Opinion
99 Civ. 10785 (WK)
February 20, 2002
Stephen Peyser, (pro se), Diana Moss, One By Diana, New York, NY, For Plaintiff.
John W. Dunne, Robert P. Lynn, Jr., LLC, Mineola, NY, For Defendants.
ORDER
On August 2, 2000, we denied summary judgment in this case with respect to Defendants Carol Horn, Roni Rabl, Inc., Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc., and E.N.K. Productions, Ltd. See Peyser v. Searle Blatt Co., Ltd. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2000) 2000 WL 1071804 ("Peyser I"). However, we granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants Searle Blatt Co., Ltd., Searle Blatt, and Alice Blatt (collectively referred to as the "Searle Defendants") on the grounds of laches. See id. Plaintiffs have since sought to vacate that summary judgment on four separate occasions, and we have denied each such request. See Peyser v. Searle Blatt Co., Ltd. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2000) 2000 WL 1876917 ("Peyser II"); Peyser v. Searle Blatt Co., Ltd., No. 99 civ. 10785 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2001) ("Peyser III") (unpublished order); Peyser v. Searle Blatt Co., Ltd., (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2001) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20844 ("Peyser IV"); Peyser v. Searle Blatt Co., Ltd. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2001) 2001 WL 1602129 ("Peyser V"). Indeed, in Peyser V, we explicitly warned Plaintiffs that they could not utilize numerous, successive requests for relief from judgment as substitutes for appeal. See Peyser V, 2001 WL 1602129 at *2-*3. Despite this admonition and our previous decisions, Plaintiffs now seek, for the fifth time, relief from our previous decisions pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 61 and, in essence, 60(b). Although Plaintiffs request that we vacate our decisions in Peyser II, III, and V (wherein we denied their previous attempts to obtain relief from judgment), they make it clear that they actually seek such relief in the hopes that we vacate the summary judgment which we entered in favor of the Searle Defendants in Peyser I. See Pls.' Not. of Mot. at 1 (seeking an order from us which would "vacate such [previous] orders dismissing Searle Blatt Co., Ltd."). For the explicit reasons set forth in Peyser II, III, IV, and V, we deny Plaintiffs' motion for relief from judgment.
The substance of Plaintiffs' arguments in support of their request for relief from judgment are imbedded in their opposition to the Searle Defendants "Fee Enumeration," as well as the accompanying exhibits and affirmations. See Pls.' Aff. in Opp'n to Defs. Fee Enumeration and in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. to the Ct. to Invoke Rule 61. As such, although their Notice of Motion and moving papers generally suggest that Plaintiffs solely seek relief from the summary judgment entered in favor of the Searle Defendants, it is somewhat unclear if Plaintiffs' moving papers also request relief from our decision in Peyser IV wherein we granted in part the Searle Defendants' motion for attorneys' fees. To the extent that Plaintiffs are also requesting that we vacate our decision to grant attorneys' fees in Peyser IV, we deny that request. Plaintiffs base their motion for relief solely on the grounds that we should not have granted the Searle Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Since we have consistently denied Plaintiffs' requests for relief from that summary judgment, and since we continue to do so today, we cannot grant Plaintiffs relief from our decision to grant attorneys' fees to the Searle Defendants on the sole contention that we improperly granted summary judgment in Peyser I or that we improperly failed to provide Plaintiffs with relief from such judgment in Peyser II, III, IV, and V.
We caution Plaintiffs that any attempts to seek such relief on the same or substantially similar grounds for a sixth time may well result in the imposition of sanctions against them. As we previously explained to Plaintiffs, they may not use such motions as substitutes for appeal from the summary judgment. Rather, if Plaintiffs so choose, they should, at the appropriate time, file an appeal.
SO ORDERED.