Phillips v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of Hayne)

6 Citing cases

  1. Bear Valley Mutual Water Company v. Riddell

    283 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1968)   Cited 7 times

    The cases relied upon to establish such a proposition, however, fail to consider the peculiar nature of a mutual water company. Appeal of Harry E. Lutz, 2 B.T.A. 484 (1925); Paxton v. C.I.R., 7 B.T.A. 92, (1927); Sackstein v. C.I.R., 14 T.C. 566 (1950); Estate of C.L. Hayne v. C.I.R., 22 T.C. 113 (1954). While, therefore, not entirely satisfactory either to the Government or to the taxpayer, the allocation formula the Court decrees in this case does do substantial justice to both parties and comes well within the theory and application of the respective authorities cited and relied upon.

  2. Ginsberg v. United States

    237 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)

    In short, it contributes to the mitigation or prevention of disease.         In most of the cases so holding the courts were careful to distinguish the facts before them from those in Estate of Hayne, 22 T.C. 113 (1954), Riach v. Frank, Supra 302 F.2d at 377-378; Hollander v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 219 F.2d 934, 936 (3d Cir.1955); Snellings v. United States, 149 F.Supp. 825, 826 (E.D.Va.1956). In Hayne it was held that the cost of installing an elevator which would enable a paralytic to leave his room was not deductible because it was not intended to have and had no beneficial effect in terms of the mitigation or cure of the taxpayer's condition.

  3. Haines v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    71 T.C. 644 (U.S.T.C. 1979)   Cited 2 times

    The petitioner did testify that he held on to the diving board and kicked his leg as the doctor had prescribed; yet, and ordinary diving board cannot be considered special equipment “for medical care.” The petitioner's pool was suitable for use by others, and in fact, he admitted that it was used by other members of the regulations of capital expenditures which are deductible as medical expenses involve equipment which is not used significantly for any purpose other than the medical care of the taxpayer; that is, eye glasses, seeing eye dog, artificial teeth and limbs, wheelchair, crutches, and inclinator or an air conditioner which is detachable from the property and purchased only for the use of the person in need of medical care. Sec. 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii); see also Estate of Hayne v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 113 (1954). The evidence presented to this Court leads us to the inescapable conclusion that the petitioner desired and built his own pool for reasons of convenience, and not for the primary purpose of medical care as that term has been defined by the regulations and the courts.

  4. Delp v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    30 T.C. 1230 (U.S.T.C. 1958)

    Consequently, we are of the opinion that Hollander v. Commissioner, supra, is factually distinguishable from the situation here presented. We have decided, in cases arising under section 23(x) of the 1939 Code, that expenditures which represent permanent improvements to property are not deductible as medical expenses. John L. Seymour, 14 T.C. 1111; Estate of C. L. Hayne, 22 T.C. 113. Such expenditures, to the extent the permanent improvement of the asset increases the value of the property, at least in a sense compensate for the expense of such improvement. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 contains no substantial change in the definition of medical care but merely includes the addition of a clarifying subsection specifically permitting a deduction for amounts paid ‘for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care.’ Sec. 213(e)(1) (B), I.R.C. 1954.

  5. Ihrig v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    26 T.C. 73 (U.S.T.C. 1956)   Cited 2 times

    It follows that even to the extent that some of these payments may have been required by law to be paid by petitioner on the corporations' default, that would not eliminate the distinction between the business of the corporations and that of petitioner. See Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, supra; Estate of C. L. Hayne, 22 T.C. 113, 120-121. What petitioner was actually doing and what, in fact, he claims to have done, was to safeguard and maintain the existence of the corporations so as not to jeopardize his personal interest.

  6. Hollander v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    22 T.C. 646 (U.S.T.C. 1954)

    Its cost was a capital expenditure and not a medical expense within the meaning and purpose of section 23(x) even though the Commissioner may allow deductions for the cost of some lesser articles having an extended life. The case is not distinguishable in principle from Estate of C. L. Hayne, 22 T. C. 113, holding that the cost of installing an elevator in a residence was a capital expenditure and not a medical expense deductible under section 23(x). Cf. John L. Seymour, 14 T. C. 1111.