Opinion
No. 130 C.D. 2012
11-28-2012
Philadelphia Parking Authority v. John J. Lynch, Sr., 1997 Plymouth Voyager Appeal of: John J. Lynch, Sr.
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH
John J. Lynch, Sr. (Lynch), proceeding pro se, challenges the October 3, 2011 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) denying Lynch's motion to vacate the August 24, 2011 order authorizing the Philadelphia Parking Authority (PPA) to sell Lynch's car, a 1997 Plymouth Voyager, at a public auction. We affirm.
On July 30, 2011, City of Philadelphia Police officers (Police) observed Lynch driving a 1997 Plymouth Voyager which the police cruiser computer indicated was not registered. The Police stopped Lynch's vehicle and discovered that Lynch was driving with a suspended license. In accordance with section 6309.2(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §6309.2(a)(1), the Police impounded Lynch's car and the PPA towed it to a PPA storage facility. The PPA notified Lynch via first class mail of the steps he must take in order to reclaim his vehicle. See section 6309.2(d) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §6309.2(d). In this notification, the PPA further informed Lynch that if he did not invoke the statutory procedure to reclaim his vehicle in the next 15 days, the PPA would petition for, and the trial court would issue, an order authorizing the sale of his vehicle in accordance with section 6310(d) of Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §6310(d).
In relevant part, section 6309.2(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code states:
If a person operates a motor vehicle or combination on a highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth while the person's operating privilege is suspended, revoked, canceled, recalled or disqualified or where the person is unlicensed, as verified by an appropriate law enforcement officer in cooperation with the department, the law enforcement officer shall immobilize the vehicle or combination or, in the interest of public safety, direct that the vehicle be towed and stored by the appropriate towing and storage agent ....75 Pa. C.S. §6309.2(a)(1).
More specifically, the notice advised Lynch that in order to reclaim his vehicle, he must appear in person at the Philadelphia Traffic Court to resolve any outstanding vehicle registration or operating privilege issues; obtain from the court a certificate of release; and bring the certificate, registration, and proof of insurance, along with payment of towing and storage fees and any outstanding fines and costs, to the PPA impoundment lot. 75 Pa. C.S. §6309.2(d).
In the event the owner does not take the proper steps to reclaim a vehicle within 15 days of receiving the notice of impoundment, "[the vehicle] shall be sold at a public sale by the [PPA] upon order of the issuing authority and after ten days' notice of the sale to the owners..." 75 Pa. C.S. §6310(d). If the vehicle is sold at an auction, the City of Philadelphia receives the monies necessary to pay outstanding fines and costs, and the owner receives the remaining balance, if any. 75 Pa. C.S. §§6309.2(d)(2) and 6310(e).
Lynch did not reclaim his car. On August 16, 2011, the PPA filed a petition for leave to authorize the sale of Lynch's vehicle. Lynch apparently filed a motion for return of forfeited property, claiming that his vehicle was seized and impounded without lawful justification. At a hearing held on August 22, 2011, Lynch argued that his vehicle was stopped, seized, and impounded "without probable cause and under false pretenses" in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (N.T., 8/22/2011, at 6.) An assistant district attorney advised the trial court that Lynch had outstanding fines and costs of $19,218.33 related to 66 unpaid tickets and 8 convictions for driving under the influence while his license was suspended. Id.
Although the trial court and Lynch refer to the motion for return of forfeited property in their opinion and brief (respectively), the motion is not in the docket or certified record.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally denied Lynch's motion. By order signed on August 16, 2011, the trial court granted the PPA's petition and authorized the sale of Lynch's vehicle. The order was officially entered on the docket on August 24, 2011. On that same date, the prothonotary served Lynch with a copy of the order and informed Lynch that his vehicle was scheduled to be sold at an auction on September 2, 2011. On August 29, 2011, Lynch filed a motion to vacate that order, alleging that his vehicle was unlawfully stopped, seized and impounded without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On October 3, 2011, the trial court entered an order denying Lynch's motion to vacate. On October 11, 2011, Lynch filed an appeal to the Superior Court, which, sua sponte, transferred the matter to this Court by order dated December 22, 2011.
The PPA states in its brief that it has not yet sold Lynch's vehicle at an auction, but the trial court says it has.
On appeal, Lynch argues: (1) the PPA violated his right to due process in failing to provide proper notice of its petition for leave to authorize the sale of his vehicle; (2) the Police did not have a legitimate public safety concern to impound his vehicle; (3) the Police violated his Fourth Amendment rights in seizing and impounding his vehicle, U.S. Const. amend IV; (4) the Police and the PPA violated his right to possess property in violation of Article 1, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. Article 1, sec. 1; (5) the PPA did not compensate him prior to taking his property in violation of the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend V; and (6) the PPA and the trial court violated the excessive fine clause of the Eighth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend VIII.
Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, whether it committed an error of law or whether its findings are supported by substantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Smothers, 920 A.2d 922, 924 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
With the exception of his third argument, Lynch did not raise any of these issues before the trial court in either his motion for return of forfeited property or his motion to vacate. Accordingly, all of Lynch's arguments are waived for purposes of this appeal save for his third issue. Pa. R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the trial court are waived for purposes of appellate review); Commonwealth v. $4,000.00 in United States Currency, 49 A.3d 21, 23 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (noting that issues not raised before the trial court are waived). See also Commonwealth v. York, 465 A.2d 1028, 1032 (Pa. Super. 1983) ("The doctrine of waiver has become firmly entrenched in Pennsylvania law and it is clear that on appeal a new and different theory of relief may not be successfully advanced for the first time on appeal.").
This Court is cognizant of the fact that the constitutionality of sections 6309.2 and 6310 is presently being litigated in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On October 2, 2012, District Court Judge J. Curtis Joyner concluded that "the Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim that they were denied due process when they had to pay the towing and storage fees regardless of whether they had committed traffic violations." Sheller v. City of Philadelphia, (E.D. Pa., No. 11-cv-237, filed Oct. 2, 2012), slip op. at 16. However, the issue in Sheller is not before this Court, and to the extent that Lynch's arguments could be viewed as challenging the constitutionality of sections 6309.2 and 6310, these arguments were never presented to the trial court and are waived for purposes of this appeal.
In his third issue, Lynch maintains that the Police lacked reasonable suspicion to initially stop and seize his vehicle because their cruiser's computer system stated that the vehicle was unregistered. According to Lynch, his vehicle was properly registered, but he recently purchased the vehicle, and for this reason, the registration was not yet in the Police's computer system. Lynch claims that because his vehicle was, in fact, properly registered, the Police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle in the first place. Lynch argues that the Police's subsequent discovery that he had a suspended license and the PPA's impoundment of his vehicle are the fruit of an illegal seizure and, therefore, the PPA could not obtain a court order and sell his vehicle. We disagree.
At the hearing on Lynch's motion for return of forfeited property, Lynch stated that his license plate was properly registered. The PPA acknowledges in its brief that a subsequent check revealed that Lynch had become the registered owner of the vehicle.
"The Fourth Amendment does not prevent police from stopping and questioning motorists when they witness or suspect a violation of traffic laws, even if it is a minor offense." Commonwealth v. Chase, 599 Pa. 80, 89, 960 A.2d 108, 113 (2008). In Pennsylvania, a police officer has authority to stop or seize a vehicle when he or she has reasonable suspicion to believe that a violation of the Vehicle Code is occurring or has occurred. Section 6308(b) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §6308(b). A person violates section 1301(a) of the Vehicle Code if the person drives a vehicle that is not registered in this Commonwealth. 75 Pa. C.S. §1301(a).
"Reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop a motorist must be viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer." Chase, 599 Pa. at 101, 960 A.2d at 120. "A finding of reasonable suspicion does not demand a meticulously accurate appraisal of the facts. Indeed, even stops based on factual mistakes generally are constitutional if the mistake is objectively reasonable." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "[I]f police can articulate a reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, a constitutional inquiry into the officer's motive for stopping the vehicle is unnecessary." Id. at 102, 960 A.2d at 120.
Here, the Police reasonably and objectively relied upon the information in their cruiser's computer system, which stated that Lynch's vehicle was not registered. Although the information in the computer database was factually erroneous, pursuant to Chase, the information nonetheless provided the Police with reasonable suspicion to believe that Lynch was driving an unregistered vehicle. Chase, 599 Pa. at 101, 960 A.2d at 120. Indeed, the examples provided by our Supreme Court in Chase specifically include instances where police stopped a motorist based on erroneous information in the computer system: United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that although the defendant's driver's license was valid, the traffic stop was objectively reasonable because the police cruiser computer indicated that his license was suspended); United States v. Miguel, 368 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that although the vehicle was properly registered, the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion because the police cruiser computer indicated that the registration was expired). Therefore, contrary to Lynch's argument, the Police lawfully stopped his vehicle, and the impoundment and scheduled sale of his vehicle were not the fruit of an illegal seizure.
Lynch also argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the Police ran his license plate through the cruiser's computer system without having observed any unlawful activity. Lynch, however, never raised this particular argument before the trial court; therefore, it is waived. Commonwealth v. $4,000.00 in United States Currency, 49 A.3d 21, 23 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012); Commonwealth v. York, 465 A.2d 1028, 1032 (Pa. Super. 1983).
Even if this argument were not waived, we believe it lacks merit. The Superior Court, as well as every Federal Circuit Court of Appeals which has addressed the issue, has held that computerized checks on license plates are not a "search" and do not implicate Fourth Amendment concerns because license plates are in plain view and motorists do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information that is exposed to the public. Commonwealth v. Bolton, 831 A.2d 734, 737 (Pa. Super. 2003); United States v. DiazCastaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2007) (collecting cases).
Because Lynch's arguments are either waived and/or lack merit, we affirm the trial court's October 3, 2011 order.
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of November, 2012, the October 3, 2011 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is hereby affirmed.
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge