Opinion
24A-JV-1621
11-19-2024
P.G., Appellant-Respondent v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT JAMES D. CRUM COOTS, HENKE & WHEELER, P.C. CARMEL, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA MICHELLE HAWK KAZMIERCZAK DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court The Honorable Valorie S. Hahn, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 29D01-2308-JD-001121
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT JAMES D. CRUM COOTS, HENKE & WHEELER, P.C. CARMEL, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE THEODORE E. ROKITA INDIANA ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA MICHELLE HAWK KAZMIERCZAK DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
DeBoer, Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] P.G., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent by the trial court for Criminal Trespass, which would be a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult. P.G. was placed on six months of supervised probation with conditions related to her substance abuse. Following a multitude of probation violations, the trial court committed P.G. to the Indiana Department of Corrections ("DOC"). P.G. appeals, raising one issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ordered P.G. to be a ward of the DOC? We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On August 25, 2023, the State filed a delinquency petition, alleging that P.G. was a delinquent child for committing acts constituting Criminal Trespass, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult, and Criminal Mischief, a Class B misdemeanor if committed by an adult. P.G. admitted to the Criminal Trespass allegation and was adjudicated a delinquent child on September 12, 2023. The trial court ordered P.G. to complete a counseling assessment with a substance abuse component and placed P.G. on probation for six months with the condition that she not consume or possess any intoxicating beverages or controlled substances.
At the State's request, the trial court dismissed the Criminal Mischief allegation.
[¶3] Over the next several months, P.G. violated her probation multiple times. On January 19, 2024, P.G. tested positive for THC and fentanyl prompting the State to file its first motion to modify the dispositional decree on February 1, 2024. On February 2, 2024, P.G. was admitted to Anderson Center for Mental Health and Addiction Services ("Anderson Center") where she spent four days inpatient. On February 7, 2024, the trial court placed P.G. on Parental House Arrest ("PHA"), during which time P.G. completed a substance use assessment at Fairbanks Recovery Hospital ("Fairbanks") and began outpatient treatment five days later. P.G. participated in one group therapy session at Fairbanks before leaving the program. On February 9, 2024, P.G. underwent a substance use assessment at St. Vincent's (her second assessment overall); however, she did not enroll in group therapy sessions due to transportation issues. In court, P.G. admitted to the allegations in the State's first motion. Thereafter, on February 29, 2024, she completed a second substance use assessment at Fairbanks (her third assessment overall) and began group therapy on March 4, 2024.
[¶4] The State filed its second motion to modify the dispositional decree on March 7, 2024, after P.G. tested positive twice for fentanyl and once for THC. On March 13, 2024, during the hearing on the State's second motion, P.G. admitted to violating the terms of the trial court's dispositional decree and conditions of probation. Upon the agreement of all parties, the trial court detained P.G. in its Juvenile Services Center Shelter Care Unit ("Shelter Care Unit"), finding such placement to be "the least restrictive placement and in the child's best interests." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 130. The trial court allowed P.G.'s Mother or Grandmother to transport her to outpatient treatment at Fairbanks with "no side trips." Id. After six days in the Shelter Care Unit, the trial court released P.G. from detention, extended her probation by three months, and placed her on 30 days of PHA because doing so "would be in the juvenile's best interests." Id. at 133.
[¶5] On April 10, 2024, the State filed its third motion to modify the dispositional decree, the allegations of which P.G. ultimately admitted on June 18, 2024. P.G. admitted she violated PHA by allowing an unapproved person into her home who provided her with fentanyl, in violation of the conditions of PHA. P.G. also admitted that she tested positive for fentanyl and THC on April 2, 2024, left home without parental supervision on April 4, 2024, and was non-compliant at Fairbanks. Fairbanks recommended P.G. enter a "residential setting" for care because P.G. exhibited a "high resistance to treatment," noting that she only "enter[ed] treatment due to being forced." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 136. Fairbanks' report clarified P.G. was disruptive in group meetings, left some meetings early because she did not want to put her phone away, "denied using any substances," and expressed "little motivation to be sober." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 136. As a result of her non-compliance and because she tested positive for fentanyl and THC, on April 12, 2024, the trial court ordered P.G. detained at the Juvenile Services Center Secure Unit ("Secure Unit."), finding that such placement was "the least restrictive placement and in the child's best interests," and that it was "contrary to the welfare of the child for the child to remain in the home." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 138.
[¶6] On April 18, 2024, after Fairbanks recommended P.G. be placed in a residential treatment facility, the parties entered an agreed order which provided P.G. be released from the Secure Unit so she could participate in a 28-day inpatient treatment program at Josiah White's, a residential recovery facility. Within one day of her arrival at Josiah White's, P.G. was involved in a physical altercation with another resident and was kicked out of the program. The trial court ordered P.G. re-detained in the Secure Unit. Josiah White's report noted that P.G. did not achieve any goals while in treatment, had "several incidents of being defiant," and "often glorified her substance use and would talk about getting high once she left treatment." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 158. It was her conduct at Josiah White's that prompted the State to file its fourth motion to modify.
[¶7] Between May 1 and May 3 of 2024, and while awaiting a hearing on the State's pending motions to modify the dispositional decree, P.G. was involved in multiple physical altercations with the staff at the Secure Unit, she engaged in self-mutilation behaviors, and she threatened suicide.
[¶8] On May 10, 2024, the parties entered an agreed order which provided P.G. be released from detention and placed in Rosecrance, which is a residential treatment facility in Rockford, Illinois. Within ten days of her admission in Rosecrance, P.G. was terminated from the program "due to an increase in problematic behaviors[.]" Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 179. Rosecrance noted that P.G.'s prognosis was poor due to "low motivation for sobriety and low motivation to improve her behaviors throughout the duration of her treatment stay." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 180. The trial court remanded her back to the Secure Unit.
[¶9] During the final disposition hearing on June 18, 2024, P.G. admitted the allegations in the State's third and fourth motions to modify the dispositional decree. At the hearing, P.G.'s Mother testified that if P.G. was allowed to return home, P.G. would be under familial supervision and she could return to her previous job as a hostess at a restaurant. Having spoken to P.G. on a daily basis, Mother stated she noticed improvements in P.G.'s behavior, P.G. had learned "how to catch herself to calm down more, faster," and P.G. was "asking for advice and more help now." Tr. Vol. 2 at 20. Mother also noted that P.G. was "ready" to accompany Mother to her Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Id.
[¶10] Mother testified that P.G. was in counseling with a therapist, Jim Keyes, who advised against making P.G. a ward of the DOC, and who made the following recommendations: she remain under his care; attend at least four Narcotics Anonymous meetings weekly; test for attention deficit disorder; and take appropriate medication, if warranted. Keyes concluded that "[m]ore treatment makes sense to me rather than more incarceration knowing that if she doesn't partiipate [sic] in the treatment plan DOC is next." Ex. Vol. 3 at 6.
[¶11] P.G.'s Grandmother testified that prior to P.G.'s freshman year of high school, P.G. had been diagnosed with oppositional defiance disorder, depression, and anxiety. Grandmother explored the possibility of P.G. attending school in Anderson, Indiana, where P.G.'s aunt is a special education teacher who could help the family get P.G. "back into a normal classroom now that [P.G.] is willing to learn." Tr. Vol. 2 at 22. Grandmother believed that P.G. "learned her lesson and she needs to come home." Id. at 23.
[¶12] P.G.'s probation officer recommended P.G. be placed in the DOC, stating:
[M]ultiple providers, including Anderson Center and Community Fairbanks, have reported low motivation to change and to be sober. At Josiah White's [ . . . ] she was involved in a physical altercation, was generally defiant, refused to participate in a lot of the treatment. She did glorify her substance use at times which is
very concerning to me and she talked about wanting to get high when she came home [ . . . ] she was determined to be a high risk for relapse. And especially after her being in custody that's really concerning that she may be harmed if she does relapse upon going home with no treatment. At Rosecrance we had the same issues, lack of engagement, verbal altercations. She had threats of violence. It's just a lot of things that have added up and been very concerning for her to go home without receiving any proper treatment because she was unsuccessful in all of these different treatment facilities that we have attempted.Tr. Vol. 2. at 24-25. At the close of evidence, the trial court committed P.G. to the DOC.
Discussion and Decision
[¶13] P.G. claims the trial court abused its discretion by committing her to the DOC following her fourth probation violation when less restrictive placements were available. When entering a dispositional decree, a trial court has discretion in its disposition of a juvenile delinquent. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006). This disposition may include awarding wardship to the "department of correction for housing in a correctional facility for children." Ind. Code § 31-37-19-6(b)(2)(A)(i). A court abuses its discretion "if its decision clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it." G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2024). In determining "whether a juvenile court has abused its discretion, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility." Q.H. v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1197, 1200 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023).
[¶14] In support of her argument that wardship is not the least restrictive or the most appropriate setting available given her mental health needs, P.G. points out that our legislature has enumerated factors in Indiana Code Section 31-37-18-6 for a trial court to consider when determining a juvenile delinquency disposition:
If consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional decree that:
(1) is:
(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and
(B) close to the parents' home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;
(2) least interferes with family autonomy;
(3) is least disruptive of family life;
(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and
(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.I.C. § 31-37-18-6.
[¶15] It is uncontroverted that the DOC is a restrictive setting. See E.L. v. State, 783 N.E.2d 360, 367 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003) (noting that commitment to the DOC is "the most severe disposition available"). However, Indiana Code Section 31-37-18-6(1)(A) does not require a trial court to place a juvenile in a non-restrictive setting, but rather mandates placement in the "least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available." Commitment to the DOC should be "treated as a last resort." C.H. v. State, 201 N.E.3d 202, 205 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022). But in some cases, this restrictive, last resort setting is also the most appropriate. Id.; see also M.C. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 453, 459 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (concluding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in committing juvenile to the DOC, where juvenile continued using marijuana, committed additional offenses, and was suspended from school, even after his involvement with the juvenile justice system).
[¶16] P.G. argues that the "juvenile court's awarding wardship to the DOC does not address the specific needs of the juvenile, which the court acknowledged to be the mental health and substance abuse treatment." Appellant's Br. at 9. We agree with P.G. that the trial court's concern for her mental health and its efforts to arm her with the tools she needed to successfully complete a substance abuse program is evident from the record. Despite testing positive for illegal substances four times while on probation, the trial court worked through many different alternatives to assist P.G.'s recovery from her substance abuse and to seek the mental health help she needed. P.G.'s numerous positive tests for fentanyl, even after beginning treatment with Keyes and enrolling in other treatment programs, show that she presents a significant danger to herself, especially when combined with her self-harming behavior and threats of suicide in early May 2024. P.G. began with outpatient care at Fairbanks but showed little interest in the program and soon tested positive for drugs again. Her second chance at Josiah White's provided inpatient treatment, but only lasted one day before P.G. was kicked out for assaulting another patient. Despite this conduct, the trial court gave P.G. a third chance to undergo inpatient treatment at Rosecrance, but P.G. was terminated from the program after ten days for "an increase in problematic behaviors." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 179. This termination occurred three weeks before her dispositional hearing was to be held.
[¶17] Although P.G. contends that she will not receive treatment while in the DOC, the trial court noted at the final disposition hearing that the DOC "[has] substance abuse [ ] and . . . mental health treatment and that is what [P.G.] needs." Tr. Vol. 2 at 35. Article 9, Section 2 of our Indiana Constitution provides, "[t]he General Assembly shall provide institutions for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders." Our legislature has imposed strict guidelines on these facilities, including, among other requirements, mandating them to "provide services and treatment to meet the individual needs of the delinquent child." I.C. § 31-37-19-21(2)(A). P.G. argues she could receive outpatient treatment outside the DOC and has a provider willing to treat her. While we acknowledge the goal of a juvenile court is to rehabilitate rather than to punish, one of our legislature's enumerated goals for the juvenile system is to "promote public safety and individual accountability by the imposition of appropriate sanctions." I.C. § 31-10-2-1(12). While another enumerated goal is to "use diversionary programs when appropriate," the trial court is entitled to weigh competing policies and use its discretion when determining placement. See I.C. § 31-10-2-1(10); see also K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382, 387-88 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002). Although the trial court tried several different outpatient and inpatient treatment programs prior to resorting to placement in the DOC, P.G. did not avail herself of those chances but instead continued to use fentanyl and THC and failed to actively participate in the programming.
Ind. Const., Art. 9, § 2.
[¶18] P.G.'s argument that she should not be committed to the DOC because the underlying charge was a misdemeanor had it been committed by an adult is equally unpersuasive. Delinquent acts are not crimes and dispositions are not criminal sentences. See M.C. v. State, 134 N.E.3d at 463. As the Indiana Supreme Court previously noted, juvenile courts, by their nature, hold discretion "unknown in the adult criminal court system." In re K.G., 808 N.E.2d 631, 636 (Ind. 2004). Disparate treatment between adult and juvenile offenders is "required to address the nuances of youth." M.C., 134 N.E.3d at 461 (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in committing a juvenile to the wardship of the DOC where the underlying offense would have been a misdemeanor if committed by an adult and the juvenile's initial disposition was six months of probation and random drug testing). Like this court's ruling in M.C., P.G. was not made a ward of the DOC solely for committing Criminal Trespass. Rather, the trial court properly exercised its discretion by granting wardship to the DOC because of P.G.'s repeated failures when presented with less restrictive options for rehabilitation. See id.
When considering the distinction between juvenile and adult courts, our court previously stated in M.C. v. State, 134 N.E.3d 453, 460-61 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), "Indiana has long recognized that its juvenile system is directed toward providing 'aid to the juvenile to direct his behavior so that he will not later become a criminal.'" Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. 1987). The juvenile justice system was founded on the principle of parens patriae, which allows courts to step into the shoes of the parents when required. In re K. G., 808 N.E.2d at 635. That notion "permits juvenile courts to care for and further the best interests of the child, 'which implies a broad discretion unknown in the adult criminal court system.'" Id. at 636.
[¶19] The trial court stated at the disposition hearing, "we have tried community resources, we have tried outpatient treatment, inpatient treatment, and none of them have been successful." Tr. Vol. 2 at 35. The trial court acknowledged that sending P.G. to the DOC is a last resort, but concluded, "[t]here is no other place that I can put [P.G.] that she is going to get the treatment that she needs to come out and be successful. If I send [P.G] home, I do not think that she is set up for success. I think that she is set up for failure and that she is set up to OD and die, and that is not what this [c]ourt wants." Id. Based upon these facts, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the safety of the community and P.G.'s best interests were served by her commitment to the DOC.
Conclusion
[¶20] In light of P.G.'s numerous probation violations, positive tests for fentanyl and THC use, unsuccessful completion of several inpatient and outpatient treatment programs, and her defiant behavior throughout her probation, the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that committing P.G. to the wardship of the DOC was in her best interest and consistent with the safety of the community.
[¶21] Affirmed.
May, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.