Opinion
No. 05-03-00693-CR
Opinion Filed October 27, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 199-80040-02. Affirmed.
Before Justices WRIGHT, O'NEILL, and FRANCIS.
OPINION
A jury convicted Tuan Khac Pham of money laundering and assessed punishment at ten years in prison, probated for ten years. In ten points of error, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and the trial court's rulings on various evidentiary issues, including a motion to suppress. We affirm. Plano police officers David Waddell and Jon Britton stopped a vehicle for speeding on U.S. 75. The stop was recorded on video, and Waddell was hooked up to a microphone. Appellant was driving the car, and Wayne Lee was a passenger. Police obtained both men's driver's licenses and learned that Lee lived in Canada and appellant lived in California. Lee told the police he had trouble speaking English and suggested they speak with appellant. While Officer Britton ran a computer check on the two men's driver's licenses, Officer Waddell talked to appellant, who initially told him he and Lee had driven from Seattle, Washington, and been in Dallas two days. He later said they did not stay in Dallas, but went to Houston to visit a friend. Appellant, however, did not know the friend's last name or telephone number. The officers also learned that the two men had spent only a day in Houston. The car appellant was driving had been rented four days earlier by appellant's uncle in Seattle. Appellant was listed as an additional driver. Officer Waddell testified that appellant was nervous, would not make eye contact, and his lip quivered as he spoke. When Officer Waddell asked appellant if he had any weapons or drugs in the car, appellant said no. Waddell then specifically asked, "There's no marijuana in the car?" Appellant replied, "No." Waddell then asked, "There's no ecstasy in the car?" Appellant hesitated briefly, looked over at the car, and replied, "Yeah, you can check." After confirming he had appellant's consent, Waddell searched the car. In the front passenger's seat, Waddell found a notebook that Lee had been holding. The notebook contained a list of cities with numbers out to the side. Next to "Dallas" was the number "190." Waddell also found a map with cities marked between Spokane, Washington, and Houston which appeared to correspond to the list of cities in the notebook. The front car interior also had water bottles, a blanket, food, and numerous business cars and pieces of paper with phone numbers, most without any names. When Waddell opened the trunk, he found a green bag and a purple bag, both of which Lee claimed as his and gave consent to search. Waddell found money hidden in the bottom of the purple bag. The money was bundled by paper straps and rubber bands. Lee told the officers the bag contained $190,000. Lee said the money was his, that he brought it from Canada, but he would not say where the money came from. When Lee said he had not paid taxes on the money, police arrested him. Appellant initially told Britton he did not know where the money came from. Ultimately, appellant said it was Lee's money and that he was scared of Lee. Britton asked if the money came from the sale of ecstasy, and appellant said, "yes" and again said he was scared. Appellant's admission that the money came from ecstasy was not recorded because Waddell was not in the area. Police arrested appellant for money laundering. At the jail, the police attempted to interview appellant, but he said he needed an interpreter. The money was taken to a bank, where bank employees counted it and determined there was $190,790. Weeks later, the City counted the money and determined there was $2000 more than in the earlier bank count. In his first and second points of error, appellant argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to convict him of money laundering. Appellant argues these points together. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Simmons v. State, 109 S.W.3d 469, 472 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). The jury determines witness credibility, the weight to be accorded to witness testimony, and conflicts in the evidence. See Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). All evidence, whether properly or improperly admitted, will be considered when reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1988); Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both supporting and against the finding, demonstrate that the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuniga v. State, No. 539-02, 2004 WL 840786, at *7 (Tex.Crim.App. April 21, 2004). Evidence is factually insufficient when evidence supporting the verdict, considered by itself, is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Evidence is also insufficient when contrary evidence is so strong that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard could not have been met. Id. The fact finder is entitled to judge the credibility of the witnesses and may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented. See Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). To convict appellant under the charge in this case, the State had to prove appellant acquired, received, concealed, possessed, transferred, maintained an interest in, or transported the proceeds of criminal activity, namely delivery of a controlled substance, of $100,000 or more. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 34.02(a) (Vernon 2003). Appellant asserts the evidence did not establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the money was derived from the delivery of a controlled substance. We disagree. Ecstasy is listed in Penalty Group 2 as a controlled substance. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 481.103(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004). The jury had direct evidence that the money came from selling ecstasy: appellant's admission to Officer Britton. Although this admission was not captured on the audio tape, it was within the jury's discretion to determine whether appellant in fact made the statement. In making this credibility determination, the jury had not only Officer Britton's testimony but a videotape of the stop from which they could gauge appellant's ability to speak and understand English. Additionally, there was abundant circumstantial evidence to lead to a conclusion that appellant was transporting proceeds from the sale of illegal drugs. First, appellant and Lee drove to Texas from Seattle for one day and were on their way home when stopped. According to the police, the water bottles, food, and blankets suggested that appellant was on a quick trip. The paper evidence in the car showed appellant and Lee spent very little time in any city. Although appellant said he and Lee were visiting a friend in Houston, he did not know the friend's last name or telephone number. In making their trip to Texas, the men avoided the more direct route of travel, Interstate 35, and instead were traveling on U.S. 75. Officer Waddell testified that I-35 is "worked real hard by different criminal interdiction teams" and that drug carriers know this and use alternate routes. The money was found in the bottom of a bag hidden beneath the clothes. Lee said the amount was $190,000. The money was bound by rubber bands and irregular straps, suggesting it did not come from a bank. The majority of the money was in twenty-dollar bills, which police testified is the most common denomination used in narcotics transactions. Moreover, Waddell testified he did not know of any legitimate businesses that would carry $190,000 in cash from one point to another, without using a bank. As Waddell explained, if a person is in the illegal drug business, he cannot put this kind of money in a bank without leaving a paper trail. When the police stopped the car, Lee was holding a notebook. Police examined the notebook and found it contained a list of cities with numbers out to the side. One of the cities was Dallas; the number "190" was out to the side. Lee told the officers the bag contained $190,000. A jury could infer from this evidence that the notebook was a drug log. Again, the officer testified that drug logs are often used to keep track of drug transactions. Although appellant characterizes the book as a mileage log, it was for the jury to determine the purpose of the book. Considering all the evidence, we conclude it was legally sufficient to establish that the money was derived from the delivery of illegal drugs. Appellant alternatively argues that the State's proof on this element was greatly outweighed by contrary proof. The only contrary proof relied on by appellant is the testimony of Thuc Nguyen, a Catholic priest in Beaumont, who met appellant more than ten years ago at a Malaysian refugee camp for Vietnamese people. Nguyen met appellant in 1989, spent two years in the camp with him, and had seen him once and talked to him on the telephone twice since that time. According to Nguyen, appellant called him in early September 2001, which was around the time of his arrest. Appellant got the telephone number of a mutual friend, who Nguyen believed would be able to provide appellant with more telephone numbers of other people who had been at the refugee camp. Nguyen testified that Vietnamese go mainly by first names and do not use the last name as much, which could explain why appellant did not know the last name of the friend he was visiting in Houston. Additionally, Nguyen testified he was familiar with appellant's character while at the camp years before and his reputation was good. Having reviewed this evidence, it does not weaken nor outweigh the evidence establishing appellant was transporting drug money. Nguyen was a character witness who had not seen appellant but one time in the past ten years and had talked to him on the telephone twice in ten years. Even Nguyen, when asked whether he was familiar with appellant's reputation for being peaceful and law-abiding, responded, "I cannot tell you that I know him very well, but as I know, he's a — yes." Any testimony concerning language barriers or Vietnamese custom was evidence the jury could use to make credibility determinations. Although appellant asserts there was "absolutely no evidence" before the jury that was "inconsistent with lawful and legal activity," he ignores his own statement to the police that the money came from the sale of ecstasy. Having reviewed the evidence under the appropriate standards, we conclude the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's finding that the money was derived from the delivery of drugs. We overrule the first and second points of error.
Jailhouse Interview
In his third point of error, appellant complains the trial court erred in admitting Officer Britton's testimony about his attempt to interview appellant at the jail, arguing the interview was conducted in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, article one, section ten of the Texas Constitution, and articles 38.22 and 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In his fourth point of error, appellant alternatively argues that once the trial court allowed Britton's testimony, it should have admitted the videotape of the jailhouse interview. During Officer Britton's testimony, the State requested a hearing outside the presence of the jury to ask questions about the officer's attempt to interview appellant at the jail. According to the prosecutor, the evidence was necessary to respond to defense suggestions (through the questioning of another Plano police officer) that "good officers take their defendants back . . . and try to get statements from them" and that "our officers are bad officers because they did not try to do that in this case." Appellant responded that "if we're going to talk about the defendant's invoking his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, then that — we would object to that." Officer Britton testified in the hearing that he did not remember appellant invoking any rights, only that appellant said he could not understand English. The trial court allowed the testimony. In the jury's presence, Britton testified he attempted to speak to appellant at the jail because he wanted appellant to tell him again what he had told him at the scene of the stop: that the money came from selling ecstasy. He took appellant to an interview room where he read appellant his Miranda warnings:I wanted him to read them in English to make sure that he understood all of his rights before I began questioning. He indicated to me that he had a problem reading English. He attempted to read it. He then told me that he'd rather have an interpreter. I asked him if he wanted me to get him an interpreter in Vietnamese and he said yes. At that time, he began having problems speaking English, so I told him that I would get an interpreter and come back and requestion him.Britton was not asked, nor did he testify, that appellant at any time invoked his right to remain silent. Although appellant purports to raise several alleged constitutional and statutory violations, he raised only a conditional Fifth Amendment complaint at trial. Because appellant cannot raise a different complaint on appeal than raised at trial, we conclude only the conditional Fifth Amendment objection is preserved for our review. See Rezac v. State, 782 S.W.2d 869, 870 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (explaining that if a party asserts a different complaint on appeal than its objection at trial, the party waives the issue). Even if appellant raised the issues below, he has not adequately briefed the issues. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1. He simply asserts the interview violated various state and federal constitutional and statutory provisions without offering any law or analysis. With respect to his only preserved complaint, appellant raised only a conditional Fifth Amendment objection below: if the evidence involved appellant invoking his right to remain silent. The evidence did not; Britton's testimony only showed that appellant asked for an interpreter. To the extent appellant believes that asking for an interpreter invokes one's right to remain silent, he has not briefed that issue, and we will not address it. We overrule the third point of error. In his fourth point of error, appellant argues that once the trial court allowed Britton's testimony about the jailhouse interview, he should have been allowed to present the videotape of the interview. According to appellant, the videotape went to "how well [he] spoke and understood the English language." He argues the trial court's refusal to admit the videotape violated the rule of optional completeness. Texas Rule of Evidence 107 provides:
When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or recorded statement is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and any other act, declaration, writing or recorded statement which is necessary to make it fully understood or to explain the same may also be given in evidence, as when a letter is read, all letters on the same subject between the same parties may be given. 'Writing or recorded statement' includes depositions.This rule guards against "the possibility of confusion, distortion or false impression that could rise from use of a portion of an act, writing, conversation, declaration or transaction out of proper context." Livingston v. State, 739 S.W.2d 311, 331 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); Fisher v. State, 121 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. ref'd). Initially, we note appellant does nothing more than quote the rule. He does not offer any substantive analysis or otherwise explain how the rule is implicated in this case. Because he fails to adequately brief this issue, we consider it waived. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h). Regardless, the State introduced the entire conversation between Officer Britton and appellant. Under these circumstances, we fail to see how the rule of optional completeness applies. To the extent he argues the videotape would show his ability to speak and understand the English language, we do not believe the rule was intended for that purpose. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to admit the videotape under rule 107. We overrule the fourth point of error.
motion to suppress
In points of error five, six, seven, eight, and nine, appellant complains the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements and evidence obtained in violation of numerous constitutional and statutory rights. In particular, he argues the detention violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, article one, section nine of the Texas Constitution, and articles 38.23 and 1.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. He argues his statements were taken in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, article one, section ten of the Texas Constitution, and articles 38.22 and 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we give great deference to the trial court's determination of historical fact. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). When the trial court does not file findings of fact, we assume that the trial court made implicit findings that support its ruling, so long as those implied findings are supported by the record. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). We review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Laney, 117 S.W.3d at 857; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855. Initially, we note appellant does not separately brief his complaints regarding the suppression issues; rather, he argues them together. He has provided no argument to this Court as to why he is entitled to relief under the code of criminal procedure. A point of error that is improperly briefed presents nothing for review. Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 210 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995); Leach v. State, 35 S.W.3d 232, 234 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.). Also, appellant has proffered no argument or authority concerning the protection afforded by the Texas Constitution or how that protection differs from the protections afforded by the United States Constitution. State and federal constitutional claims should be argued in separate grounds, with separate substantive analysis or argument provided for each ground. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 251 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690-91 n. 23 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Coggin v. State, 123 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, pet. ref'd). We will not make appellant's state constitutional arguments for him. See Muniz, 851 S.W.2d at 252. Turning to the appellant's arguments under the federal constitution, we begin with his complaints concerning the admissibility of two statements at the scene. After the money was found, Officer Britton testified he asked appellant where the money came from, and appellant said it belonged to Lee. According to Britton, appellant then looked toward Lee and said, "I'm scared." Britton asked appellant if he was afraid of Lee, and appellant said "yes." Officer Britton then asked, "Did he get it from selling ecstasy or did it come from the sale of ecstasy?" Appellant responded, "Yes, but I'm scared." (This conversation was not recorded on videotape.) Appellant argues the two "yes" responses should have been suppressed because they were the product of custodial interrogation and he had not been Mirandized. He argues he was in custody as defined by the fourth situation in Dowthitt v. State: "when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave." 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Initially, we note that at the end of the suppression hearing, appellant made fifteen pages of objections to the statement and evidence seized but did not lodge the particular objection he makes on appeal. Consequently, we conclude this issue is not preserved. Rezac, 782 S.W.2d at 870. Regardless, after reviewing the record, we conclude the police did not have probable cause to arrest appellant until appellant told them the money was derived from the sale of ecstasy. Prior to that point, police had a bag of money, but did not know its source. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the police had probable cause to arrest and had manifested that knowledge to appellant. See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255. To the extent appellant references the three other general situations outlined in Dowthitt, he has not briefed how any applies in this case. Consequently, that portion of his complaint is inadequately briefed. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h). In addition, to the extent appellant argues the statement was involuntary, he did not object on this basis in the trial court. Rather, the only complaint concerning voluntariness went to the consent to search the car. We overrule the fifth and sixth points of error. In the seventh and eighth issues, appellant argues the evidence seized at the scene should be suppressed for three reasons: (1) the continued detention was not reasonable, (2) the consent to search the bag was not positive and unequivocal, and (3) the search of the trunk and bag exceeded the scope of any consent. We first address the "continued detention" argument. Appellant argues the detention impermissibly exceeded the scope of the stop because the police searched the purple bag after the purpose of the stop concluded. He argues there "was no reasonable suspicion to further detain and question [appellant and Lee] or obtain additional consent." The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, including those entailing only a brief detention. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 (1980). A detention may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). When a police officer simply requests permission to search a vehicle, however, that does not amount to an unlawful seizure under the federal constitution. The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe voluntary cooperation. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991). There is no dispute in the present case that the initial traffic stop was valid. Once the stop was made, Officer Britton went to run the checks on both men's driver's licenses and, less than a minute later, Officer Waddell obtained appellant's consent to search the car. Officer Waddell said he had never received a warrant report back in less than one minute, evidencing that the original purpose of the stop was ongoing at the time appellant gave his consent. After searching the interior of the car, Officer Waddell took the keys from the ignition and opened the trunk. There he found two bags, both of which belonged to the passenger, Lee. Officer Waddell obtained Lee's consent to search the bags and found the money in the purple bag. While the evidence at trial was somewhat confusing and conflicting as to when the officers received clearance on the warrants check, Officer Britton testified he had not obtained clearance on both men at the time Lee gave his consent to search the purple bag. From this evidence, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude the investigation into the traffic violation was ongoing when appellant gave his consent to search the car and, furthermore, that clearance was not obtained until after consent was given to search the bag. Even if we assumed appellant is correct in asserting that the officers had received clearance during the search, we are aware of no law, and appellant has cited us to none, that requires police officers in the middle of a consensual search to stop once they receive clearance on a warrants check unless they have reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is not required for a police officer to request consent to search an automobile after the reason for the initial stop is concluded, provided that a message is not conveyed that compliance is required and that the driver is not detained after he has refused to give consent to search. See James v. State, 102 S.W.3d 162, 173 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd); Leach v. State, 35 S.W.3d 232, 235 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, no pet.). Thus, the officers could seek consent to search after the initial traffic stop was complete. To the extent appellant argues that the officer could not ask Lee for additional consent to search his bags, absent reasonable suspicion, once clearance was obtained, we conclude this complaint is personal to Lee as is discussed below. Appellant next argues the consent to search the purple bag and the trunk was not given voluntarily. Appellant, however, has argued no specific fact to support his position. Under these circumstances, we consider his complaint inadequately briefed. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(h). Regardless, we have reviewed the videotape of the stop and the record and conclude the trial court did not err in determining that appellant's consent was voluntary. The Fourth Amendment test for a valid consent to search is that the consent be voluntary, and voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996); Rayford v. State, 125 S.W.3d 521, 528 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3207 (Oct. 4, 2004). To be valid, the consent must "not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force." Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 331 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 228 (1973)). The federal constitution requires the State to prove the validity of the consent by a preponderance of the evidence; the Texas Constitution requires the State to show by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was valid. Rayford, 125 S.W.3d at 528. In this case, the following exchange between Officer Waddell and appellant was videotaped:[OFFICER]: Okay. You're not carrying any weapons in the car, are you?
[APPELLANT]: No, just my bags with extra clothes.
[OFFICER]: You have a bag?
[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
[OFFICER]: No pistols —
[APPELLANT]: No, nothing.
[OFFICER]: — no rifles —
[APPELLANT]: No, nothing.
[OFFICER]: — no drugs in the car?
[APPELLANT]: No, nothing.
[OFFICER]: Are you sure?
[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
[OFFICER]: Are you positive?
[APPELLANT]: Yeah.
[OFFICER]: There's no marijuana in the car?
[APPELLANT]: No.
[OFFICER]: There's no ecstasy in the car?
[APPELLANT]: Yeah, you can check.
[OFFICER]: Are you — I can search the car?
[APPELLANT]: Yeah.In addition to the above exchange, appellant testified at the suppression hearing that he was not afraid of the officers at the scene. Additionally, he acknowledged that he offered to allow the police to search the car, understood what he was doing, and understood when the officer asked if he could search the car. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude appellant's consent to search was not voluntary. The overriding factor in this case is that appellant offered to allow the police to search the vehicle and knew what he was doing when he made the offer. There is nothing prior to this offer to suggest that appellant did this under any implied or express duress or coercion. After appellant made this offer, the officer confirmed that appellant was allowing him to search the car. Again, there is nothing to suggest that appellant's consent to search the car was made under any duress or coercion; in fact, appellant testified he was not afraid of the officers at the scene. Under these circumstances, we conclude there was clear and convincing evidence (and thus necessarily a preponderance of the evidence) from which the trial court could conclude appellant's consent to search the car was voluntary. With respect to the purple bag, the videotape of the stop shows that the officer, while searching the trunk, found a purple bag that Lee claimed was his. The officer then asked if he could search the bag, and Lee nodded his head affirmatively. Appellant challenges the voluntariness of Lee's consent. It is settled law that rights assured by the Fourth Amendment are personal in nature and their violation may be remedied only at the instance of one whose rights were violated, not that of a third party. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968) (defendant could not assert Fourth Amendment rights of third party to challenge legality of search but his pretrial admission of ownership of incriminating evidence to show standing was not admissible against him in subsequent trial); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted."). Therefore, an assertion of Fourth Amendment rights should be analyzed in terms of whether the challenged search or seizure has infringed on the legitimate expectation of privacy of the person asserting the right. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140. An accused cannot vicariously assert the Fourth Amendment rights of a third party to undo the consent he freely gave and reclothe himself in the Fourth Amendment protections he previously discarded. See Smith v. State, 789 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1990, pet. ref'd). Appellant presented no evidence that he had ownership in the incriminating evidence, nor did he make any such argument below. Thus, he did not show that he had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the purple bag and cannot challenge Lee's consent. Regardless, by appellant's own voluntary consent to search the car, appellant waived any expectation of privacy in the purple bag found in the trunk, assuming the police did not exceed the scope of the consent. In his final suppression issue, appellant argues the police exceeded the scope of his consent because it did not include the trunk of the car. When an individual voluntarily consents to a search, an officer's authority to perform the search is not without limit. Vargas v. State, 18 S.W.3d 247, 253 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. ref'd); Harris v. State, 994 S.W.2d 927, 931 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, pet. ref'd) (citing Dubose v. State, 915 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)). The extent of the search is limited to the scope of the consent given, and the scope of the consent is generally defined by its expressed object. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991); Vargas, 18 S.W.3d at 253. The standard for measuring the scope of consent is that of "objective" reasonableness — what the typical reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the individual. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. In Jimeno, the issue was whether it was reasonable for an officer to consider that a suspect's general consent to search his car included consent to examine a paper bag on the floor. Because the suspect did not place an explicit limitation on the scope of the search conducted, the Supreme Court concluded it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search his car included consent to search containers within that car which might contain drugs. Id. As stated previously, appellant offered to let the police search his car for ecstasy. The police responded by asking permission to search, which appellant gave. Appellant did not limit either his offer or his consent to the car's interior. In fact, appellant did not voice any objection when the officer went to open the trunk. The trunk is part of a car. Under these circumstances, we conclude that it was objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude that appellant's consent to search the car included the trunk. We overrule the seventh and eighth point of error. The ninth point of error simply asserts that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress; he does not raise new arguments. We have addressed all of appellant's complaints on this issue. We overrule the ninth point of error.