Opinion
3:22-cv-1266-MMH-LLL
12-20-2022
STEVEN R. PHELPS, Plaintiff, v. RICKY D. DIXON, Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE
MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff Steven R. Phelps, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on November 11, 2022 (mailbox rule), by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1; Complaint). Attached to the Complaint are multiple grievances and responses thereto, as well as disciplinary reports, a sick-call request and refusal forms, a proposed summons, and other documents. See Docs. 1-1 to 1-33. Phelps also filed three Declarations (Docs. 2 to 4), in which he apparently seeks leave to proceed as a pauper.
In the Complaint, Phelps names Ricky D. Dixon, the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections, as the only Defendant. Phelps asserts that Dixon “is legally responsible for the overall operation of the Department and each institution under its jurisdiction, including Florida State Prison,” where Phelps is housed. Complaint at 1. He alleges that on September 17, 2022, Sergeant Murphy threatened him and “shoved/pushed” him. Id. at 2. Phelps contends that he “refused to give up the hand restraints” despite several orders to do so, but he eventually complied and then was placed back in his cell without any property. Id. at 2-3. The next day, Phelps received some soap, deodorant, a toothbrush, and inhalers, but did not receive any of his grievances, photos, or other property. Id. at 3.
According to Phelps, Defendant Dixon was negligent in failing to honor his requests made in his grievances regarding threats of reprisal. Id. Phelps further contends that Dixon “fail[ed] to end [Phelps'] exposure to unreasonable RISK/DANGER” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Dixon acted with deliberate indifference in failing to “free [Phelps] from cruel and unusual / inhumane livings at Florida State Prison.” Id. at 4. He requests injunctive and monetary relief. See id. at 4-5.
Initially, the Court notes that Phelps failed to use the Court's required form for filing a civil rights case. See Local Rule 6.04(a)(3). The Court has repeatedly advised Phelps of this requirement, but he continues to file cases without using the form. See, e.g., Case Nos. 3:22-cv-1160-MMH-JBT, 3:22-cv-1159-MMH-JBT, 3:22-cv-881-MMH-PDB, 3:22-cv-775-MMH-MCR, 3:22-cv-641-BJD-LLL, 3:22-cv-625-MMH-MCR. Notably, Phelps fails to include all of the information required by the civil rights complaint form, including information regarding his prior lawsuits. Thus, this case is subject to dismissal on that basis.
Additionally, the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the Court to dismiss this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the Prison Litigation Reform Act mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection between the official's acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 126263 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
A “plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.
In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Phelps' pro se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1175. And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.'” Alford v. Consol. Gov't of Columbus, Ga., 438 Fed.Appx. 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).
The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).
Phelps' Complaint is due to be dismissed pursuant to this Court's screening obligation. Insofar as Phelps attempts to hold Dixon liable for the actions of correctional staff members, “[s]upervisory officials are not vicariously liable under section 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates.” Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022); see Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). Indeed, “[supervisory officials cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for the actions of their subordinates unless the supervisor ‘personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct' or ‘there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.'” Smith v. Deal, 760 Fed.Appx. 972, 975 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360).
There are three ways to establish a causal connection between a supervisor's actions and the unlawful conduct: 1) “when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so”; 2) “when a supervisor's custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights”; or 3) “when facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (citations and quotations omitted). “The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted). This “standard by which a supervisor is held liable in his individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1048 (11th Cir. 2014).Dickinson v. Cochran, 833 Fed.Appx. 268, 272 (11th Cir. 2020). Phelps has not alleged that Dixon was personally involved in the threats or “inhumane” conditions. Neither has he alleged a sufficient causal connection between Dixon's actions and the alleged constitutional violations.
To the extent Phelps complains about Dixon's responses to his grievances, simply denying a grievance or otherwise not addressing it how a prisoner would like, without more, does not render one liable for the underlying constitutional violation. See Jones v. Eckloff No. 2:12-cv-375-FtM-29DNF, 2013 WL 6231181, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2013) (unpublished) (“[F]iling a grievance with a supervisory person does not automatically make the supervisor liable for the allegedly unconstitutional conduct brought to light by the grievance, even when the grievance is denied.” (collecting cases)). And inmates have “no constitutionally protected liberty interest in access to the prison's grievance procedure.” Moore v. McLaughlin, 569 Fed.Appx. 656, 659 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1177; Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)); see Charriez v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 596 Fed.Appx. 890, 895 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding the district court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff's claim that the defendants “had violated his constitutional due-process rights by failing to take corrective action during the appeal of the suspension of his visitation privileges[ b]ecause the prison grievance procedure does not create a protected liberty interest”); Mathews v. Moss, 506 Fed.Appx. 981, 984 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding the plaintiff failed to state a claim because he merely “alleged that his prison grievances were either ignored or wrongly decided or that prison officials did not properly follow the prison's own grievance procedures”). Thus, to the extent Phelps alleges that Dixon denied him due process in the grievance procedure, such allegations fail to state a claim.
Finally, the law is well-settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of corrections officials. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”). Thus, Phelps' complaints about Dixon's “negligence” does not amount to a constitutional violation.
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that Phelps has failed to state a claim against Defendant Dixon. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED.