(Punctuation and footnotes omitted; emphasis in original.) Petzelt v. Tewes, 260 Ga.App. 802, 805(1), 581 S.E.2d 345 (2003).[B]ecause fraud is inherently subtle, slight circumstances of fraud may be sufficient to establish a proper case.

Petzelt v. Tewes. However, nothing in the record suggests that either Dr. Jose or Scottish Rite acted with an intention to deceive plaintiffs or that either made a wilful misrepresentation with the intention and purpose of injuring Ella. See Prince, supra, 278 Ga. App. at 312-313 (1) (b); Karpowicz v. Hyles.Petzelt v. Tewes, 260 Ga. App. 802, 805 (1) ( 581 SE2d 345) (2003).Karpowicz v. Hyles, 247 Ga. App. 292, 297 (6) ( 543 SE2d 51) (2000).

Furthermore, the jury could conclude that the Douglases and FSF recklessly made such representation and/or recklessly failed to discover and disclose the illegality throughout Bigley's investment relationship with FSF. And such conclusions authorize a finding of scienter and intent to induce investment with respect to these defendants, especially if the jury found the existence of a confidential relationship. See Petzelt v. Tewes, 260 Ga. App. 802, 805 ( 581 SE2d 345) (2003) ("`[R]eckless representation of facts as true when they are not, if intended to deceive, is equivalent to a knowledge of their falsehood even if the party making the representation does not know that such facts are false. A misrepresentation is intended to deceive where there is intent that the representation be acted upon by the other party.'" (emphasis omitted)); Chastain, supra; Tigner, supra.

And aside from rank speculation about Esposito's mind-set and motives during the May 14, 2001 treatment, Prince has not pointed to any evidence that Esposito actually harbored animosity toward Prince or knew that such animosity would prevent him from providing proper chiropractic care. See Petzelt v. Tewes, 260 Ga. App. 802, 804 (1) ( 581 SE2d 345) (2003) ("[I]f a person consents to undergo a medical procedure, the physician cannot be liable for battery unless the consent was not freely obtained or was obtained by fraud."). (Punctuation omitted.)

"A misrepresentation is intended to deceive where there is intent that the representation be acted upon by the other party." Petzelt v. Tewes, 260 Ga.App. 802, 581 S.E.2d 345, 347 (2003). Proof of fraud is typically not susceptible of direct proof, and so circumstantial evidence must be used to establish fraudulent intent.

” Petzelt v. Tewes, 581 S.E.2d 345, 347 (Ga Ct. App. 2003).

” Id. at 201. “‘A misrepresentation is intended to deceive where there is intent that the representation be acted upon by the other party.'” Id. (quoting Petzelt v. Tewes, 581 S.E.2d 345, 347 (2003)). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that because “[p]roof of fraud is typically not susceptible of direct proof . . . circumstantial evidence must be used to establish fraudulent intent.”

Assuming that Bencini and D D had the requisite scienter in the production of the Financial Statements, the record contains no evidence that D D or Bencini intended to induce TSG or the Investor Plaintiffs to act or refrain from acting in reliance upon the Financial Statements. "A misrepresentation is intended to deceive where there is intent that the representation be acted upon by the other party." Petzelt v. Tewes, 260 Ga.App. 802, 805, 581 S.E.2d 345, 347 (2003). There is no evidence to support the claim that Bencini and D D knew that the Financial Statements would be used in connection with an offer to sell securities in TSG or that the Investor Plaintiffs would be solicited for investment capital.

to obtain the patient's signature on the consent form, thus vitiating the patient's consent. For example, in Petzelt v. Tewes, 581 S.E.2d 345, 347 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003), the plaintiff consented to a "denervation" procedure to alleviate pain in her back, based on the defendant physician's representation that the patient's orthopedic surgeon was "fully aware" of everything the defendant physician was doing. Id. at 346-347.

A claim for medical battery can be established if it is shown that the physician intentionally or recklessly misrepresented a material fact in order to obtain the patient's signature on the consent form, thus vitiating the patient's consent. For example, in Petzelt v. Tewes, 581 S.E.2d 345, 347 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003), the plaintiff consented to a "denervation" procedure to alleviate pain in her back, based on the defendant physician's representation that the patient's orthopedic surgeon was "fully aware" of everything the defendant physician was doing. In reality, the defendant physician had dictated notes indicating a "c.c."