For example, a valid nonconforming use of a property may arise when a property is used lawfully prior to the enactment of town zoning regulations. See, e.g., Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 482–83, 408 A.2d 243 (1979) ("[t]he lot and building in question" qualified as legally protected nonconforming uses because they were lawful and in existence prior to enactment of zoning regulations). Or, like in the present case, the zoning regulations could have permitted the use (e.g., by right or special permit), but a subsequent amendment to the regulations later made that permitted use nonconforming.

" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 176 Conn. 479, 483–84, 408 A.2d 243 (1979). As this court has noted, "[o]ur General Statutes recognize and protect this bedrock principle."

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 483–84, 408 A.2d 243 (1979). Our General Statutes recognize and protect this bedrock principle.

If Weyls still has vitality, the case would be dispositive because it deals with the same town, regulations, zone and tract of land at issue in the present case. The plaintiff argues, however, that Weyls has been implicitly overruled by the court in Petruzzi v. ZBA, 176 Conn. 479 (1979), which involved a plaintiff who sought a building permit to convert a church into a single-family detached home in a district zoned for such use. The building officer denied the permit for noncompliance with current setback, frontage and area requirements.

Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67, 85, 527 A.2d 230 (1987). If there has been no change in the permitted use, such as a residence or a church, and no change in setback requirements, the renovation to the interior of an existing structure is not a prohibited enlargement of the nonconformity. Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 483-84, 408 A.2d 243 (1979). The construction of a larger, single-family dwelling on a substandard lot with inadequate frontage to replace an existing dwelling on the lot, however, is an expansion of the nonconformity.

The court concluded that the board had erred in rescinding the plaintiff's building permit. Applying the reasoning of Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 408 A.2d 243 (1979), the court found that, since the Mead House was a preexisting legal nonconformity due to a variance for the setback regulation, the board was prohibited from applying the area limitation for accessory buildings to the structure. The court also concluded that the Mead House was a preexisting legal nonconformity insulated from subsequently enacted regulations because it was built prior to the enactment of the town's zoning regulations.

" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 483-84, 408 A.2d 243 (1979); see also Taylor v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 65 Conn.App. 687, 694, 783 A.2d 526 (2001). "It is a fundamental zoning precept in Connecticut . . . that zoning regulations cannot bar uses that existed when the regulations were adopted . . . It is readily apparent that the rule concerning the continuance of a nonconforming use protects the right of a user to continue the same use of the property as it existed before the date of the adoption of the zoning regulations."

Although not expressly characterized by the ZBA as such, the legal underpinning for this contention can only be construed in one of two ways: either (1) the Hinckleys have abandoned the old shed and established a new one, or (2) the Hinckleys have illegally added to or altered the shed such that it constitutes an illegal expansion of a nonconforming structure. It is not entirely clear whether the principle of "abandonment" applies to nonconforming buildings as opposed to nonconforming uses. Although "[i]t is recognized that the distinction between a nonconforming building or structure and a nonconforming use of land is genuine and may be critical"; Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 481 n. 2, 408 A.2d 243 (1979); there is no indication that the "abandonment" of a structure admits of a different analysis from the abandonment of a use. See R. Fuller, 9B Connecticut Practice Series: Land Use Law and Practice (3d Ed. 2007) § 52.1, p. 200 "[T]he term `nonconforming uses' is often used without consideration as to what aspect of the use of property is nonconforming, and in determining whether an activity is an expansion or change of a nonconforming use, the nature of the nonconformity is important . . . [such as] (4) nonconformity as to location of structure, i.e., it does not conform with one or more of the setback requirements."); cf. Fucci v. Planning Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 94 0356380 (November 4, 1996, Booth, J.) (18 Conn. L. Rptr. 77, 78).

The elimination of non-conformities is a recognized goal of zoning law. Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 483, 408 A.2d 243 (1979). It is also a principle recognized by the East Haddam Zoning Regulations, which provide, at Section 8, that:

The section also distinguishes between nonconforming lots and nonconforming structures. See also Petruzzi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 176 Conn. 479, 481 n. 2, 408 A.2d 243 (1979). Section 9-4.2A then concludes: "No new building or structure shall be erected except as provided herein.