Opinion
C.A. No. 02C-10-036.
Submitted May 28, 2004.
Decided July 21, 2004.
Beth D. Savitz, Esq., Hudson, Jones, Jaywork Fisher, Dover, Delaware.
John R. Grady, Esq., Grady Hampton, Dover, Delaware.
Counsel:
I have considered the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment should be rendered if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment may not be granted if the record indicates that a material fact is in dispute, or if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of the law to the circumstances. However, when the facts permit a reasonable person to draw but one inference, the question becomes one for decision as a matter of law.
Superior Court Civil Rule 56(c).
Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 659 A.2d 777, 780 (Del.Super., 1995) Figgs v. Bellevue Holding Co., 652 A.2d 1084, 1087 (Del.Super., 1994).
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 470 (Del. 1962).
Wooten v. Kiger, 226 A.2d 238 (Del., 1967).
The plaintiff contends that it is entitled to its commission because it produced a ready, willing and able buyer who met the terms of the listing agreement. The defendants contend, however, that the listing agreement was subject to certain verbal understandings which defeat the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff contends in response that these alleged verbal understandings did not exist and that they are ruled out by the integration clause in the listing agreement. The defendants also contend that the buyer's offer contained terms and conditions, such as those relating to date of settlement and sale free of leases, which were not agreeable to them. They contend that they were uncertain that they could comply with these terms. This contention is disputed by the plaintiff. Given these circumstances, I conclude that material facts relevant to the plaintiff's motion are in dispute or, at least, that it is desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of the law to the circumstances.
In support of their motion, the defendants make the contentions mentioned above and further contend that the plaintiff failed to comply with certain provisions of Maryland law pertaining to realtors. I am not persuaded at this stage of the proceeding, however, that alleged non-compliance with the cited Maryland statutes is a valid defense to the plaintiff's claim for a commission. The defendants also contend that they terminated the listing agreement before the buyer made his full-price offer. However, a dispute exists as to whether the alleged termination was wrongful. Under these circumstances, I conclude that the defendant's motion for summary judgment must also be denied.
Therefore, the cross-motions for summary judgment are both denied, without prejudice to any of the parties' contentions.