Opinion
Case No. 5D19-1997
05-15-2020
Tiffany PHAGAN, O/B/O L.D.P., Appellant, v. Paul MCDUFFEE, Appellee.
Marc E. Dwyer, of Chiumento Dwyer, Hertel Grant, P.L., Palm Coast, for Appellant. David L. Ferguson, of Woodard & Ferguson, P.A., Ormond Beach, for Appellee.
Marc E. Dwyer, of Chiumento Dwyer, Hertel Grant, P.L., Palm Coast, for Appellant.
David L. Ferguson, of Woodard & Ferguson, P.A., Ormond Beach, for Appellee.
WALLIS, J.
Appellant, Tiffany Phagan o/b/o L.D.P., appeals the order dismissing her petition to establish dependency and ongoing support for her daughter, L.D.P. Appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the petition. We agree and reverse.
Because the jurisdictional issue is dispositive and was properly raised at the hearing, we decline to address Appellant's remaining arguments.
Tiffany Phagan (Mother) and Paul McDuffee (Father) are the biological parents of L.D.P., who was born in June 2000. In 2001, Mother filed a petition for paternity, child support and other relief, seeking to have Father adjudicated L.D.P.’s biological father. Mother also requested that the court order that Father pay her child support. The trial court entered a final judgment adjudicating Father as L.D.P.’s father and ordering that Father pay Mother child support.
In 2006, Mother moved to modify the final judgment as to child support. The parties entered into a stipulation to modify child support, agreeing that there was a substantial change in circumstances that warranted the modification. The stipulation stated that Father would pay increased child support until L.D.P. reaches "the age of eighteen (18) ... or so long as the child is dependent." The trial court entered a Supplemental Final Judgment, ratifying the parties’ stipulation and incorporating the stipulation into the Supplemental Final Judgment.
Four days before L.D.P.’s eighteenth birthday, Mother filed the Supplemental Petition to Establish Dependency and Ongoing Support for Child on behalf of L.D.P. The Supplemental Petition alleged that L.D.P. is severely disabled and has numerous medical conditions that began when she was three weeks old and that have required significant medical interventions throughout her life. The Supplemental Petition further alleged that it is unlikely that L.D.P. will be self-sufficient even after she graduates from high school. As a result of her disabilities, Mother requested that the court adjudicate L.D.P. dependent and order that Father provide continuing support for her as long as L.D.P. is dependent upon her parents.
Father moved to dismiss the Supplemental Petition, arguing, inter alia , that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Supplemental Petition and to extend child support beyond a child's eighteenth birthday. The trial court agreed, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to modify or extend Father's support obligations because: (1) Father fulfilled his child support obligation as required by the Final Judgment and Supplemental Final Judgments; and (2) L.D.P. was not adjudicated dependent before she turned eighteen and none of the judgments entered in this case recognized L.D.P. as dependent. Therefore, the trial court dismissed the Supplemental Petition without prejudice for L.D.P. to file an independent action for support against Mother and/or Father.
It is well settled that a parent has a legal duty to provide financial support for his child until the child reaches the age of majority. Loza v. Marin, 198 So. 3d 1017, 1020 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). Thus, "[a] court possesses continuing jurisdiction to modify a support award, but only during the period provided for support." Id. at 1021. However, section 743.07, Florida Statutes (2018), provides exceptions to this general rule. In particular, section 743.07(2) provides, in relevant part, that:
This section shall not prohibit any court of competent jurisdiction from requiring support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18 years when such dependency is because of a mental or physical incapacity which began prior to such person reaching majority or if the person is dependent in fact.
In Ruiz v. Ruiz, 783 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), this Court held that a dissolution court has jurisdiction to consider a petition to extend child support for a dependent child past her eighteenth birthday when the petition was filed before the child reached majority. In contrast, in Brown v. Brown, 714 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), we found that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to modify a parent's support obligation in a divorce judgment for an adult dependent child when the petition for modification was filed after the child reached the age of majority. We explained that in that instance "an independent action must be brought to adjudicate the father's support obligation for an adult dependent child." Id. at 477. Brown further explained that the cause of action belongs to the adult dependent child, who may bring a separate case for extended child support against either parent. Id.
We disagree with the trial court that Brown is controlling in the instant case. In Brown, the mother filed the petition when the dependent child was twenty-six years old, whereas, here, Mother filed the Supplemental Petition before L.D.P. turned eighteen. Thus, the facts of this case are more in line with Ruiz. Moreover, nothing in Mother's and Father's stipulation from 2006 limited the trial court's jurisdiction or required that Mother obtain a dependency determination for L.D.P. before she turned eighteen in order to extend child support. Section 743.07(2) likewise does not require that a child be adjudicated dependent before he reaches majority in order for a trial court to have jurisdiction to order extended child support. Rather, section 743.07(2) only requires that the "dependency is because of a mental or physical incapacity which began prior to such person reaching majority." Thus, because the Supplemental Petition alleged that the disability leading to L.D.P.’s dependency occurred before she reached majority and because Mother filed the Supplemental Petition before L.D.P. turned eighteen, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the issue of extended child support. See § 743.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2018) ; Ruiz, 783 So. 2d at 362–63 (finding the trial court had jurisdiction to consider a petition to modify child support after the child turned eighteen where the petition was filed before the child reached the age of majority, the child had been effectively adjudicated dependent before she reached the age of majority, and the court's order related back to the date the petition was filed); see also Taylor v. Bonsall, 875 So. 2d 705, 709–10 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to extend a child support obligation beyond the eighteenth birthday of a dependent adult child where the parties entered into a stipulation that required a parent seeking extended support to obtain an order before the child's eighteenth birthday; however, "[b]ut for the stipulation, the trial court would have had jurisdiction to extend [the child's] support beyond her eighteenth birthday because the petition was filed prior to that date"). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to consider the Supplemental Petition and to consider Father's Motion to Dismiss.
REVERSED and REMANDED with Instructions.
COHEN and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.