When the ordinary meaning is absurd or so strained as to seem to not fit the overall legislative objectives, we resort to other rules of construction to gain the legislature's true intent. See Elrod v. Treasurer of Mo., 138 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Mo. banc 2004); Phillips v. Am. Motorist Ins. Co., 996 S.W.2d 584, 592 (Mo.App.1999). The rules of statutory construction are merely aids that allow the court to ascertain the legislature's intended result.
When the ordinary meaning is absurd or so strained as to seem to not fit the overall legislative objectives, we resort to other rules of construction to gain the legislature's true intent. See Elrod v. Treasurer of Mo., 138 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Mo. banc 2004); Phillips v. Am. Motorist Ins. Co., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 584, 592 (Mo. App. 1999). The rules of statutory construction are merely aids that allow the court to ascertain the legislature's intended result.
Sometimes, when we isolate one phrase from its statutory context, we get a meaning different from that which would appear if we considered the entire statute in context. See Phillips v. Am. Motorist Ins. Co., 996 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Mo.App. 1999). As explained in Ferrell Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Holloway:
In sum, section 319.303 and section 571.070 are distinct sections in separate chapters governing unrelated subject matter, and thus the definition of a term from section 319.303(16) is not dispositive regarding the use of the term in section 571.070.1(2). In support of Rodgers's argument for application of the section 319.303(16) definition of “fugitive from justice” to the term as used in section 571.070.1(2), he cites cases that hold that “each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole,” Phillips v. American Motorist Insurance Co., 996 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Mo.App. W.D.1999), and that “it is proper to consider, not only acts passed at the same session of the legislature, ... but also acts passed at subsequent legislative sessions and, likewise acts passed at subsequent legislative session[s].” State ex rel. Jackson County v. Spradling, 522 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Mo. banc 1975) (internal quotation omitted).
In sum, section 319.303 and section 571.070 are distinct sections in separate chapters governing unrelated subject matter, and thus the definition of a term from section 319.303(16) is not dispositive regarding the use of the term in section 571.070.1(2). In support of Rodgers's argument for application of the section 319.303(16) definition of "fugitive from justice" to the term as used in section 571.070.1(2), he cites cases that hold that "each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole," Phillips v. American Motorist Insurance Co., 996 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999), and that "it is proper to consider, not only acts passed at the same session of the legislature, ... but also acts passed at subsequent legislative sessions and, likewise acts passed at subsequent legislative session[s]." State ex rel. Jackson County v. Spradling, 522 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Mo. banc 1975) (internal quotation omitted).
" Id. "In particular, a prior inconsistent statement of a witness who is available for cross-examination may be used as substantive evidence in a civil trial." Id.; Phillips v. Am. Motorist Ins. Co., 996 S.W.2d 584, 593 (Mo.App. 1999). "This [C]ourt defers to the jury's role of judging the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses."
Where one view of the language does not comport with the obvious legislative purpose in the light of common sense, we will interpret such language so as to reflect the actual purpose of the legislature. See Phillips v. Am. Motorist Ins. Co., 996 S.W.2d 584, 591-93 (Mo.App. 1999) (refusing to apply literal interpretation of statute where it would lead to an absurd result that the legislature could not have intended). It would make little sense to restrict the grounds in section 211.447.4(4) to crimes committed in Missouri.
In particular, a prior inconsistent statement of a witness who is available for cross-examination may be used as substantive evidence in a civil trial. Phillips v. American MotoristIns. Co., 996 S.W.2d 584, 593 (Mo.App. 1999). Relevancy and materiality of the hearsay evidence does, however, depend on whether it is offered as substantive evidence or for the purpose of attacking the witness' credibility.
We are required to "interpret and apply statutory provisions with reference to each other in order to determine legislative intent." Phillips v. Am. Motorist Ins. Co. , 996 S.W.2d 584, 587 n. 3 (Mo.App. 1999) (citation omitted) ;see alsoBoard v. Eurostyle, Inc ., 998 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo.App. 1999). "This court presumes that statutes in pari materia are intended to be read consistently and harmoniously."
We are required to "interpret and apply statutory provisions with reference to each other in order to determine legislative intent." Phillips v. Am. Motorist Ins. Co. , 996 S.W.2d 584, 587 n. 3 (Mo.App. 1999) (citation omitted) ;see alsoBoard v. Eurostyle, Inc ., 998 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo.App. 1999). "This court presumes that statutes in pari materia are intended to be read consistently and harmoniously."