Opinion
No. CV 06-4018752S
July 27, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE NO. 133
Practice Book § 3-10, which governs the procedures for a motion to withdraw appearance, provides that: "(a) No motion for withdrawal of appearance shall be granted unless good cause is shown and until the judicial authority is satisfied that reasonable notice has been given to other attorneys of record and that the party represented by the attorney was served with the motion and the notice required by this section or that the attorney has made reasonable efforts to serve such party." The attorneys and firm seeking to withdraw three attorneys from Edwards Caldwell, LLC (EC), and the firm of Lustig Brown, LLP (LB) — have met the requirements for granting the motion. "Decisions regarding the withdrawal of counsel are evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard." Tolman v. Banach, 82 Conn.App. 263, 265, 843 A.2d 650 (2004). The court, in its discretion, grants the motion to withdraw.
Rule 116 of the Rules of Professional Conduct is also implicated. Rule 1.16(b) provides that a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if "(5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled; (6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or (7) other good cause for withdrawal exists." Rule 1.16(c) requires compliance with Practice Book § 3-10, providing that a lawyer "comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation."
First, there is good cause to allow withdrawal. EC's attorneys have submitted affidavits attesting that their client, the defendant Atlantic Risk Management, Inc. (ARM), has not paid legal fees for substantial pretrial work, and that EC is a boutique firm that cannot continue to represent the defendant in this "complex, multi-million dollar litigation." They have also submitted, inter alia, a notice letter sent to ARM's president, Otto Kieslich. Because LB was retained by EC to act as local counsel and is affected by ARM's failure to pay and the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship between EC and ARM, LB joined in EC's motion and sent Kieslich its own notice letter. Certainly, EC and LB are not required to finance the litigation or render gratuitous services. See Stephen Eldridge Realty Corp. v. Green, 174 App.Div.2d 564, 564-66, 570 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1991).
It is noted that the client has not filed an objection. As for the plaintiff, although the movants state that the plaintiff has submitted papers in opposition to the motion, these do not appear in the file.
Despite demonstrating good cause, EC and LB are reminded that their obligations to ARM do not cease entirely. Pursuant to our rules of professional conduct, once representation is terminated by the court, "a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation." See Rule 1.16(c). This is because counsel has a continuing duty to assist the client during this transition by taking steps to protect the client's interests "to the extent reasonably practicable," steps such as "allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned." See Rule 1.16(d).
Second, both EC and LB provided notice of withdrawal to the plaintiff's counsel, Cooney, Scully Dowling. Third, same was provided to Kieslich, with drafts of the motion attached. Accordingly, the court is satisfied that the requirements set forth in Practice Book § 3-10(a) — good cause for withdrawal, notice to other attorneys and notice to the client — have been complied with by both EC's attorneys and LB.
Same was also provided to Updike, Kelley Spellacy, P.C., the firm retained by Clarendon National Insurance Company, an interested party.
Finally, the Kieslich notice letter, as sent by both EC and LB, incorporates statements that it must include under Practice Book § 3-10(b) and (d). Practice Book § 3-10(b) requires in civil cases that a motion to withdraw include "the last known address of any party as to whom the attorney seeks to withdraw his or her appearance" and "have attached to it a notice to such party advising of the following: (1) the attorney is filing a motion which seeks the court's permission to no longer represent the party in the case; (2) the date and time the motion will be heard; (3) the party may appear in court on that date and address the court concerning the motion; (4) if the motion to withdraw is granted, the party should either obtain another attorney or file an appearance on his or her own behalf with the court; and (5) if the party does neither, the party will not receive notice of court proceedings in the case and a nonsuit or default judgment may be rendered against such party." Practice Book § 3-10(d) requires that "each motion to withdraw appearance and each notice to the party or parties who are the subject of the motion shall state whether the case has been assigned for pre-trial or trial and, if so, the date so assigned." Both EC and LB strictly complied with these formalities in their separate letters to Kieslich.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the court grants the motion to withdraw.