Opinion
No. 1306 C.D. 2014 No. 1505 C.D. 2014
06-09-2015
In Re: The Philadelphia Parking Authority, Elizabeth A. Craddock v. John J. Lynch 1995 Subaru Legacy Vin # 4S3BK625XS7335355 Appeal of: John J. Lynch In Re: Philadelphia Parking Authority v. John J. Lynch 1995 Subaru Legacy Vin # 4S3BK625XS7335355 Appeal of: John J. Lynch
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEAVITT
John J. Lynch, pro se, appeals two orders of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) granting the Philadelphia Parking Authority's (Parking Authority) petition for permission to auction off Lynch's 1995 Subaru Legacy (vehicle). We affirm.
On June 26, 2014, the Philadelphia Police stopped Lynch and determined that he was operating his vehicle in violation of multiple provisions of the Vehicle Code, including operating an unregistered vehicle, driving with a suspended Pennsylvania driver's license, driving without proof of insurance and failing to have current emissions and inspection stickers. The police issued citations to Lynch and directed the Parking Authority to tow and impound Lynch's vehicle pursuant to Philadelphia's "Live Stop" program. The Parking Authority mailed an impoundment notice to Lynch advising him of the vehicle's location, the procedures for retrieving it and the consequences for failing to do so. The notice specifically advised Lynch that the Parking Authority would petition the trial court for authorization to sell the vehicle at public auction if it was not retrieved within 15 days from the date of the notice.
75 Pa. C.S. §§6309 - 6309.2. The Live Stop program is discussed in greater detail infra.
Lynch did not retrieve his vehicle. In accordance with the impoundment notice, the Parking Authority petitioned the trial court for authorization to sell the vehicle at public auction. The trial court granted the petition on July 15, 2014, and the vehicle was sold at auction on July 29, 2014. On August 12, 2014, the trial court entered an order extinguishing Lynch's legal and equitable interest in the vehicle and transfering ownership to the individual who purchased the vehicle at the auction. Lynch appealed both the July 15, 2014, and the August 12, 2014, orders to this Court, and the appeals were consolidated.
Lynch did write to the traffic court to formally demand the release of his vehicle. Because this was not the proper method for contesting an impoundment, no further action was taken.
On appeal, Lynch divides his argument into seven issues. The crux of Lynch's appeal is that the Live Stop program violates his constitutional right to due process. First, he contends that the Parking Authority failed to serve him with its petition to auction his vehicle. Second, he challenges the Parking Authority's ability to tow and immediately impound vehicles at the direction of the police. In support, Lynch relies solely on an unpublished opinion by the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Sheller v. City of Philadelphia, No. 11-cv-2371, 2012 WL 4754820 (E.D. Pa. October 5, 2012). In response, the Parking Authority argues, inter alia, that Lynch has misconstrued Sheller.
This Court's review determines whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law or whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Smothers, 920 A.2d 922, 924 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
Lynch has made similar arguments in a previous appeal to this Court. Philadelphia Parking Authority v. Lynch, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 130 C.D. 2012, filed November 28, 2012), involved another impoundment of a Lynch vehicle that was not registered and was operated while Lynch's license was suspended. Lynch did not reclaim his vehicle, and the petition for permission to auction the vehicle was granted. Lynch appealed and offered a series of arguments that the Parking Authority's actions were unconstitutional. This Court concluded that his arguments were devoid of merit.
The Parking Authority raises two additional arguments to rebut Lynch's case, i.e., that Lynch impermissibly raises arguments in his brief to this Court that were not raised before the trial court, and that the Live Stop program is constitutional because it reasonably advances the Parking Authority's "Community Care Taking Functions." We need not consider these additional arguments because we conclude that Sheller is inapposite.
The Parking Authority, inter alia, is charged with the enforcement of on-street parking in Philadelphia. 53 Pa. C.S. §5505(d)(21). Its enforcement powers include the ability to immobilize, tow and impound motor vehicles. In addition, the General Assembly has designated the Parking Authority as the exclusive towing and enforcement agent for Philadelphia's Live Stop program, which targets owners of unregistered vehicles found operating on Pennsylvania's roadways, as well as those who operate a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license. 75 Pa. C.S. §6309(a).
Section 5505(d) of the Parking Authority Law states, in relevant part, as follows:
(d) Powers.--An authority has all powers necessary or convenient for the carrying out of the purposes under this section, including:
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(21) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this chapter, if authorized by resolution or ordinance of the legislative body of the parent municipality, to administer, supervise and enforce an efficient system of on-street parking regulation. This paragraph includes the power:
(i) to conduct research and maintain data related to on-street parking activities;
(ii) to issue parking tickets for illegally parked vehicles;
(iii) to collect on behalf of a municipality rates and other charges, including fines and penalties, for uncontested on-street parking violations;
(iv) to boot or tow a vehicle which is illegally parked or the owner of which is delinquent in payment of previously issued parking tickets; and
(v) to own or lease personal property used in connection with the exercise of any power provided in this paragraph.
53 Pa. C.S. §5505(d)(21).
The exercise by the authority of any power under this paragraph shall not be construed to constitute the prosecution of a summary offense under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 13 (relating to traffic courts).
Police officers may respond to violations of the Vehicle Code in a variety of ways. Section 6309.2 of the Vehicle Code authorizes law enforcement to direct the immediate impoundment of motor vehicles operated without proper registration or where the driver is not properly licensed. The registered owner of an impounded vehicle must be notified in writing within 24 hours of the location of the vehicle and the procedures for retrieving the vehicle. 75 Pa. C.S. §6309.2(c)(2)(ii). The registered owner must first appear before the Philadelphia Traffic Court to address all alleged violations and obtain proof that payment has been remitted for any fines and costs associated with the tow and impoundment. Once those obligations are satisfied, the Traffic Court will issue a Vehicle Release to the owner, which the owner can present to the Parking Authority to reclaim possession of his vehicle. In the event a vehicle is not retrieved, the Parking Authority, after proper notice to the registered owner, may petition the trial court to sell the vehicle at public auction. 75 Pa. C.S. §6310(d).
The section states, in relevant part:
(a) General rule.--Subject to subsection (d), the following shall apply:
75 Pa. C.S. §6309.2(a).(1) If a person operates a motor vehicle or combination on a highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth while the person's operating privilege is suspended, revoked, canceled, recalled or disqualified or where the person is unlicensed, as verified by an appropriate law enforcement officer in cooperation with the department, the law enforcement officer shall immobilize the vehicle or combination or, in the interest of public safety, direct that the vehicle be towed and stored by the appropriate towing and storage agent pursuant to subsection (c), and the appropriate judicial authority shall be so notified.
(2) If a motor vehicle or combination for which there is no valid registration or for which the registration is suspended, as verified by an appropriate law enforcement officer, is operated on a highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth, the law enforcement officer shall immobilize the motor vehicle or combination or, in the interest of public safety, direct that the vehicle be towed and stored by the appropriate towing and storing agent pursuant to subsection (c), and the appropriate judicial authority shall be so notified.
It states, in relevant part, as follows:
(d) Sale of unclaimed vehicle or load in cities of the first class.--In case any impounded vehicle or combination is unredeemed, or the load is unclaimed, for a period of 15 days after notice of impoundment is given, it shall be sold at a public sale by the Philadelphia Parking Authority upon order of the issuing authority and after ten days' notice of the sale to the owners, lienholders or secured parties of the vehicle or load except that, if the Philadelphia Parking Authority determines it to be necessary to preserve their value, goods which may spoil may be sold in any commercially reasonable manner prior to expiration of the 15-day period and, if impractical to do so, without giving notice to the owners, lienholders or secured parties.75 Pa. C.S. §6310(d). --------
Lynch argues that this program unconstitutionally deprived him of his property without notice and an opportunity to be heard. In support, Lynch contends that the District Court held that the Live Stop program is unconstitutional in Sheller v. City of Philadelphia, No. 11-cv-2371, 2012 WL 4754820 (E.D. Pa. October 5, 2012). However, Lynch misstates the holding of Sheller.
Sheller was a class action initiated by individuals whose vehicles had been towed and impounded in accordance with the Live Stop program. The plaintiffs levied multiple counts against the Parking Authority, challenging the Parking Authority's right to tow and impound vehicles, as well as impose fees for such services, on the basis that the program violated the plaintiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process under the Federal Constitution. The Parking Authority moved to dismiss the complaint, and the District Court granted the motion in part. In doing so, the District Court held that the towing of vehicles under the Live Stop program was constitutional, but expressed concern about the procedures for those vehicle owners acquitted of traffic violations. The District Court held that those acquitted should be able to retrieve their impounded vehicles without having to pay storage and towing fees. The count in the class action complaint asserting that the Parking Authority must reimburse innocent vehicle owners for wrongfully charged impoundment and towing fees is still being litigated. The remaining counts, including those challenging the constitutionality of the impoundment procedures, were dismissed.
Here, Lynch was not found innocent of the traffic violations that prompted the impoundment of his vehicle, so he does not fall into the class of individuals identified in Sheller that have arguable claims. As such, Sheller is inapplicable to Lynch's claim and does not provide any basis for the relief he seeks.
Lynch also contends that because he was not served with a copy of the petition to auction his vehicle, he had no notice that his vehicle would be auctioned. This argument is factually inaccurate. Although Lynch was not served with a copy of the Parking Authority's petition, the Impoundment Notice informed Lynch that the Parking Authority would petition the trial court for permission to auction off Lynch's vehicle 15 days from receipt of the Impoundment Notice. The notice further stated:
THIS IS THE FINAL NOTICE THAT YOU WILL RECEIVE BEFORE THE COURT ENTERS AN ORDER AUTHORIZING THE SALE OF THIS VEHICLE. IF YOU DO NOT RECLAIM THIS VEHICLE, THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS WILL ISSUE AN ORDER GRANTING THE PETITION... AND AUTHORIZING THE SALE OF YOUR VEHICLE AT THE PUBLIC AUCTION [ON JULY 29, 2014.] YOUR INTEREST WILL BE EXTINGUISHED
AND OWNERSHIP WILL VEST TO THE SUCCESSFUL BIDDER.Brief of the Parking Authority, Appendix A, Impoundment Notice at 2, June 27, 2014 (emphasis in original).
In short, Lynch cannot claim that he had no notice that the Parking Authority would petition for permission to auction off his vehicle. Moreover, there is no requirement in the Live Stop program that the Parking Authority must serve its petition to auction an unclaimed vehicle on the owner of the vehicle. Accordingly, Lynch's argument lacks merit.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 9th day of June, 2015, the orders of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dated July 15, 2014, and August 12, 2014, in the above-captioned matters are hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge