Opinion
No. 62919-1-I.
January 25, 2010.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 08-2-26900-1, Andrea A. Darvas, J., entered December 30, 2008.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Ellington, J., concurred in by Schindler, C.J., and Dwyer, J.
Calista Phair appeals the superior court's order denying her motion to vacate summary judgment. Phair contends she was never served with the summary judgment motion. The record demonstrates otherwise. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Phair is a recent graduate of Renton High School. While enrolled, she objected to the school's use of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn by Mark Twain. In 2007, after she graduated, she submitted to the Renton School District a written request for reconsideration of instructional materials used, requesting the district withdraw the book from its curriculum. The district's policy set out a detailed procedure for such requests, culminating in an appeal to the district board of directors, which would make a final decision. Phair participated in some steps of the procedure, but not others. As a result, the board never rendered a final decision. Nevertheless, Phair sought review of the district's action in superior court.
The district moved for summary judgment, arguing Phair lacked standing because she was no longer a student and that her claim was unripe because she failed to exhaust administrative remedies and there had been no final decision. Attached to the district's summary judgment motion was a certificate of service. The certificate stated under penalty of perjury that legal secretary Alice Wells had served Phair via hand delivery and via first class mail on November 14, 2008.
Phair did not respond to the motion and did not appear for a hearing on the matter on December 12, 2008. The court granted the motion, dismissing Phair's claims with prejudice.
On December 24, 2008, Phair filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment order and to compel the district to produce proof that it had served her with its motion for summary judgment.
On December 29, 2008, the court entered an order denying Phair's motion. The court explained the motion to produce proof of service was redundant because sufficient proof of service had already been filed. The court attached a copy of the certificate of service to its order. Phair filed a second motion to produce proof of service, arguing the certificate was not sufficient. The court denied that motion as well. Phair appeals.
DISCUSSION
We review the denial of a motion to vacate for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion only if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.
Rivers v. Wash. State Conf. of Mason Contrs., 145 Wn.2d 674, 697, 41 P.3d 1175 (2002) (court applies abuse of discretion standard to review denial of motion to vacate under CR 60(b)); Olpinski v. Clement, 73 Wn.2d 944, 951, 442 P.2d 260 (1968) (motion to vacate under CR 59).
In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).
Phair's motions to vacate were based upon her assertion that she had never been served with the motion for summary judgment. The court denied her motions because the summary judgment motion attached a certificate of service establishing under penalty of perjury that service had been timely and properly made in person and by first class mail.
While Phair questions the sufficiency of "a generic copy of a form," CR 5(b) specifically directs that "[p]roof of service of all papers permitted to be mailed may be by . . . affidavit of the person who mailed the papers." The certificate at issue here satisfies this requirement. Additionally, service by mail is deemed complete on the third day after the documents are placed in the mail. In this case, the certificate establishes the documents were placed in the mail on November 14, 2008. Service was thus complete on November 17, 2008, providing more than the requisite 28 days' notice before the hearing on December 29, 2008.
Appellant's Br. at 2.
The court was entitled to rely on the certificate of service to conclude Phair had been properly served. There were no other grounds to vacate the judgment.
We affirm.