDERED.