On the other hand, actions of public officials are presumed to be regular and done in good faith. Philbrick v. Young, 255 N.C. 737, 122 S.E.2d 725 (1961), and the burden is on the challenger to show that the actions as to him were unequal when compared to persons similarly situated. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 88 L.Ed. 497, 64 S.Ct. 397 (1944), rehearing denied, 321 U.S. 804, 88 L.Ed. 1090, 64 S.Ct. 778 (1944).
"The power of a court upon a proper showing to correct its records and supply an inadvertent omission cannot be doubted." Philbrick v. Young, 255 N.C. 737, 122 S.E.2d 725, and many cases there cited. See also Trust Co. v. Toms, 244 N.C. 645, 94 S.E.2d 806; and S. v. Cannon, 244 N.C. 399, 94 S.E.2d 339, in which case the Court, speaking through Denny, J., later C.J., approved the amendment to the minutes of the superior court some fifteen years after the omission occurred.
To hold that the signature by a subscribing witness satisfies the acknowledgment required by G.S. 30-2(b) would constitute judicial repeal of the 1959 amendment. Petitioner relies on the case of Philbrick v. Young, 255 N.C. 737, 122 S.E.2d 725. That case was decided under 1943 statutory law and is not supportive of petitioner's position. Although we sympathize with petitioner, we are compelled to hold that her dissent was invalid within the requirements of G.S. 30-2 (b).